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THE WAR WITH NAZI GERMANY: THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE. By CYRIL FALLS. A GENERAL Officer of my acquaintance was recently-asked to write a series of articles on the present war, including the war at sea. Before dealing with the latter particular subject he betook himself to a department of the Admiralty from which news, and even doctrine, percolates. There he was received with traditional courtesy, which, however, turned to horrified amazement when he made his business known. " But are we to take it, Sir, that you are going to describe to the world the principles of British naval strategy and tactics ? " He came away ashamed of his own presumption. How shall I venture in where he feared to tread ? With much diffidence I shall attempt to do so, claiming only in support of my daring that I have studied the principles of naval warfare fairly closely and possibly know as much about them as most amateurs in that realm. I must own that in the course of the last few weeks I have felt no anxiety more acute than that concerning the fate of our cruisers should they encounter one of the German pocket - battleships. It seemed to me more than probable that the German warship, if attacked-- as all who know the Navy knew that she would be if opportunity offered--would sink one, two, and possibly even three cruisers. That would have constituted a serious moral as well as material reverse. The theory on which the " Admiral Graf Spee " and her sister - ships were constructed is interesting. In size they were scaled down to conform to the 10,000-ton limit of Article 190 of the Treaty of Versailles. But the German designers were men with brains, and they accomplished very much more than scaling down. These pocket - battleships, or exceptionally powerful armoured cruisers, were built in the hope that they would be able to escape from anything which they could not destroy. As such they were expected to prove ideal commerce-raiders. Their best speed is 26 knots, but steaming at a moderate rate they have an enormous range. Their major armament consists of six 11-inch guns in two turrets, and eight 59-inch guns, though of the latter only four can fire in either broadside. Still, though clever the designers may have been, they were not magicians. Something had to be sacrificed to pay for this remarkable combination of speed, cruising-range and hitting-power. The first sacrifice was in protection; for the armour is only four inches in thickness, and the deck only three inches over the vitals and less elsewhere. The second sacrifice was not intended. Their gunnery in peacetime was considered by observers to be rather inferior to the best German standards, and this was believed to be due to the vibration set up by the Diesel engines. I have been informed that when the big guns were firing at a considerable range the " spread " of the salvo fired by one of these ships was observed to be three times as great as the British Navy expected from guns of similar calibre. In the Battle of the River Plate, however, the German marksmanship was good, if inferior to the British. After the defeated " Admiral Graf Spee " had fled from our cruisers to take refuge in a neutral harbour, the Germans talked of a fight waged by one against three, and even some of our own people with little knowledge of guns have wondered whether the odds were not in our favour. It is easy to show that they were not, by a long chalk ; or, that if they were, it was only because of superior seamanship, gunnery, daring and probably also morale. You cannot count heads when assessing the fighting value of naval units unless weight of projectiles and range of guns are approximately equal. We are told that the fleet of such and such a small country consists of so many vessels--let us say, twenty-three. It sounds a lot, yet if the " Hood " or the " Dunkerque " were to encounter this fleet either of them would probably sink the whole of it without herself suffering loss or damage. The British cruisers which defeated the " Admiral Graf Spee " were not designed to take on anything in that class. Let us see how they compare with their victim. The " Exeter" mounts six 8-inch guns; the " Ajax " and " Achilles " each eight 6-inch guns. The weight of the projectile used in an 11-inch gun is something like seven times as great as that of a 6-inch and three times as great as that of an 8-inch, and the broadside of the German was over half as heavy again as that of the three cruisers combined. Without going into detail, it may be said that the pocket - battleship could completely outrange the cruisers, so that though the latter could employ their superior speed, at least four knots, for the purpose of manoeuvre, they could never reach their target without approaching within easy range of the big guns, to say nothing of having to encounter the fire of the " five-nines." It was only by taking fearful risks that they could ever hope to hit at all. Their tactics would obviously have to be what they, in fact, were, in the graphic words of the Uruguayan captain who witnessed the action--to worry their quarry as three terriers might worry a bull. Even this phrase is inadequate, because a bull's horns are short-range weapons. In fact, however, the battle did not begin on these lines. It is established that the "Exeter " bore the brunt of the combat alone for a period of some two hours and provided the opportunities of which the 6-inch-gun cruisers later took advantage. Her fight was magnificent, and so was her shooting. There was no question of her being ranked as a particularly good gunnery ship, for the simple reason that she was commissioning at home when war broke out, but her gunnery could not have been excelled. The battle, however, was won at least as much by tactics as by gunnery. For the full story we shall have to wait a little longer ; it may not, in fact, be worked out in all its detail until after the war. It has, however, been established that the " Ajax " (the flagship) and "Achilles " manoeuvred, in the words of the Naval Correspondent of The Times, like "frigates hanging on to ships of the line, firing into them at moments of advantage while escaping destruction by skill in manoeuvre." As a result of the combined action of the British ships the German was repeatedly holed, the gun-tower of her 5'9-inch guns on one side was overturned, and her fighting-tower was hit. She also suffered a fair number of casualties. But the damage done to the "Admiral Graf Spee " was not so great as that inflicted on her most formidable adversary, the " Exeter." Apart from the direct hits, the latter was riddled by fragments of shell which burst alongside. The steering-gear was damaged after the action had lasted just an hour, and for the remainder of the period during which she maintained it the captain conned the ship with a boat's compass and conveyed his orders through a chain of men to the after steering-wheel and the engine-room. By that time only one 8-inch gun remained in action, and it had to be fired by hand. Her casualties in personnel were higher than those of the " Admiral Graf Spee." To a triumph of gunnery and tactics we therefore have to add a triumph of morale. The Battle of the River Plate will take its place with the most glorious secondary actions fought by the British Navy. The final scenes present a picture which will always fill a melancholy page in the annals of the German Navy. The story of the marvellous secrets which had to be preserved at all cost must be taken with a grain of salt ; there was no reason why any secrets should have been discovered by us had the ship been interned for the duration of the war. The scuttling of the "Admiral Graf Spee " seems rather to have been a sort of pagan gesture, and as such possibly appears less ignominious in Nazi eyes than in ours. To each his own tradition. What has, however, struck neutral opinion so forcibly is the lack of confidence disclosed by this action. If the Germans hoped to win the war they could also hope to recover their fine ship when the war was over. The natural inference is that in no event did they expect to see her again. Meanwhile, a whole ocean has been cleared, at least temporarily ; for it has been proved that she was the only marauder at large in it. Whether the Americans are correct in their view that this fight proves the pocket - battleship to have been constructed on faulty principles is another matter. It may be so ; yet a ship of this type remains capable of defeating three cruisers of the types with which the Admiral Graf Spee was engaged unless they display seamanship, gunnery, skill and valour to match those of the " Exeter," the " Ajax " and the " Achilles." (Note picture in middle of page) THE GALLANT SHIP " EXETER," WHICH BORE THE BRUNT OF THE "ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE'S " FIRE, RETURNING IT SHOT FOR SHOT UNTIL ONLY ONE 8-IN. GUN COULD BE WORKED, AND THAT BY HAND. Five officers and fifty-six ratings of the cruiser " Exeter " lost their lives in the action with the "Admiral Graf Spee," and three officers and twenty ratings wounded. The ship's normal complement numbers 600. The " Exeter " bore the brunt of the early stages of the battle, gallantly returning the "Admiral Graf Spee's " fire, shot for shot, until only one 8-in. gun could be fired, and that by hand. The steering-gear became damaged : for 45 minutes Captain F. S. Bell conned the ship from the after-control position, using a boat's compass. Through a chain of ten sailors, orders were conveyed to the after-steering wheel and the engine-room, until the ship fell out of the action.