

the amusement of your readers, as I can easily suppose that, in such a sequestered corner, variety may not always be found. I present you with a specimen; and if I find it is inserted you shall have more, for I have long labored under the *cacoethes scribendi*.

Before the American war our great contractor Mr. E. was an Indian trader of low credit and of indifferent reputation. Having been discovered by his correspondents at Montreal fertile in expedients, and more disposed to augment than to diminish the balance against him; they judged it most prudent to decline supplying him any longer, and to put up with their first loss.

A grievous disappointment which he met with in the interior, added to this resolution, reduced him to beggary. At this time, Capt. N. was appointed to command at Michilimackinac. This gentleman finding Mr. E. very attentive and obliging took compassion on him, procured him a few goods on credit, and gave him the preference in his transactions with the Indians. In a few years Mr. E. amassed a considerable sum of money and sought to re-establish his credit in Montreal; not by full payment, but by a composition. When I found myself, says he (for he told the story) in the possession of £1200, I resolved on going to Montreal to purchase the goods I wanted, by which I could make a great saving—but I owed £400 which I was unwilling to pay. I went to my creditors, told them a lamentable story of my hardships and losses among the Indians, and they gave me a discharge for 2/6 in the pound. In a few days it appeared that he was worth £1200. He returned to Michilimackinac, where he continued to enjoy the same advantages for some years longer through the favor of Capt. N. and after the peace he removed to N. York with a fortune of £30,000. Here he lent his money to persons in distress at most enormous rates of interest. But he had the art to retain his reputation till a temptation presented itself which he could not resist.

One of his friends was arrested for debt to a large amount, and an extensive tract of land which he possessed was to be sold for the benefit of the creditors. The friends of the debtor agreed to buy it in for his benefit, as it would go very low, and Mr. E. was appointed to bid at the sale. He purchased the land infinitely below the real value, but instead of restoring them according to agreement, he kept them for himself.

Soon after this stroke of policy, which more than trebled his fortune, Capt. N. who had been to England, returned to Canada by the way of New York. He had never profited by Mr. E.'s prosperous dealings among the Indians; and when he had paid the passage money for himself and family, he found his purse empty. But hearing that his old friend Mr. E. was in New York, he waited on him to procure a supply to be remitted from Quebec. Mr. E. refused to assist him. The captain was actually obliged to sell a negro woman, and thus to deprive his lady of the only servant she had to assist her, in the care of six children. So much for Mr. E.'s gratitude. He has been elected a director of one of the principal banks—he has built an elegant villa in the neighborhood of the city—he keeps a coach—is attended by livery servants, and lives most sumptuously; but he enjoys neither respect nor influence—his true character is known, and although he may be worth two plums, he is execrated by all honest men. You see then, Mr. Reckoner, that the world is sometimes just.

Yours,
ARISTARCHUS.
New York, 2d March, 1811.

Foreign Intelligence.

—000000—

OFFICIAL AND INTERESTING.

The following translations from Lisbon papers contain the details of the proceedings of the French and combined armies, from the commencement of Massena's retreat down to the middle of March.

From these it appears that the French have abandoned Portugal; that Massena has postponed "driving the English into the sea," till some future day, and that Bonaparte will have to issue another order for "planting his eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon." The atrocities of the French in Portugal have been such as to fix a hatred to them in the minds of the people of that nation, which will not be eradicated in two or three generations to come. Bonaparte, if ever he conquers Portugal, will have to drive the inhabitants of that devoted country into the sea as well as the English; they will never submit to his government as long as a man of the present generation is able to grasp a dirk.

Extract from two official letters from Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Periera Forjaz.

The enemy retired from the position which he had occupied in Santarem and its vicinity, in the night of the 4th inst. I then imme-

diately put in motion the British army in order to follow him on the morning of the 6th.

His first movement indicated an intention of forming a junction with a considerable force at Thomar; in consequence I detached towards that town on the 8th a considerable body of troops, consisting of a part of the divisions commanded by marshal Sir W. Beresford under the orders of maj. gen. the hon. Wm. Stewart, and which had passed the Tagus at Abrantes and afterwards at the Zezere, and of the 4th, 6th, and part of the 1st division of infantry, and also of 2 brigades of British cavalry. The enemy however continued his march for the banks of the Mondego, the 2d corps proceeding at the same time by the road of Espinhal, and the division of gen. Loison by that of the Anciao, and the rest of the army by the road that leads to the town of Pombal; the last forces were followed, and never lost sight of by the light division, regiment of royal dragoons, and the 1st regiment of Hussars, who took near 200 prisoners on that day.

On the 9th the enemy formed a junction opposite the town of Pombal with the 6th corps, excepting gen. Loison's division, the 8th corps, the 9th, and the division commanded by gen. Montbrun. The Hussars, and the Royal Dragoons, who, with the light division, were immediately in front of the enemy's army, distinguished themselves on this occasion by a charge, which they made upon it under the command of col. Arentschildt. A detachment of the regiment of dragoons, No. 16, commanded by lieut. Wegland, and which had been reconnoitring the enemy near Leyra, made prisoners of a detachment of the enemy's dragoons; and having followed the enemy from Leyra, arrived at the camp just in time to join their companions in making the charge. It was not possible for me to collect a sufficient number of troops to commence my operations against the enemy until the 11th; on that day the 1st, 3d, 4th, 6th, and light division of infantry, the brigade of gen. Pack, and the whole British cavalry formed a junction at the camp, immediately in front of the enemy, who had begun to retire from his position during the night.

He was then followed by the light division, by the Hussars, Royal Dragoons, and brig. gen. Pack's brigade, all under the command of maj. gen. Slave; and endeavoring to keep possession of the old Castle of the town of Pombal, was dislodged from it; but the 6th corps and the cavalry of gen. Montbrun, which formed the rear-guard, supported by the 8th corps, kept possession of the camp on the other side of the town, our troops not having arrived in time to complete the arrangements for the attack before dark. On this occasion the battalion of Portuguese chasseurs, commanded by lt. col. Elder, distinguished itself.

The enemy retired during the night; and on the following day, the 15th inst. the 6th corps, with gen. Montbrun's cavalry, took a strong position in the outlet of a defile, situated between Pombal and Redinha, posting their right in a wood, and upon the river of Soure, and their left extended towards the heights and sides of the mountains, above the river which passes Redinha, leaving that place in their rear.

I attacked them on the same day in this position with the 3d, 4th, and light division of infantry, and with the brigade of general Pack, and cavalry; the other troops formed the reserve.

The post in the wood, upon the right of the enemy, was first forced by maj. gen. sir Wm. Erskine, with the light division. We were then able to form the troops in the plain, on the other side of the defile; while the 3d division, under the command of maj. general Picton, was formed in the skirts of the wood, in two lines, and likewise upon the right;—the 4th division, commanded by maj. gen. Cole, formed in two lines in the centre, having brig. gen. Pack's brigade supporting it on its right, and communicating with the 3d division; and the light division formed in two lines on the left; these troops were supported in their rear by the British cavalry—the 1st, 5th and 6th divisions formed the reserve.

Our troops were formed with the greatest exactness and celerity; and lt. gen. sir Brent Spencer putting himself at their head, and leading the line which attacked the post of the enemy upon the heights, they were immediately dislodged from them, with the loss of many men killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major gen. sir Wm. Erskine particularly mentions the brave conduct of the 52d regiment, and of the chasseurs under the command of col. Elder, in the attack of the wood; to which I ought to add, that I never saw any thing done in a more handsome manner than the dislodging of the French infantry, who on this occasion occupied the said wood.

There was only one narrow bridge over the river of Redinha, and one ford near the bridge, by which our light troops passed those of the enemy; but as the enemy's artillery commanded those passages, some time elapsed before we could place on the other

side a sufficient number, or body of troops, to make new dispositions, and attack the heights on which they had again posted themselves. The 3d division however passed and again manœuvred upon the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and the cavalry, supported by the light division, compelled their principal force to fall back towards Condeixa.

The light infantry belonging to the division of gen. Picton, and under the command of lieut. col. Williams, and the chasseurs No. 4, commanded by col. Rego, were the troops which had the principal share in this operation.

We yesterday found the whole of the enemy's army (with the exception of the 2d corps which was still in Espinhal) posted in a very strong position in Condeixa; and I observed that they were then sending their baggage by the road to the bridge of Murcella; I concluded from this circumstance that col. Trant had not left Coimbra, and that the enemy having been very much pressed and closely pursued in their retreat, had not been able to detach troops to force or dislodge col. Trant from that city. In consequence I caused the 3d division under the command of major gen. Picton to march across the mountains, on the left of the enemy, and along the sides of the only road which remained open for their retreat; this manœuvre produced the immediate effect of dislodging them from the strong position, which they occupied in Condeixa; and last night they encamped in the mountains, at a place called Cassal Novo, distant one league from Condeixa.

We immediately opened a communication with Coimbra; and made prisoners of a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, that was on the road to that city.

We found this morning the 6th and 8th corps formed in a very strong position near Cassal Novo; the light division immediately attacked, & drove back their advanced posts; but we could only dislodge them from the position which they occupied, by means of movements on their flanks. I therefore ordered the 4th division under the command of gen. Cole to move towards Penella, for the purpose of securing the passage of the river Esa, and the communication with Espinhal, near which major gen. Nightingale had been observing the movements of the 2d corps of the enemy since the 10th inst.; while the 3d division commanded by major gen. Picton, moved immediately, turning the enemy's left; and the light division with brig. gen. Pack's brigade, under the command of major gen. sir W. Erskine, turned their right, and major gen. Campbell with the 6th division supported the light troops, by which the enemy was attacked in front; these troops were supported by the cavalry, and 1st and 5th division and the brigade of col. Ashworth in reserve. These movements compelled the enemy to abandon all the positions which he successively took in the mountains; and the two corps of the army which formed the rear guard of the enemy, were at the same time driven back, towards the main body of their army, posted at Miranda du Corvo and river Esa, with considerable loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.

In the operations of this day, the regiments No. 43, 52, 95 and 3d of chasseurs, under the command of colonels Drummond, Beckwith, and major Patrickson, lieut. col. Rofs, majors Gilman and Stewart, and lieut. col. Elder, particularly distinguished themselves; as did also the battalions of light infantry belonging to the division of gen. Picton, and commanded by lt. col. Williams, and the chasseurs, No. 4, commanded by col. Rego, and the flying artillery, commanded by captains Rofs and Bull.

The result of these operations has been the preservation of Coimbra and Beira Alta from the devastations of the enemy; and the opening to us the communication with the northern provinces, as well as obliging the enemy to make his retreat by the road of the bridge of Murcella, in which they may be harassed and pursued by the militia, who will act with safety upon their flanks, while the allied army continues to pursue them closely and harass their rear.

All this part of the country affords the greatest advantages in positions for a retreating army, and of this the enemy knew how to avail himself: he retreats from the country in the same manner he entered it; that is, in a solid mass, covering his rear guard in all marches by the operations of one or two corps of the army, in the strong positions which the country affords him; those corps are very closely supported by the main body of the army. Before they quitted their position, they destroyed part of their artillery and ammunition, and then blew up or rendered useless every thing that their horses were unable to carry. They have no provisions, except what they plunder, and which are carried at the expense of the soldiers, except some cattle, which they carry with them.

It is with considerable pain that I am obliged to add to this account that the conduct of the enemy in their retreat, in every part, is such, that their barbarities have seldom been equalled, but were never exceeded;

even the towns of Torres, Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which their head quarters had been for months, and in which the inhabitants had been induced by promises of good treatment to remain, were plundered, and many of the houses burned on the night when the enemy retired from the position which they occupied; they afterwards burned all the places and towns through which they passed in their retreat. The convent of Alcobaca was burned by orders sent from the French head-quarters: the palace of the bishop of Leyra, as well as the whole city in which gen. Drouet's head-quarters had been, met with the same fate; and there is not a single inhabitant of the country of any class or description of those who remained, and had intercourse with the French army, who has not reason to complain bitterly of the atrocities which they have experienced from the enemy; it is thus that the enemy have fulfilled the promises, and executed the threats contained in the proclamation of the French commander in chief, in which he told the inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal, that he had not come to make war against them; but that he brought a powerful army of 110,000 fighting men to drive the English out of the kingdom, and compel them to embark.

I entertain hopes that the example of what has occurred in this country, will teach its inhabitants, and those of other nations, what reliance they ought to place upon such promises and such threats; and that the only security they have for the preservation of their lives and of every thing dear to them, is in a decisive and determined resolution to resist the enemy.

I have the honor to enclose to your excellency lists of the killed and wounded in the different affairs which the army has had with the enemy since he commenced his retreat.

I must also communicate to your excellency that I have received the most able and cordial assistance, in every operation mentioned in this despatch, from lieut. gen. sir Brent Spencer, and from marshal sir W. Beresford, whom I had requested to pass the Tagus, and who has been with me since the 11th instant: from major gen's sir W. Erskine, Campbell, Picton, Cole, Slade, and from major gen. the hon. George Colville, as well as from all the generals and officers commanding the respective brigades under the orders of the generals named. I am particularly indebted for services of the highest utility to quarter-master gen. col. Murray, to the deputy adj. gen. the hon. col. Pakenham, and to officers in the quarter master general's department, and likewise to the officers of my staff, from whom I have received all the aid and assistance which they could afford me.

I feel much regret at having to inform your excellency that the town of Badajoz surrendered on the 11th inst. to the enemy; I have not yet learned the particulars of that event; but I have no doubt with respect to the fact. From the moment that the enemy entered Estremadura, and directed their views and efforts towards that place, my attention has been directed to the means of saving it.

Before the unfortunate battle of the 19th of Feb. I had determined to reinforce the Spanish army, and that for the purpose of obliging the enemy to raise the siege of that place; that determination was to have been carried into effect as soon as I should receive and be joined by the reinforcements which I expected would arrive in the Tagus by the end of the month of January.

The battle of the 19th Feb. destroyed the Spanish troops, upon whose aid and co-operation I relied; it then became impossible to detach a sufficient number of troops, to effect the object that I had in view; and this was the case even after the arrival of the reinforcements, unless the enemy had removed from the position that they occupied upon the Tagus. I then determined to attack the enemy in his position, as soon as I should be joined by the reinforcements, in case of the weather being such as to make the roads passable.

The reinforcements arrived in the beginning of March, but had not then joined the army; and in the night of the 5th the enemy retired from the position he occupied on the 6th instant. I desired gen. Leire, the governor of Elvas, to communicate to the governor of Badajoz, by means of signals, or in any other manner which might best suit, that Massena had begun to retreat, and that he might be assured that I would send him succour as soon as possible; in the meantime, I trusted that he would defend the place to the last extremity. I had in consequence made every arrangement to detach a body of troops when they should leave the Tagus and the Zezere, and accordingly with this view troops marched from Thomar on the 9th, as they did also from other points, that part of the corps of Marshal Beresford, which have taken post on the other side of the Tagus, and the vanguard of which had advanced to within three marches of the fortress of Elvas.

On the morning of the 9th, I received at Thomar intelligence of the most favorable