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**A TRUNK OF BOOZE.**

Hez Porter, whose chief claim to notice these days is the frequency in which he figures in police records, is back again at the old stand—Governor Mills's guest for the next three months. It happened this way. Hez went to Palmerston with a trunk and returned with the same piece of travelling goods, containing four cases of whiskey. Inspector Beckett is wise on weights, and the trunk was heavy. Result—four cases of booze in the inspector's possession, and Hez out of the business for the next three months. Porter is suspected of being the runner for a dive which the police have in their watchful consideration.—O.S. Times.

**GERMANY WILL BE ON "LAST LEGS" BY MIDWINTER**

By Hilaire Belloc in Toronto Sunday World.

It is true to say, and must be repeated, that with every week that passes the enemy's effort will be more and more political and less and less strategic. It must be so in the nature of things. For whenever a man's reserves are near their limit, in any struggle, whether in some financial contest or in strength as in a wrestling match, or in numbers, as in this case of the enemy in the present great war, he has only two policies open to him. Either he must throw the last of his energies into one supreme effort which will almost invariably include diversion to another field of the more direct methods hitherto attempted, or he must try and husband his strength and use it sparingly in order to spin it out. If there is any conclusion from the present position to be drawn more clearly than another it is that those who now govern the whole of our allied enemies unchecked and uncriticized from one united command have put their money upon the former of these two policies. It is a point which has already been emphasized in these columns and which must be repeated, for upon our judgment of it will very largely depend, not only our appreciation of the present phase of the war, but of its possible duration and of its probable political conclusion.

But there are in this calculation certain elements which, tho they have been repeated over and over again under the best authority and with elaborate arguments and citation of evidence of facts to prove them, have not yet sunk into the public mind and do not yet hold public opinion. People still talk as tho the calculation of enemy numbers and of remaining enemy resources were a piece of private amusement indulged in at random and leading to any number of various conclusions. I, therefore, once more this week, at the expense of some considerable repetition, because I believe it to be the chief interest of this moment, return to that general statement of the enemy's resources as compared with those of the allies, which is at the basis of all judgment of the war, and further allude to the objects the enemy had in view in beginning this Balkan adventure, and show why those objects may be regarded as political and strategic in so far as the two can be distinguished.

To begin at the beginning. A nation puts into the field for the prosecution of the war certain forces divided into units, that is, corps, divisions, brigades, batteries, squadrons, battalions. It is compelled by the very nature of military organization to arrange its strength in this fashion. It doesn't say, "I have a million men available. I will train and equip them and put them into the field." What it says is, "I will put only so many units into the field as it can maintain there at full strength through the probable course of the war in spite of the probable rate of wastage." For as the men of the various units are put out of action by death, capture, wounds, and illness of every kind developed on active service, their places must be taken by fresh men who have been trained and equipped behind the armies, and who in the meantime may be called "the nation's reserve of man power."

In the old days when nations fought with professional armies it was not the full national reserve of man power which was considered, but the probable number of recruits obtainable and trainable and capable of equipment under the system of those times. Today this mass behind the fighting units is equivalent to all that young manhood of the nation which can be spared from work necessary to the munitioning and equipment of the army and to the economic maintenance of the state. When we talk of "a decline of the effectives" of any army, what we mean is not that the enemy is reaching the end of his men but that because for one reason or another the reserve of man power behind the armies is giving out. Either the units have got to be put on to a lower establishment—e.g., battalions once of a thousand men are to be regarded in future as counting only 750 men—or whole units are eliminated in order to keep up the standard of others, e.g., the effectives of the 10th corps are distributed between the 8th and 9th to bring the latter up to full strength, while the 10th as a unit disappears. The latter expedient is obviously the more clumsy and much the more followed. And after a certain point when the reserves of men are exhausted an enemy's effectives begin to decline.

From these elementary considerations it follows that the limits of a nation's reserves depend exactly upon the military task it has undertaken—that is, the number of units it is proposed to put into the field coupled with the rate of wastage in those units; and the number of units it is proposed to put into the field depends either upon the task imposed upon it by others or imposed by a task it has ambitiously chosen of its own accord.

For instance, Great Britain in the South African War was dependent upon voluntary recruitment, but it had from this source reserves virtually indefinite in men compared with the numbers of the enemy. The rate of wastage was such and such and could not only be repaired but the number of the units in the field constantly increased. Prussia and her vassal states in the war of 1870 had only to put against the greatly inferior numbers of the French so many units as, at the rate of wastage then suffered, could be amply supplied with men for a much longer time than the war lasted, and Prussia at the end of the war was stronger in trained and equipped men than she had been at the beginning of it.

nearer 900. He has just opened a new line in the southeast of about 200. He is, at any rate, actually holding well over 1500 miles, and the number of units he requires for this is correspondingly great. His rate of wastage is quite out of proportion to the experience of past wars, with this exception that the wastage from sickness (as amount we can only estimate and on which we have no exact figures) is less than it used to be, or, to be more accurate, the permanent wastage from grievous sickness is less.

We know from ample intelligence supplied to the bureaux of the allies what the rate of wastage is. The enemy has to find about a million new men every two months. There is no doubt a certain discrepancy between the drafts he is finding and the total permanent losses, the latter being the smaller figure than the former, but amounts to about four-fifths. While the enemy has to find half a million a month somehow he need not write down his absolute permanent losses as more than 400,000 a month, and the difference between the two figures is represented partly by the somewhat increasing permanent margin of temporary losses. Take it at the lower figure and consider only the men whom he has to replace for good and all and you have not less than 400,000 a month. This figure is arrived at by all sorts of ways and invariably comes out—within a very little margin of error—at the end of the statement or calculation, and it tallies with the corresponding rate of wastage of the other armies of which these same bureaux have private information.

We need not waste time over the sort of people who, in their vague dread of the enemy, endow him with supernatural powers, expect his wastage to be incredibly less than that of the allies, and his opportunities of recruitment to be in some miraculous way indefinitely superior to that of the rest of mankind. He is fighting the same kind of war as are the allies, in much the same fashion. He has about the same numbers per million of men who can be equipped and trained usefully, and he is losing about the same numbers per million. Further, the general reader must specially remember that the figures thus arrived at by very numerous independent authorities, working along every possible line of evidence, are the only serious basis for a judgment. General opinion relies in the matter upon evidence infinitely worse. (Several correspondents have called my attention to a public statement that there are "nine or ten million Germans alone of military age left." It is quite true—or, rather, there are more. Five are in the existing units or on communications; two are maimed or incapacitated by illness. Nearly all the rest are those rejected by the doctor or retained for civilian work.)

Now these calculations thus independently undertaken by men trained to this kind of evidence and attaining it in a degree altogether out of proportion to the little trickles of information that a civilian population possesses with regard to the enemy, do not indeed come to an absolutely precise number nor fall within a margin of error of a few thousands. It would be a miracle if they did. They differ between the maximum and the minimum by something like a million, and that sounds like a very large margin of error, and it would be in any war but this; but it means, measured in time, two months or a very little more than two months.

In other words, if you take an estimate of that one of the numerous calculations which gives most latitude to the enemy, which most believes in his powers of resistance, if you couple it with that one which is most sceptical as to his rapid rate of wastage, if you couple them both with that one which allows for the very largest number to be returned to efficient service after being in hospital—if you weigh all the scores against the Allies—you arrive, for the date when the enemy's effectives will decline, at somewhere about the turn of the New Year or a very little later. Say the end of January at the very latest. More reasonable estimate, less violently weighing the scales against the chances of the Allies, reduces that time to the course of December, while estimates which have very great authority behind them, but must be admitted to be at the hopeful end of the line, place the turn of affairs in the month of November itself.

It is quite clear under such circumstances that the enemy some little time ago arrived at a point where he had to consider his whole position. During the summer, while he still expected a decision against the Russians and a separate peace with them—and while his successes in the east were presumably permitting him to negotiate secretly with the Kings of Bulgaria and Greece to tie them down to their present action—he still hoped for a conclusion of the war before his effectives should decline. It is fairly well authenticated that the head of the enemy's government proposed October as the conclusion of the campaign. Once it was apparent that he would not obtain his decision, then the approaching decline in his effectives became a matter of sheer necessity the chief matter for his consideration.

It is hardly necessary, let us hope, to emphasize a point once more which has been made so frequently in these columns as that concerning the maintenance of effectives by insufficient material. It should be self-evident that any power reaching the end of its reserves could keep up the numbers of human beings present in the field by arming those hitherto rejected by the doctors, by arming boys, by using in the field elderly men hitherto kept back as instructors or upon communications or in bureaux, and by arming even older men hitherto exempted from all military service. The moment you begin to take in bad material you can increase your nominal effectives pretty well indefinitely, but you do so at the expense of your real strength. A hundred men, of whom 25 are inefficient, is a much weaker body than 75 effectives. This is a practical point on which one can appeal to any man who has had practical experience. The 25 inefficients cannot be merely eliminated, leaving you with 75 effectives. On the contrary, they break down in batches, hamper your mobility, and confuse every arrangement. Every student of military history knows that the com-

mauder in straits for effectives is tempted to have recourse to inefficients. Pretty well every campaign of exhaustion shows these in the field in increasing numbers before the end comes, but it is true to say that their very presence in the field hastens instead of delays the breakdown of the force which is suffering from the last stages of attrition.

Whether the enemy's decline in effectives were to come towards the end of November or towards the end of January really mattered very little. His whole plans would be to change in view of the fact that his decline was coming within a brief delay and almost certainly now before a decision should have been obtained.

Compare the position of a speculator in some financial affair. He has the money to do his work up to a certain date. He is confident that he will bring off his adventure before that date. He fails to do so and he finds the rate of his present expenditure will exhaust his funds in two months or three, or four, and with no prospect of his original scheme coming off in that interval. It does not matter to such a man whether the moment of exhaustion is as a fact exactly two months off, or three, or even four. It is coming quickly, it is within measurable distance, and on the old lines the position cannot be retrieved within that interval. He is compelled to change his plan radically, and that is precisely what the enemy did some time back when he decided that he had failed on the Russian front and prepared a new move.

What the enemy's new move, due to approaching exhaustion of his effectives, has been, we know. It has been the essentially political stroke of the Balkans. Political rather than strategic for reasons described at length last week; because it necessarily introduces divergent aims in the alliance; because it in particular disturbs opinion in this country; (just as it is hoped to do by the Zeppelin raids which are absolutely useless in a military sense and are uniquely designed to disorder civilian opinion). It reintroduces the quarrels and jealousies of the Balkan States.

The numbers which Germany and Austria can put upon the new front, and have at great risk managed to put upon this new front in the southeast (where an arrow indicates the Allied relief to Serbia and a note of interrogation our ignorance of its size) are almost insignificant compared with those upon their main fronts. There is but one strategic or purely military object connected with the new move, and that is the possibility of the enemy's training, arming and supplying a certain number of Turkish units, either not already in existence, or, if in existence, ill supplied.

Upon what scale he can do this we are ignorant, but we know that it is on no scale that can seriously threaten the grand alliance. It would be a far more serious thing for further neutral states in the Balkans were on account of the new move to join the enemy's side, but even they cannot munition at the rate required for modern artillery, and Germany and Austro-Hungary are already in the rate of munitioning surpassed by the western allies. They will throw nothing serious into the scale beyond what they have within the boundaries of their own fronts.

The position of the great war is surely clear enough in its large lines. If we grasp those lines as a whole, we do not, indeed, see the future, for that is forbidden to man, but we have the elements of a sound judgment and we can see the trend, if not the end, of events.

The enemy's effectives cannot be maintained at their present strength beyond a date upon which the commanders of the Allies slightly differ, but which no one puts later than the early part of next year nor earlier than next month—November; and perhaps the close of that month.

That is the great cardinal fact of the moment. As against this the enemy keeps up but does not increase his production of munitions and equipment; while the Allies, not yet so much as in sight of a decline of their effectives, already his superiors in the rate of equipment and munitioning in the west, are increasing their rate of the same in the east.

Meanwhile, the enemy is throwing away men more lavishly than ever because his higher command has decided that a violent expenditure of energy in this crisis is better policy than husbanding his remaining reserves. In connection with this policy, he has also created a new diversion, largely political, in the Balkans with some 5 per cent. of his forces, and could at the most, were his success complete in that direction, slowly train and still more slowly equip some unknown number—perhaps half a million—of men drawn from the subjects of the Turkish Empire. While this experiment is being made in the southeast of Europe he is being hammered continuously upon the western line; he is losing great masses of men (for the equivalent of five army corps have gone in the last three weeks—October 23—allowing a proportion of 1 in 5 casualties for the dead); he is failing in exceedingly expensive counter-offensive strokes, and on the east he is at last held.

That is the situation as a whole, and the more steadily we bear it in mind and base our judgment upon it, the better for the nerves of the nation.

**GREECE ANCIENT AND GREECE MODERN**

Less than a hundred years ago Macaulay in one of his brilliant essays in the Edinburgh Review, "Mitford's History of Greece," sketched with double perspective the existing condition of that country and her continued claims, by reason of her ancient heritage, upon the sympathies of civilized mankind: "Her freedom and her power have for more than twenty centuries been annihilated; her people have degenerated into timid slaves; her language into a barbarous jargon; her temples have been given up to the successive depredations of Romans, Turks and Scotchmen, but her intellectual empire is imperishable. . . . Wherever literature consoles sorrow, or assuages pain; wherever it brings gladness to eyes which fall with wakefulness and tears, and ache for the dark house and the long sleep—there is exhibited, in

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**THE RECOVERY OF GREECE**

Since these words were written, and almost before Macaulay himself had passed away (1859), Greece had shown signs of recovering from her ruinous condition, and in our own day, thanks to the sympathetic attitude of Great Britain, France and Russia, and their active co-operation with her against Turkish domination and misrule, she, like her neighbor, Italy, and largely from similar causes, has once more taken her place among the nations of Europe to the great gratification and abounding hope of all who had an appreciation of her ancient power and glory, and the large part which under wise guidance she might still play in the world. Nobody, we dare say, would have rejoiced more than Macaulay, before the outbreak of this war, to have seen the complete reversal in half a century of his dismal picture which Modern Greece then presented. She is now nominally, at least, a free and independent country, with a constitutional monarchy—the executive consisting of the King and responsible Ministers. Legislative power is in the hands of the Bule elected by manhood suffrage for four years.

**GREECE'S OPPORTUNITY**

While then the co-operation of Italy with Great Britain, France and Russia was warmly welcomed, not only for the material strength she brought in defence of the liberties of Europe against German aggression and domination, and of the integrity of the smaller States, but as an attempt to discharge a long-standing debt of gratitude, it is easy to understand the profound disgust and distrust which the halting attitude of Greece under precisely similar conditions has inspired throughout the Allied countries. Perhaps it is not yet too late to hope that Greece of her own free will may once make the cause of liberty and freedom her own, and escape the deep damnation that is sure to come upon her in case of national ingratitude. Do not the voices of the dead and of the living sons of freedom at this hour call upon Venizelos to leap into the breach proclaiming: "A land of slaves shall no more be mine. Dash down you cup of Samian wine." G. H. R. in Toronto Mail and Empire.

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**GREECE WINS INDEPENDENCE.**  
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