

ern assurances of a large portion of them to remain neutral; even the Ottawa chiefs from Arbocrotch who formed the delegation at Washington the last Summer, in whose friendship I know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast number of chiefs who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Manpolt, Logan, Walk-in-the-water, Splitlog, &c. are considered the principals.—This numerous assemblage of Savages, under the entire influence and direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the only communication which I had with my country. This communication had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army, which I marched to the frontier of the river Detroit. The body of the Lake being commanded by the British armed *ships* and the shores and rivers by gun boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water. On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on pack horses—all its operations were successful until its arrival at Detroit, and in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all opposition seemed to fall before it. One month it remained in possession of this country, & it was fed from its resources. In different directions, detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the province, and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which appeared to be taking place—the militia from Amherstburg daily defeating, and the whole country, under the controul of the army was asking for protection. The Indians in general at first appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the contest. The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not a single cannon or mortar was on wheel suitable to carry before that place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon, to make a break in the first instance. The council I called was of opinion it was not. The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was not until the 7th of August that two 24 pounders, and three howitzers were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the enterprise. While the operations of the army were delayed by these operations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had arrived at Amherstburg under the command of Colonel Proctor. The desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcement that came by water, I received information of a very considerable force under the command of Maj. Chambers, on the river Le Trench, with four field pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently destined for Amherstburg; and in addition to this combination, and increase of force, contrary to all my expectations, Wyandots, Chippewas, Otta-

was, Pottawatamies, Munsees, Delawareas, &c, with whom I had the most friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg and accepted the tomahawk and scalping knife. There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they were sent to the river Herron, Brownstown and Maguago to intercept my communication. To open this communication, I detached Major Vanhorne of the Ohio volunteers with two hundred men to proceed as far as the River Raisin, under an expectation he would meet Capt. Brush with one hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity of provision for the army.—An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown, and Maj. Vanhorne's detachment defeated and returned to camp without effecting the object of the expedition.

In my letter of the 7th inst. you have the particulars of that transaction with a return of killed and wounded. Under this sudden and unexpected change of things, and having received an express from General Hall, commanding on the Niagara river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of any co-operation from that quarter, and that two senior officers of the artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pass the Turkey river and River Aux Cannard, with the 24 pounders, and that they could not be transported by water, as the Queen-Charlotté, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the river Aux Cannard; and as it appeared necessary to open the communication to the river Raisin and the Miami, I found myself compelled to suspend the operations against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit. Fully intending at that time, after the communication was opened to recross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of three hundred men. On the evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th inst. the army, excepting the garrison of 250 infantry, a corps of artillery, all under the command of Major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river, and encamped at Detroit. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I depended, a detachment of six hundred men, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller, was immediately ordered. —For a particular account of the proceedings of this detachment and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago, which reflects the highest honor on the American arms, I refer you to my letter of the 13th August, instant, a duplicate of which is enclosed, marked G. Nothing however but honor was acquired by the victory; and it is a painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could only open the communication, as far as the point of their bayonets extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very severe storm of rain, rendered their return to

camp indispensably necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small detachment, and the provisions being still at the Raisin, & in a situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th inst. in the evening, I permitted Colonels M'Arthur and Cais to select from their regiment 400 of their most effective men, and proceed an upper route through the woods which I had sent an express to Captain Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the River Raisin to accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting on the defensive becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching Colonels M'Arthur and Cais on the 11th instant, evacuated and destroyed the fort on the opposite bank. On the 13th instant, in the evening General Brock arrived at Amherstburg about the hour Colonels M'Arthur and Cais marched, of which that time I had received no information. On the 15th I received a summons from him to surrender fort Detroit, of which the paper marked A. is a copy. My answer is marked B. At this time I had received no information from Colonels M'Arthur and Cais. An express was immediately sent strongly escorted with orders for them to return. On the 15th, as soon as General Brock received my letter, his batteries opened upon the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the evening all the British ships of war came nearly, as far up the river as Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At daylight on the 16th (at which time I had received no information from Colonels M'Arthur and Cais, my expresses, sent the evening before, and in the night, having been prevented from passing the numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade recommenced, and in a short time I received information that the British army and Indians, were landing below the Spring Wells, under the cover of their ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit, did not exceed 800 men. Being new troops, and unaccustomed to a camp life; having performed a laborious march; having been engaged in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts necessary for their situation, are the general causes by which the strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled with women, children and the old and decrepid people of the town and country; they were unsafe in the town, as it was entirely open and exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it, there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first instance the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries; towards the close, it was directed against the fort alone, and almost every shot and shell had their effect.

It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect the whole force in the fort; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not have carried into the field more than 600 men, and left any adequate force in the fort.

There were landed at that time of the enemy, a regular force of much more than that number, and twice the number of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force, I did not think it expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantages, because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. In addition to this, Colonels M'Arthur and Cais would have been in a most hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have dared to adopt it, I well knew the high responsibility of the measure, and I take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty and a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then joined the British force were numerous beyond any former example. Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence than these savages have exhibited. A large proportion of the brave and gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been extended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the necessary supplies of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing and comforts for the sick, on pack horses, through the wilderness of 200 miles filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths, could have supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern nations of Indians; but against the united strength of U. Canada, whose population consists of more than twenty times the number contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the regular forces in the province, and the wealth and influence, of the North West and other trading establishments among the Indians, which have in their employment and under their entire controul more than 2000 white men. — Before I close this dispatch it is a duty I owe my respectable associates in command, Colonels M'Arthur, Findley, Cais, and Lieutenant Colonel Miller, to express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner they have performed their respective duties. If aught has taken place during the campaign, which is honorable to the army those officers are entitled to a large share of it. If the last act should be disapproved, no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise to express my obligations to General Taylor, who has performed the duty of Quartermaster General, for his great exertions in procuring every thing in his department which was possible to furnish for convenience of the army; likewise to Brigade Major Jesson for the correct and punctual manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally for their exertion, and the zeal they have manifested for the public interest. The death of Dr. Potter soon after