

has struck the sun's face, and, falling to pieces, has pitched headlong, and now lies floating long and large, full many a rood: and will be invisible as soon as it becomes red hot: and being of a different substance from that of the sun, will appear brighter, till the substances are amalgamated. Thus accounts he for the sun's bright as well as dark spots. He doubts the reality of any spot, and attributes the appearance to an epidemic disorder in men's eyes. I—cannot tell what it is—no U.

### Highly interesting to the Public.

#### The Black Spot Explained!!

The President of the Philological Speculative-Epicurean-Casco Pumpkin Club, having read, with astonishment, the multiplicity of vain attempts to account for the spot observed, a few weeks since, in the disk of the Sun; and unwilling that the community should be duped by the astronomical swifcers, who have filled almost every news-paper on the continent, with their trifles, ordered a special meeting of the Club. They convened, at the Club room, on the fifteenth day of the fifth month, and the fifth of the full moon, Anno Domini MDCCLXXVI, precisely at eight o'clock P. M. And after a lengthy and very interesting discussion, determined, that, the present season in the region of the Sun, is uncommonly fruitful; and that the PHENOMENON, which has excited so much astonishment, and caused the destruction of a vast quantity of quills, ink and paper, is a large PUMPKIN; that when the part of the Sun, on which it grows, is nearest the earth, it is suspended by its vine, which is of sufficient length to reach below the circumambient atmosphere of "this mundane sphere."—It will be visible every revolution of the Sun, until it is gathered, which will probably, be a few weeks previous to their next Thanksgiving. The Club have no doubt that Doctor Herschel has published a similar account in England; and are aware that many envious and ill disposed persons, after having seen the Doctor's statement will accuse them of plagiarism. But they aver most solemnly, that they have seen nothing from the learned Doctor on the subject.

By Order,

PHILANDER SARCASM,

S. P. S. E. C. P. C.

Club Room, 15th May, 1816.

Portland Paper.

#### RED AND YELLOW SNOW.

Something as astonishing as Spots in the Sun.

Under the head of Terraeno, in Italy, 21st Dec. we read as follows:—"There has fallen during six hours, in our city and its environs, a greater quantity of snow than has been known in the memory of man. To this phenomenon there is added another, even more astonishing, which is, that the snow is red and yellow. Religious processions have been made to appease the HEAVENS. People believe that something extraordinary has taken place in the air. It is to be hoped our philosophers may account for this phenomenon. Mr. professor Sigagnoni, a Jesuit, distinguished by the intendant of the province, to make experiments upon the snow, a bout which the people are yet very much alarmed."

#### FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

##### Speech of Lord Castlereagh.

In the British House of Commons, Feb. 19, on moving an address to the Prince Regent, in approbation of the late treaties entered into by the British Government, with France and the Allied Powers.

After some introductory remarks, principally upon the form of the vote which he was about to propose, his lordship proceeded.

From the very nature of the war, and the character of the enemy with whom they had to contend, the contest was one of that description in which all restricted efforts would have been equally unwise, whether with respect to a sound policy or to economy. Many hon. gentlemen had formed an erroneous opinion of that contest, as if the mass of the French nation were embarked in the cause of Bonaparte; but though that view was erroneous, one general and unanimous feeling pervaded Europe, that it would prove one of the most arduous contests in which the alliance had ever engaged. Whatever doubts existed as to the desperate character of the struggle, they only constituted an additional reason why the government, in any arrangements it might make for carrying on the war, should make them upon the largest and most comprehensive scale. The country certainly was not in a condition to be able to afford the expenses of a protracted war; and therefore it became the wish of government to make the confederacy as comprehensive as possible, not only with respect to the powers included in it, but as to the efforts which each were like-

ly to bring into the field. With that view of the contest, it would have been most unwise to have starved it in any of its parts, or to have abstained from throwing into the alliance all that vigor and energy, and exertion, which the liberality of the house had enabled ministers to produce. The house would see, upon examining the great mass of treaties before it, the extent to which all Europe combined. With the exception of Sweden, who was by no means indisposed to unite with the other powers, but who was prevented from so doing by motives of economy, which the other members of the alliance allowed to be a sufficient ground of exemption, there was not a single power on the east of France who was not comprehended in the general league. On the other side of France, also, although Portugal was prevented from immediately joining in alliance, on account of the distance of the Prince Regent from his dominions, there was no power except Spain who was not bound up in that confederacy. The reason why the name of that power was not found affixed to the treaty of the 25th of March (respecting which a question had been asked by an honorable member on a preceding evening,) was because she objected to the form of that instrument, and from a point of etiquette. Not being one of the four principal powers who signed the declaration of the 12th March she declined, from a dignity of feeling which perhaps ought not to have operated at that moment, to become an acceding party to the treaty of the 25th of March. But, at the same time, she readily made an offer of her assistance to the full extent of her means.

With respect to the amount of subsidies which had been paid, he trusted government had pursued that course of policy, which essentially contributed to the consolidation of that vast force which was arrayed against France. The general mass of the subsidies paid to the four great Powers, as well as to those who afterwards acceded to the alliance, amounted originally to five millions. We on our part, stipulated to bring into the field 150,000 men, or to pay an equivalent in money equal to the amount of force not actually supplied. During the course of the war, we have kept up, including the Hanoverians and the corps in Italy and Flanders, between eighty and ninety thousand, for a proportion of troops amounting to about sixty thousand men. The powers of Europe were agreed in opinion that some had better be employed towards the general system of alliance, by subsidizing all the minor powers. The King of the Netherlands received no subsidy, for reasons which were sufficiently obvious, nor did the troops of Switzerland receive any, because they were not actively employed against France. The general rate of subsidy was upon the calculation of eleven pounds per man. The fourth of the whole subsidies was saved, and the gross amount of them did not exceed six millions. The House had seen what was the effect of that policy.—It had contributed to unite and consolidate a confederacy so immense, that no extent of disaster could have altered the ultimate issue of the campaign, though certainly it might have been protracted. Even if the battle of Waterloo had been as fatal and disastrous to the Allied troops, as it proved to the army of France, yet the means which were brought into active operation were so prodigious and so powerful, that the final result of the contest would unquestionably have been the same. It was a general impression felt by every member of the alliance, that no delay should take place which might be avoided. Delay would have given to the character of the war a feature of aggravation and difficulty, which was most anxiously to be deprecated. It was in fact, of the last importance, not only that the success should be early, and that it should be decisive, but that Europe in the prosecution of that great cause, which was the cause of Europe against usurpation, and an attempt to renew military despotism, should act with that strength and unity which might undecide the French nation upon a point in which their national vanity was most likely to delude them. Whatever might have been the success of the campaign, if they could flatter themselves that it arose out of any particular concurrence of circumstances, and not from the magnitude and controlling force of the Powers assembled against them, there would still have existed a disposition, connected with that national pride which belongs to them, to indulge in those military feelings which never can be compatible with the general repose of Europe. But certainly the character of the battle of Waterloo, together with the arrangements subsequent upon that battle, would leave no ground to question what were the motives that brought the whole of Europe against them. It was of great importance to teach France that lesson of wisdom, and there was no Frenchman who could now have a doubt upon the subject. In the last campaign, at the battle of Waterloo,

they had an opportunity of trying their military in its highest perfection, against that of England and Prussia, assisted by the troops of some of the minor states. There never was an army which took the field more ample in all the resources and equipments which could give vigor and efficiency here never was an army which went to battle with a more desperate determination to conquer or to die, than that which Bonaparte led to the frontiers of the Netherlands; and yet he apprehended, there was no instance in the annals of war (speaking it without any derogation from the prowess or skill displayed by the French on that memorable day,) that could be compared to the manner in which the army of the Duke of Wellington, aided by that of Prince Blucher defeated that army, with such a character of success as could not be found in the most brilliant victories upon record, in any age or country.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!)—He should be glad to know what single victory ever led to results so vast and important in a political and military point of view as the battle of Waterloo.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!)—The enemy, by that one victory, were absolutely precluded from again appearing in the field, while the victors approached in a triumphant march of fourteen days to the capital of the enemy, which they had reduced to submission.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!)—That battle decided the character of the war, and the fate of the Government, and compelled the individual, by whose lawless aggression it had been excited, to seek a refuge from destruction in the very country which he had designed to ruin. He did not think that he indulged in any excess of national exultation, when he thus described the unparalleled character of the battle of Waterloo.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!)

Having stated those grounds of the policy upon which his Majesty's government proceeded, he trusted the House would feel upon that branch of the question little or no difficulty in coming to such an opinion, as would enable them to go to the foot of the throne with an unanimous expression of sentiment.—There never perhaps, existed an instance of a confederacy to such an extent of military strength combined with so much military order. It appeared, from the circumstance of a return which was made of the effective force, in consequence of an arrangement made with the French government, who were to furnish the necessary equipments and clothing, that there was actually an addition of 100,000 men concentrated within the territory of France, after the battle of Waterloo, amounting to 1,240,000 men. He could assure the House that the numbers were not overrated, for the returns were most scrupulously checked by the Duke of Wellington, who was appointed to conduct the arrangements in question. In addition, however, to that force there was also in movement against France different corps of large magnitude. There were 100,000 Austrians marching towards the Rhine, and 150,000 Russians, the head of which column was already advanced beyond the Elbe in Franconia. There was a point to which he wished to allude, while mentioning the co-operation of the latter power; and he was the more bound to mention it, in honor of that power, because there seemed to exist a disposition on the part of this country to view its general character and proceedings with jealousy. For his own part he certainly saw nothing which could justify that jealousy; on the contrary, in some points of policy which were almost cardinal in the system of Russia, he had observed a disposition to consult and promote the interest of Great Britain.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!) The conduct of Russia, with regard to the Ionian Islands, was an instance of that disposition which he had mentioned. He could not indeed but consider it as an unfair degree of jealousy which was attached to that power, because of its vast resources, its numerous population, and its extensive territory, as if therefore it was necessarily disposed to play a game of ambition, which threatened the permanent interests and security of Europe.—(Hear! Hear! Hear!) It became him, however, to pay a fair tribute of acknowledgment to the eminent services which it performed towards promoting the general objects of the confederacy. By the stipulations of the treaty of the 25th of March, she was under no farther obligation than that of bringing into the field 150,000 men, a number which she in the first instance increased, and ultimately augmented to not less than 250,000. The Duke of Wellington saw 150,000 Russians reviewed in the plains of Vertus, all under arms; and his Grace declared that he had never seen an army better equipped, more perfect in discipline, or exhibiting altogether a more martial and soldier-like appearance.—(Hear, hear, hear.)—It was his duty to state that that increased and most important force was brought into active service by the Emperor of Russia, without even an attempt on the part of this country or that of his Imperial Majesty, to establish any pecuniary negotiation. He had actually put 100,000 men in motion

and they were considerably on the advance towards the French frontier before any arrangements were made to give him that subsidiary assistance which had already been bestowed upon the lower of the minor powers embarked in the general confederacy. He must say, therefore, that it was not good policy to anticipate imaginary dangers from the military strength and resources of Russia when they had hitherto been employed only in the public cause of Europe. It was not wise to provoke the suspicion of that Power by such imputations upon its views.—(Hear)

With respect to the combined efforts made by all the members of the alliance, he should not overstate them when he said, that if the war had continued two months longer there would have been a million and a half of soldiers in France to carry on the contest. So large a host, composed of the military of various nations, might be supposed to have a tendency to produce those evils inseparably attendant upon the movements of hostile armies; but it was not among the least of the objects which occupied the attention of the allied sovereigns to introduce into their corps a strict and rigorous discipline, which might restrain all excesses. It was impossible perhaps to do that in the early stage of the transaction, in such a way as should prevent all just grounds of complaint in the districts where they happen to be; but even in those districts the evils complained of arose principally from the circumstance that the peasantry were alarmed at their approach, and did not remain in their houses to administer those supplies which were required. After some time, however, a degree of order was introduced, no less creditable to the armies themselves than to the civilized times in which we live. There was no instance in history of 10 or 11 hundred thousand men being thrown into a country as they were into France, living at the expense of that country, and yet without any marked instance of indiscipline occurring; on the contrary, though there existed many powerful feelings of resentment in some of the troops arising out of the circumstances under which the spoliation and subjugations of France throughout Europe had been carried on, a general spirit of benevolence and clemency animated the whole confederacy towards their vanquished enemy.—Not, however, to detain the House longer with that subject, pointedly to that particular point on which he apprehended, whatever difference of opinion might arise, it would be found principally to turn. In advertent to the line of policy which was pursued, it was necessary, he should observe, that a great distinction existed between the peace of the preceding year, and that which was afterwards concluded. For his own part, he would never forget the generous and disinterested conduct of the allies towards France in the year 1814, though, perhaps, if looked at in conjunction with the events that afterwards occurred, it might be wished that it had never been adopted. But what human transaction would bear to be so considered, or would endure the application of after occurrences in determining its abstract wisdom or prudence? (Hear, hear.) If the allies, when they conquered the peace of 1814, when the French nation seemed ready to leap into their arms, and into the arms of their legitimate king; when only one strong and electric feeling appeared to be entertained throughout the whole country, a feeling of joy and gratitude at being delivered from their tyrant; if at that moment they had refused to meet the general enthusiasm of the nation, and pursued a stern and angry policy; if they had carried on the war with the determination of destroying Bonaparte and his adherents, instead of accepting his submission and permitting his departure, he was confident they would have been accused of interested and narrow views of policy, and of having clouded that horizon which looked so calm and beautiful to all who observed it. It was, on the contrary, and always ought to be, the chief policy of a great confederacy to act upon large and liberal principles in every part of its career, and upon those principles, in the most extensive sense of the word the confederacy of last year unquestionably acted. If indeed every member composing that confederacy had not so acted, the very elements of which the confederacy consisted were of such a character, that hardly any attempt at violence, or any effort at spoliation, could have been made which would not have found, in the principles that bound them altogether, its own corrective and remedy. It was a confederacy formed to resist oppression, and not to inflict it. That was its true and legitimate character, and never was its character shown in a more imposing point of view than in the campaign of 1814.

After such a war as was then waged against France, they retired from her territory without claiming any other tribute or reward than that peace which appeared to leave France more happy, and Eu-

rope more secure than they had been for a long series of years. If the allies had pursued a more doubtful course of policy, if they had adopted towards France or Bonaparte a course of measures partaking of more severity and rigour, perhaps the consequence would have been to involve that country and the confederates in a protracted and intestine warfare. It was obvious however, that whatever motives of wisdom or discretion dictated that forbearance and generosity in 1814, it would have been childishness in the extreme, if at the close of the last campaign, they had indulged in the same feelings to the same extent, and not have founded the peace upon fundamental principles, more calculated to correct any new mischiefs that might arise. In examining that question in a diplomatic point of view, he wished first (assuming it as a wise and necessary plan to adopt some principal precautions, because it had been contended by an honorable and learned gentleman on a former evening, that we had no right to form any system of precautionary measures that interfered with the internal affairs of France, a position which he should argue afterwards,) to examine the two modes in which the principles could be applied.—First, the general principal and the general ground of political necessity, upon which interference could be justified; and secondly, a more partial view of the particular situation in which the allies stood with respect to France. He was the more anxious to meet that branch of the discussion fairly, because it was one which had been much pressed by the honorable gentlemen on the other side of the House.

A reference had been made on a former evening to a letter written by Lord Clancarty, from a single sentence of which it was attempted to be deduced, that we entered upon the late war for the single and exclusive object of deposing Bonaparte, and that provided he did not resign, it would be a matter of perfect indifference to us who was at the head of the French government. He apprehended, however, if the honorable and learned gentlemen, who referred to that dispatch of Lord Clancarty, had read the sentence which he quoted in connection with the next sentence, he would have found the principal distinctly avowed, that though we never declared the object of the war to be for the purpose of imposing on France any form of government, or that the restoration of the Bourbon family prepared to treat for peace; yet other views entered into our calculations, if they could be accomplished by just and lawful means. We certainly objected to Bonaparte as the sovereign of France; but did it therefore follow, that we had no choice as to who might be sovereign, or that we were so blind as not to prefer the establishment of a government in the person of that individual with whom relations of amity could be most securely maintained, to the erection of any other government, at the head of which perhaps might be placed a person growing out of that military system, to abate the nuisance of which, have been the primary objects of the alliance? He denied that there was any thing in the letter of Lord Clancarty which gave even a shadow of authority for such a construction to be put upon it, and he would refer the House to the declaration made by his Majesty's government in the ratification of the treaty of the 25th of March. Although it was declared in that treaty, that the deposition of Bonaparte, and the exclusion of his dynasty were the specific objects of the confederacy and it was admitted that the restoration of the legitimate Sovereign, Louis XVIII, was a point most desirable to be accomplished by any justifiable means, we guarded expressly against being understood as pledged to bring about that restoration. He begged the House would distinctly understand the grounds upon which that declaration went.

(To be continued.)

LONDON, March 9.

Such is the scarcity of work, that hands are employed on the Plymouth dock lines at 9s a week, and great numbers cannot get engaged even at this miserable pittance.

March 17—Letters from Kensington and Berlin announce the death of the distinguished commander Count Bulow, within a few weeks after he had retired from the army. He was in the 61st year of his age, and died of an inflammation in the liver.

Paris, March 20.

One of the Dutch East India ships has foundered—1,100 persons drowned. The Spanish Refugees at Bayonne have been ordered to quit that city within a week, to retire either to Gax or to return to Spain.

We have a report from London that Lord Liverpool has resigned.

It is said that Prince Blucher is at present unfortunately afflicted with a morbid derangement.