

administration. A war begun upon principles so outrageous to public opinions, to the feelings and interests of this people, can be supported only by the violence which destroys the freedom of speech, & endangers the liberty of the citizen. But while our Chamber is not yet encompassed by a standing army, and the writ of habeas corpus is not suspended, we will lift up a warning voice to our constituents, and apprise them of their danger.

When amidst the peaceful scenes in which for thirty years you have been accustomed to repose, you are made to realize that war exists; when you find that to supply the exhausted Treasury, paper money has been issued; and that direct and burdensome taxes must be imposed upon your lands and your occupations, while the means of providing for their payment are diminished: we feel with what inquisitive anxiety you will look around you for the causes of your tribulation. No invasion of our country has been threatened. No enemy was near. No enterprise upon our independence had been undertaken. Neither treason, insurrection, nor resistance to the execution of the laws, were to be apprehended: Your commercial rights it is true have been exposed to violation by the belligerent nations, and injuries have been sustained, that were entitled to redress. But though the measure of injury cannot affect the right of reparation; it ought not to be disregarded by a wise nation in its attempt to procure atonement, by a resort to the last extremity.

Without stopping upon this most solemn occasion, to notice the insinuations and assertions so lavishly made, of a plot to dismember the Union, by the employment of secret emissaries, and the attempts to excite Indian hostilities, insinuations and assertions wholly unsupported by proof, and which furnish conclusive evidence of a want of more important reasons; we may consider the causes assigned by Government for this appeal to arms, to be, in substance,

First. The impressment of American seamen.

Secondly. The principles of blockade, imputed to the British Government, by which ports not actually invested may be considered as subject to blockade.

Thirdly, and principally. The Orders in Council.

In regard to the impressment of our seamen, the British Government have at no period pretended to the right of taking them, knowing them to be such. They claim the right of visiting neutral ships in search of their own subjects; & in the exercise of it, abuses, though to a much less extent than the people have been led to believe, have been practiced. But the conclusive remarks upon this subject is, that Mr. Monroe, now Secretary of State, and Mr. Pinkney, the present Attorney General, had made an arrangement with the British Government, for the protection of our seamen, which in their judgment would have been perfectly competent to that object. But this arrangement, President Jefferson, evidently and fatally determined to preserve every source of irritation, refused to confirm. Since that period the British Government has always professed a willingness to enter upon new ar-

rangements, their Minister has lately explicitly offered to obtain the restoration of every American seaman, upon being furnished with a list of them. We cannot but add, that the Senate of this Commonwealth has refused to concur with the House in the means of procuring from every town a list of their impressed citizens, the number of which we have reason to believe would appear quite inconsiderable in comparison with the exaggerated allegations of our administration, as well as with those who by this act of their own Government, are now exposed to capture and confinement in prison ships.

Upon the question of constructive blockades, separate from the Orders in Council, which rest on special circumstances, there can be no pretence for a controversy, involving the necessity of War. The British Government has declared in "official communications," that to constitute a blockade, "particular ports must be actually invested and previous warning given to vessels bound to them not to enter." To this definition it is understood, that the American Government assents. But it is alleged that G. Britain violates her professed limitation of this right of blockade, by her Orders in Council, which are in effect, a constructive blockade of France, and her dependencies.

It is far from the disposition of your Representatives to investigate the reasons advanced by G. Britain in defence of this measure, which her present administration consider essential to the maintenance of her independence. But we may confidently appeal to your good sense, for the confirmation of the solemn truth, that war against G. Britain alone, at the moment she declares her Orders in Council repealed, whenever a revocation of the French decrees shall have effect, is a measure stamped with partiality and injustice. By the operation of these orders our commerce is excluded from the ports of France and her dependencies. But were they repealed, the municipal regulations, heavy duties and other multiplied embarrassments in those ports, would be obstacles to that commerce, not less effectual than the British edicts. Thus to obtain the right to traffick with France, which would not be worth pursuing, we renounce a participation in a lucrative commerce with the rest of the world. To indemnify the merchant for his partial losses, his whole property is exposed to capture. To secure retribution for occasional depredations, and individual outrage upon solitary vessels by British cruizers, the entire navigation of the country and your brave seamen will fall a prey to their fleets, which cover the ocean.

This cursory view of the alleged causes of hostility, compared with your own observation, and recollection of the course of events, will enable you to judge not only of the sincerity of the administration, but of the solidity of their motives. We beg you also to recollect that the French Decrees, while they were much more outrageous in principle, were long anterior in time, and therefore first demanded resistance from our Government, and that it appears by public documents, that the Orders in Council would have been revoked, had not our administration

thought proper to connect the revocation with a claim for the relinquishment of principles of blockade which are now recognized as conformable to the Law of Nations. From these considerations we are constrained by a sense of duty to express our fears and persuasion, that the deplorable event which has now come to pass, is attributable to other causes. The most prominent of these is the embarrassment arising from the precipitate declaration of the President of the U. States, that the French Decrees, which violated our commercial rights, were repealed.— This assurance has been contradicted by a series of events and circumstances which leave no room for doubt. By the sinking and burning of our vessels on the high seas; by the formal declaration of the French Government enforcing and amplifying those decrees; and finally by the language of the late Presidential Message to Congress, which, while it still asserts the repeal of those decrees, explicitly admits, that since the period of such pretended repeal, "her Government has authorized illegal captures by its privateers and public ships, and that other outrages have been practiced on our vessels and our citizens; and that no indemnity has been provided or pledged for French depredations on the property of our citizens." It is thus manifest, that the mere revocation of those decrees is an insult to common sense. Yet to disguise the imposition practiced upon our Executive, to gratify its wounded pride, and evade the retraction of error, we are called upon to hand all that is dear to a nation.

Another and more remote cause of this war, we are compelled to refer to a disposition in many, whose influence predominates in our national councils, to aggrandize the Southern and Western States at the expence of the Eastern section of the Union. It is unavailingly true, that the partial and local interests of the people of the different states might, by a spirit of accommodation, be so blended and reconciled as to produce a great and harmonious whole, capable of securing the highest degree of national felicity and strength. But we cannot disguise our conviction, that a system coeval with the formation of our Constitution was digested and has been unceasingly pursued to create and secure a preponderance of weight and power over the commercial States. Whatever tends to check the growth of the navigating interest, & prevent the accumulation of wealth in those states; whatever discourages the increase of their population and encourages emigration from them; whatever will contribute to the extension of territory in the Southern and Western region, by conquest or otherwise, will materially contribute to the attainment of that object. The war now commenced is adapted to produce these effects.

The first result will be a wide and wasteful sweep of our vessels by capture. The shipping of Massachusetts is her main lifeline. The loss of it is irremediable, as it constitutes capital. But to a southern planter, this is at most a temporary evil, as foreign bottoms will carry his crops to market. By the embarrassments and losses thus attendant upon commerce, it is the expectation of some politicians,

it will be deemed unworthy of protection and cease to be reproducible, and that the attention of men will be diverted from commercial pursuits, and their emigration promoted to countries acquired or intended to be acquired by conquest or purchase; which form no part of the original territory of the United States and were not included in our national compact.

Another cause of the present war must be referred to a spirit of jealousy, and competition with Great Britain, to a mistaken belief that she would yield to the pressure of the continental system established by the tyrant of Europe, and to a propensity to co-operate in the system, in the hope of sharing in the glory of its success, and perpetuating in our Country the preponderance of influence & power of its advocates. By adopting and pertinaciously adhering to this system, the party in power advanced too far to retreat without discredit.

They have calculated that a change of their measures would be a correction of error, and that this must be followed by the forfeiture of their claim to public confidence. But in war, the worst that can befall them is the loss of offices and of power, and they are not without hope of finding a refuge from censure and contempt in the violent passions which are kindled from a state of war.

[To be continued in our next issue.]

From the New-York Evening Post, 1795.

The Militia of the United States.

From a source which may be supposed to be true, we learn that on the 12th inst. General Dearborn of Connecticut, having received a letter from General Dearborn, requiring him to send a five companies of the Connecticut militia which had already been drafted, to be marched to the garrisons, four to New-London and one to New-Haven, and there to rest under the command of the officers of the United States at those places: Gen. Galloway, who at the moment he received the requisition, was setting out on a tour to the Springs for health, put off his journey and immediately communicated the contents of the council in different parts of the State, with orders to meet him on Monday. The council convened accordingly and having approved of the promptitude of the executive in having ordered the drafts of the militia, agreeably to the laws of Congress, the following resolutions arising out of the requisition made by Gen. Dearborn were then submitted for consideration by the Governor.

"Can the militia be legally or constitutionally demanded until one or more of the contingencies enumerated in the constitution, shall have arisen? And can a requisition to place any portion of the militia under the command of an officer appointed by the general government, be executed?"

The council impressed with the great importance of these questions, seriously and deliberately examined them, and the following were the result.

The Constitution of the United States has wisely ordained that Congress may provide for calling out the militia in three cases only, viz. to "execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion." The acts of Congress of February 1795, and April 1802, in strict pursuance of the Constitution, provide for the calling forth the militia into actual service in the exigencies above named. The board gave it as their opinion, that as the requisition of Gen. Dearborn, said to be in pursuance of that of the Secretary of war on the 12th June, was not grounded on any declaration made by the President of the U. States, stating that the militia were required either to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, and that some of the exigencies recognized by the last and constitution of the U. States had not shown to exist; and therefore the board held that the Governor ought of right to retain the exclusive command of the militia of the State, and that he cannot be divested of it by any power in the general government.

With respect to the second enquiry the council observed, that the Constitution of the United States provides that the appointment of the officers of the militia shall