

train of petty annoyances leading eventually to an expensive law suit, and embittering years of life.

As it was, the Christian governed his conduct by the principles of the gospel. He submitted to the wrong and probably by submitting to it in the spirit which Christianity enjoins, converted the event into a blessing to himself, his family and his neighbour. The occurrence was forgiven, and in a few days forgotten; and the family lived years, side by side, in friendship, prosperity, and perfect peace. Is it not better to follow the advice God gives than to surrender ourselves to the dominion of our passions?—[J. S. C. Abbott.]

From the New York Com. Advertiser of May 19.

SUPREME COURT.

CASE OF ALEXANDER MCLEOD.

Our report yesterday, or rather sketch of the proceedings, was necessarily confined to the argument of Mr. Bradley, which was closed at a little after 12 o'clock. We have no report of his argument, but we have an *ex parte* of his argument. He was succeeded by the attorney general, Mr. Willis Hall, in an exceedingly able and cogent review of the law as applicable to the case, educed by numerous authorities. We find his argument excellently reported in the Tribune, from which paper we copy it as follows:

After Mr. Wood had concluded his argument, Hon. Willis Hall, attorney general, commenced by saying that the matter before the Court was strictly a matter of law. It was a Court of law, and he intended to argue the case strictly as a question of law. The defendant was considered with care, and the case rested on allegations to prove.

The prisoner stands here indicted for murder; he has pleaded not guilty. Notwithstanding this, a motion has been made that, without trial, of this issue, without any deposition of the indictment, the trial be discharged. There is no pretence of indemnity, but the offence is legally committed. Now, by the common law, it would be statute, both in this country and in England, an indictment must be dismissed either by a motion to quash, for prima facie informality, by a trial by the jury, or by a writ pro se petitio.

He asked the court for any other way to dispose of an indictment. The trial of the Court is a novelty—a man without precedent, except upon the trial, the first of the kind that had ever been made—and he tested the decision so far as it would be repeatable.

By the English law a writ of *ad hoc corpus* would be granted to him, for murder by the Court or Queen's Bench. However, the common law of that country and no one descended alike are proud, the 21st Charles II, Chap. II. He also referred to statutes especially excepting from the writ of *ad hoc corpus* cases of a criminal character. (See, Gen. III, Chap. 100.) If, therefore, he were being tried by the legal tribunals of his own country, he would not be allowed the privilege of appearing in court and not being tried.

Again, the provision is that the party may make affidavit or proofs, the state also, or the plaintiff, may make affidavit and counter proofs. In this case, after the indictment has been found, this court cannot investigate the matter, a part of the testimony on which the decision is to be based, is shut out of the law. Authorities were cited to illustrate this. If it be true, then, that this Court can decide behind the indictment, if they are shut out from part of the testimony offered to the grand jury, and if the same could not be heard after the indictment, it must end here, so far as the Court is concerned.

What now do the facts which have been laid before the Court in evidence present. There is a fierce excitement along our northern border; on both sides, the two nations are greatly engaged with each other; a bitter polemic is broken forth; many of the unscrupulous rebels have, in their country, and have excited the sympathies of our people in their behalf. They have again gone back to Navy Island—a locality out of our jurisdiction—some of our citizens have followed them. There were instances of violence on the Canadian side, and most recently the same time our Government was doing all it could to put a stop to all violations of the neutrality between this country and England. The letter of Mr. Rogers, too, shows that the crisis had most entirely dispersed.

Under these circumstances this invasion of our territory, and some of our citizens murdered. After this, the question, which had rested now for three years without a trial, (see *Gen. III, Chap. 100*)—was, what was to be done? The Court is charged with having committed the murder is found within our jurisdiction; he is arrested and brought before the magistrates, and proved by strong evidence to have been with the murderer. He is committed for trial. At the same time, too, every effort was made to procure his release, and to aid him in procuring a discharge; there was every disposition to enable him to take all possible advantage of the circumstances attending his arrest, and to secure his capture by the Caroline. The letter of Mr. Rogers, too, shows that the Court even tried to a master who goes largely to show the guilt or innocence of the party.

To illustrate the case: If an ambassador of any foreign government were to be arrested and committed on any charge, and he were brought into this Court by writ of *ad hoc corpus*, alleging his responsibility to our laws, the Court could only consider the facts which go to show this responsibility.

Again: if a man should kill another in self-defence, and should be found guilty, if a sheriff should be arrested for executing the sentence of law upon a condemned criminal, could either of these come into this Court and spread out all the circumstances, pleading the causes why they should not be legally liable, and then be discharged? Most certainly. This is all there is a question for the grand jury. It is to be observed, however, that the Court even tries to a master who goes largely to show the guilt or innocence of the party.

Let us consider now, what is in the effect of the recent arrival by Great Britain that she approaches and exerts her influence for the release of McLeod. This order can have effect only in one of two cases:

1. When we grant as a justification of the prisoner, that he should kill another in self-defence, and should be arrested for executing the sentence of law upon a condemned criminal, could either of these come into this Court and spread out all the circumstances, pleading the causes why they should not be legally liable, and then be discharged?

2. When the guilt of McLeod being admitted, the order is used as a protection to exonerate him, and take him away from subjection to our Courts, and to Great Britain.

In the first case, if the order is used as a justification of the prisoner, it is to be argued, for example, that the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment. The indictment charges that the prisoner did intentionally, instigated by the devil and out of his malice, killed the said Dufee, but he did not, and says that he did not, not at the instigation of the devil, in the discharge of his duty. It is then argued that the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment.

The attorney general is asked, whether the party becomes a source of war, if no punishment can be inflicted upon the offender, and will not be reported to us for trial.

Another ground which is assumed is, that the offence of the individual is merged in that of the nation. What is meant by merging a crime? Can crime be transferred?—Can the offence of the individual's heart— that which gave rise to the act itself, be transferred? If the individual were incompatible with the party, then he would be despatched, neither he nor his master could be punished.

The power to declare war, to conclude peace, and to do all things having relation to these incidents of sovereignty, is vested by the constitution, the Executive and in Congress. In support of this assertion Mr. Spencer read from the constitution of the U. S. section 8, article 1, section 10, same article, and section 2, article 2.

The power to make or declare war, as that of making peace, is vested by the constitution. The states are absolutely prohibited from any agency or participation in the exercise of these powers. Each department of the government must of necessity be kept to its own appropriate sphere of action, and so also of the states. The jurisdiction of the latter extends to all domestic concerns; that of the general government relates almost entirely to the foreign affairs of the country, or its relations with foreign countries.

In the first place, the attorney general is asked, whether the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment. This, then, part of the ground that he does not do, and that he is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment, is a very strong point in favor of the defense. The party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment, for the reason that it does not have a right to a trial, and that the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment.

The attorney general has said that the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment, and that he is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment, and that he is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment.

Secondly, the attorney general says, that the party is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment, and that he is not in actual or nominal control of the indictment.

Senior of this state should call out the militia of the state, and one of the soldiers should kill a citizen, for which he should be indicted and brought up for trial. What effect would an order from the Governor, certifying the facts and ordering his release, produce in this Court but annullment? And shall we then to an order from a foreign potentate, which from our own chief magistrate would be powerless?

We have thus considered the order of the British Minister for his release, in the only light in which I am confident the prisoner can be discharged by the analogy made still stronger this argument, applying the same principle to Mr. McLeod. On the question, then, of immunity by reason of the order of the English government he had nothing further to say, but that he had an order left in his pocket of discharge on his own man, and that this order is intended to protect him from the authority of our laws: this is a pertinent subject for decision in this Court; this are these inquiries we are to consider, viewing it in this light:

1. Is the order sufficiently authenticated by Mr. Fox's letter to Mr. Webster? The authenticity of the letter itself will not be contested, though the original would have been more satisfactory than a copy.

2. Did the order stand well with sufficient evidence to prove that it is valid?

3. Can the order of a foreign government protect a murderer from trial in this state?

As to the second inquiry:—The letter alludes to that the "transaction for which McLeod has been arrested, and is to be tried on his trial, was a transaction of a public character, planned and executed by persons fully empowered by her Majesty's colonial authorities?"

We find his argument excellently reported in the Tribune, from which paper we copy it as follows:

Afier Mr. Wood had concluded his argument, Hon. Willis Hall, attorney general, commenced by saying that the matter before the Court was strictly a matter of law. It was a Court of law, and he intended to argue the case strictly as a question of law. The defendant was considered with care, and the case rested on allegations to prove.

The prisoner stands here indicted for murder; he has pleaded not guilty. Notwithstanding this, a motion has been made that, without trial, of this issue, without any deposition of the indictment, the trial be discharged. There is no pretence of indemnity, but the offence is legally committed. Now, by the common law, it would be statute, both in this country and in England, an indictment must be dismissed either by a motion to quash, for prima facie informality, by a trial by the jury, or by a writ pro se petitio.

Many have suggested that the Court should direct the prosecuting officer to enter a *nolle prosequi*. As to the propriety of this Mr. Hall wished, in closing his argument, to offer one or two considerations.—This trial, he said, had arisen out of a gross violation of our territory; this is not even denied by the counsel for the prisoner. Now, this has always been spoken of by all commentators on law as the highest crime one nation can commit against another. This case had no exciting circumstances; it was an unwarrantable and unnecessary aggression.

The Canadian was private property, sailing under the American flag. Those who were aboard at the time of her destruction had been drawn there by no hostile intent, but by curiosity. England had taken the ground that Canada the state of New York, after the Government of the United States, justly offered to this country upon its territory, and did not take a specific action to oppose it. In this case, however, the trial was done rashly, unthinkingly, all would have been well; but now that she has avowed it as her own, it comes to us to consider, whether we too hastily obey the commands she lays upon us.

Suppose that the order was justifiable, valid, and sufficient, to protect the party; it still does not embrace the act charged in the indictment. The men in the boat were asleep, unarmed, suspicious of danger; there was no resistance.

Did the safety of the province require that these men, who had given no offence and who meditated none, should thus be murdered in cold blood? Was it necessary that the British soldiers should search the warehouse at Schleswig, with torches, for more victims? With such facts as these before the Court, an order to discontinue should not be rashly resolved upon.

In a most eloquent eloquence, Mr. Hall went on to say that never, until we learn rigidly, uncompromisingly, to protect the lives of our citizens, with the name of an American to be protected as prisoners of war—not to be guarded by the laws of war. In the Roman Republic, long before we were entitled to the privileges of war; if a civilian volunteer, he cannot be compelled to march in an army. Now McLeod was a volunteer; all that was required of him was to march in an army, and to be a soldier.

Before proceeding to the consideration of the third and main inquiry, I wish to answer some of the propositions advanced by the opposing counsel.

And, first, he says that whatever a subject does by order of his sovereign he cannot be personally held responsible for. This, at best, is truly so far, as his own sovereign is concerned. The principle, moreover, has no application to the case of McLeod, because it has been proved that he was a volunteer.

Vattel says that, even in actual war, those not belonging to the regular army are not to be protected as prisoners of war—not to be guarded by the laws of war. In the Roman Republic, long before we were entitled to the privileges of war; if a civilian volunteer, he cannot be compelled to march in an army.

Suppose that the principle which will cover this case.

In the second place, the opposing counsel say that the subject cannot look to see whether another sovereign will be injured by his obedience to his own. Mr. Hall stated that the laws of nations, as he should presently show, were a part of the common law; every individual is bound by them, and no one is allowed to plead ignorance of them. If the prisoner, then, has committed murder—an offence against the common law, of which the law of nations is part—then can he plead that he is allowed to do the same thing as another sovereign may have on another's territory. The principle is fallacious, and not of universal application.

Mr. Hall then proceeded to discuss the third general inquiry—whether the order of a foreign government can shield a murderer from trial in this state.

If so, it must have this binding effect, either by acting directly on this court, or by some general law binding upon the court. As to the first, my pretence will be made that an order issued from part of the testimony offered to the grand jury, and if the same could not be heard after the indictment, it must end here, so far as the Court is concerned.

Again, the provision is that the party may make affidavit or proofs, the state also, or the plaintiff, may make affidavit and counter proofs. In this case, after the indictment has been found, this court cannot investigate the matter, a part of the testimony on which the decision is to be based, is shut out of the law. Authorities were cited to illustrate this. If it be true, then, that this Court can decide behind the indictment, if they are shut out from part of the testimony offered to the grand jury, and if the same could not be heard after the indictment, it must end here, so far as the Court is concerned.

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