

MAY 24th, 1915—ITALY JOINED THE ALLIES IN THE GREAT WAR

ITALY'S TWO WARS

WE FOUGHT FOR THE OTHERS

The following lines conclude a recent book by Colonel Mario Caracolo, published May 24th, 1935, entitled "Italy in the World War".

We reproduce them in undying memory of the heroic dead of what was to have been in the cause of justice and fraternity of the peoples of the world, but instead turned out to be the cause of triumph of the most impudent egoism of some Nations to the detriment of other peoples, the prime cause of the present uneasiness in Europe.

We publish them also for the survivors of that great tragedy, especially for the Italian Returned Soldiers living in Canada, ever proud of their achievements, ever ready to defend the land of their birth, although faithful citizens of Canada.

And last but by no means least, the purpose of this publication, on the anniversary of the day that Italy entered the World War, is to let our Canadian friends know the main reason which grieves Italy, to-day that she is decided to obtain, at a high cost, a place in the sun for her increasing population and sees the road obstructed by her ex-Allies who gained so much by the sacrifices of the Italian people.

The unfair treatment received through the local press to-day parallels the menace which the Allies presented to Italy when she did not want to accept the Treaty of Versailles: "You only have enough to eat for ten days; we will starve you."

Italy had to endure the injustice, which they wished to repeat by sanctions.

The local press used every art to deceive the Canadian public, it may have succeeded in hoodwinking a few, but it can never change true facts.

The armistice of Villa Giusti halted the Italian army, which could have reached Vienna unimpeded.

The intervention of foreign political factors and interests of every kind took this and many other fruits of victory from the Italian army.

To future historians the fact will appear strange indeed that the terms of the armistice were made not by Italy, who practically alone had fo-

diminished by foreign interventions.


This is not the place to expound what happened in the period between the armistice at Villa Giusti and the Treaty of Versailles. The painful story of all coalition wars was renewed once again, perhaps harder than ever. One who looks at Europe to-day, fifteen years after the end of the war, must agree that there was peace in name only.

Never, in fact, were so many inte-

ed to 49% of the entire fleet, while the English were about 41% and the French 46%.

In the economic field, Italy, a poor nation without raw materials or other riches save her marvelous sun, squeezed from her means the necessities of war, increasing her public debt from 19 milliards (1913) to 103 milliards (1920), and had thus a debt and a decrease of riches superior to that of any other ally. Consequently, at the end of the war, the cost of living was higher in Italy than in all other nations. (2)

In spite of so much sacrifice, when the time for adjusting accounts arrived, even that which was due Italy according to the treaties was denied her. According to the treaty of London, we should receive the Trentino right to the Brennero, Trieste and her district, Istria right to Quarnero with Cherso and Lussin; part of Dalmatia with the islands and—in Albania—Valona and the interior of Vojussa. The part of Dalmatian coast not assigned us should have been neutralized and passed on to the "future state of Croatia or to Serbia and Montenegro".



The Austro-Italian front is curved for about 600 kms. — held by 30 and then 60 divisions — bound on the north by mountains and on the south by the sea — is trespassed by only two railways and few roads — the armies fighting on the Isonzo have communication only with the west.

The Franco-German front is in all rectilinear for 600 kms. — held by 176 and then 200 divisions — at its shoulders is a region ample and rich in resources — served by countless roads and railways of every kind.

ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY AND ITALIAN FORCES ABROAD

Allied Forces in Italy	
French: December 1917 and January 1918: about 120,000; from February 1918 on .....	32,000
English: December 1917 and January 1918: about 110,000; from February 1918 on .....	62,000
Czecko-Slavakian: October 1918 .....	15,000
Americans: October 1918 .....	3,000
<b>Total foreign forces in Italy</b> .....	<b>112,000</b>
Italian Forces Abroad	
In France — from March 1918 on (2nd Army Corps) .....	51,000
— from January 1918 (T A I F) .....	60,000
— Centurions, different workmen .....	20,000
<b>Total in France</b> .....	<b>131,000</b>
In Macedonia .....	48,500
In Albania .....	95,000
In other theatres of war .....	7,000
<b>Total Italian forces abroad</b> .....	<b>281,500</b>
Losses Of Allied Forces In Italy	
French .....	2,782
English .....	6,097
Czecko-Slavakian .....	291
American .....	11
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>9,181 (not through cause of war)</b>
Losses Of Italian Forces Abroad	
In France .....	14,870
In Macedonia (approximate) .....	3,000
In Albania (approximate) .....	5,000
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>22,870</b> besides tens of thousands of sick.

ught for a long time with Austria and had finally defeated her, but by those Allies who throughout the war, except for short periods, were almost disinterested in our operations.

Thus a military victory, the like of which few or perhaps none can be found in history, because never before was such a military power reduced to nothing, was deformed and

rests, so many egoisms, so many passions, so many vexations, so many hypocrisies, so much ignorance, gathered together to solve so many problems.

In this concern suffice it to say that adversity of fate and conspiracy of man would not give what the treaties assigned them, while they had accomplished much more than was expected.

What we contributed to the war we stated in preceding chapters and we will sum up here again, but once more I will repeat that it is much more than what we should have by the treaty of London, because we were bound to attack an Austria engaged with Russia and Serbia, whereas we fought against all of Austria and alone.

To mention a few: we engaged with ever increasing Austrian forces, from 20-25 enemy divisions which we fought against in June '15, to 35 in '16, 40 in '17, and after October 55, of which 8 were German, and 55 to 60 in '18, thus practically the whole Austrian army.

Furthermore: in the final battle of Vittorio Veneto the whole allied aid was equivalent to 3 or 4 foreign divisions (there were six: 2 French, 3 English and 1 Czecko-Slavakian) but two large Italian divisions were in France), and 3,000 American soldiers (1). With the French army in France there were about 60 English divisions, 12 Belgian, several Portuguese contingents, and 2 million Americans.

Moreover: while we lost 14,870 men in France and 3,000 in Macedonia (besides tens of thousands of sick) the Allies in Italy lost 9,181 altogether. (1)

Science of War REWRITTEN BY ITALY

By Herbert L. Mathews

"We live to learn" in war as in peace. Lessons have been drawn from the Italian campaign in Ethiopia that the world will undoubtedly—and unfortunately—adapt in future wars. There would be few persons today so optimistic as to believe that Europe will not see another war in the near or distant future. Certainly, no general staff—not even ours in the United States—could afford to ignore the advances in the theory of warfare that have been made here in Ethiopia, and it is safe to say that military experts everywhere have looked eagerly in this direction for the past six months. For all the problem has been the same: to what use can Italian experiences be put in the next war?


It so happens that these observations have been exceptionally fruitful. The campaign, which has achieved such startling successes in recent weeks, offers the basis for some general conclusions—with the obvious reservation that a colonial campaign is not a European war. The Ethiopian campaign has presented some problems peculiar to itself, the most important of which lay in the fact that the enemy was, from the military point of view, a savage with a thin veneer of European training. But if we have not here the ideal conditions of a manoeuvre south of the Brenner Pass or in Alsace-Lorraine, there is the more important factor that this has been in deadly earnest.

A theory has been put to the test, and it is particularly valuable that the theory in question is Italian—so far as any technique can be nationalized. It is the principle of the "guerra manovrata" (the war of manoeuvre).

The World War was fought by huge armies, locked almost immov-

ed thus: England (and Dominions) 1,898,000 kms. with 4,895,000 inhabitants; France 489,000 kms., 3,700,000 inhabitants; Belgium 54,000 kms, 3,000,000 inhabitants; Italy 91,000 kms., 150,000 inhabitants.

Furthermore, by the accords of S. Giovanni di Moriana (April 20, 1917) it was established that in the distribution of the Turkish provinces Italy was to have Smirne and its hinterland. Everyone knows that neither Smirne nor Dalmatia were ceded to Italy. Moreover, the great booty of the German colonies were hitherto divid-



Italian craft lost during the war.

WE FIGHT FOR OUR EMPIRE

(From "The New York Times Magazine, May 10, 1936)

come must be decisive and, above all, a deadlock must be avoided.

How is that to be done? In the first place, by not making a simple, and solid, frontal attack. The assault must be in short, sharp thrusts at more than one point, with mobile units. The idea is to break through the line of the enemy, or to encircle his position so effectively that he must withdraw or face the deadly effects of a flank attack. The defense must move forward to meet such an attack half way, thus gaining the impetus and moral effect of launching an attack, or it must seek to hold its positions with a part of its forces, manoeuvring with the rest to catch the enemy on the flank and force his withdrawal.

This, then, is the general principle of the war of movement—a principle by no means peculiarly Italian, for most, if not all, general staffs throughout the world have adopted it. But what the Italians have done is to develop this principle in a fashion peculiar to themselves, and to bring it as near to perfection as has yet been possible.

The Italian innovation, on the tactical side, is to divide a given military force—whether it be a battalion or an army of two or three complete corps—into three groups, or forces, of approximately equal size. In practice, the first and second groups usually turn out to be larger than the third, but the effect is the same.

Each group is a self-supporting, self-contained unit—a miniature army, with sufficient food, water, munitions, artillery, tanks, airplanes, engineering and transport materials to permit it to exist by itself, cut off from all communications, for at least two or three days during actual combat, and indefinitely during intervals. However, while the fighting groups are confined to three forces, the "logistical" or service units are four in number, since behind the army as a whole is a fourth body coordinating the furnishing of supplies of all kinds to the three fighting units.

The first of the active groups (Continued on page 6)