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The Road to Peace,

COMMERCE, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS.

—•—
BY AN OLD FARMER.
—•—

I AM both feeble, and old, and as you will perceive, without my telling you, not much gifted with the powers of fine writing. I can only express my opinions in a plain, simple way, such as may suit a farmer's, fisherman's, or mechanic's taste, and I do not expect, or wish, that the fine educated gentlemen should either read, or admire my writings.

It may be asked, why then I write at all on subjects beyond my reach? I answer, my sufferings and my fears will not permit me to be silent, and as to going beyond my depth, I shall take care to say only what I know, and to reason only upon what I fully understand. Even an old farmer may sometimes give good advice, which much more *learned* men would do well to follow; and as to a farmer's honesty, as he has no *interest* in the *misfortunes* of his country, but both his farm and his labour must rise, stand, and fall with the *prosperity* of the nation, he is a much more fit counsellor in times of peril and adversity, than soldiers, or other military men; than contractors, public officers and the thousand other leeches, who feed upon the blood of the nation, when it is once set flowing by war.

I always found, that I recollected more of the sermon of the minister of my parish, by taking down the heads of his discourse. And I therefore conclude, that it is a good thing to divide, what one has to say into distinct heads, so that a man's mind may take in and comprehend fully, one thing at a time.

Before I do this, I would observe, that every man who is a warm, obstinate, passionate partizan, whether Federalist, or Democrat, or Republican—every man who chooses to be idle, and to drink grog rather than to work—every man, who wants an office more than he

wants peace and prosperity, had better lay aside my book—he will find nothing to please him. I write only to the moderate and honest of all parties. I write to the sober and the industrious. I write to those only who are contented with being *well governed* and who do not wish to be governors themselves, and who are not constantly hankering after the people's money.

The subjects I shall say something upon, are :

1. Why are we at war ?
2. What has the war cost, and what will it cost ?
3. What have *been* its fruits, and what will be its fruits ?
4. Who dances, and who pays the piper ?
5. How much Massachusetts will pay towards the war, and how much will fall on such a farmer as me ?
6. Whether the war has borne, and whether it is likely to bear equally on all the states ?
7. What may be the effect upon us of the late disasters of the French in Russia ?
8. What is the best course for an honest farmer to take to contribute his mite towards a peace ?

Lastly. I shall compare the characters of old Gov. Strong and of old Deacon Phillips, *merely as Friends to Peace*, with those of Major General Varnam and Brigadier General King, *merely as Friends to War*, and as expecting to make their fortunes out of it.

Under the last head, I shall consider (not so much on my own account, for I am too old and sick to be drafted from the militia, but on account of my only son,) whether if Governor Strong should be our Governor next year my son would not be likely to stay at home, but if the two *Generals* are elected, whether I must not prepare his coffin, for if he goes he certainly will perish either under the care of the *army doctors*, or by the bullets of the enemy.

1st. Why are we at war ?

This is a question which I am often asked in *our* town, and they think because I have been a representative to Boston four or five years, I must know. Now I have no objection to letting any body hear or see what I do know about it, and though it may not be new to *many*, it may to *some*.

I always think it a bad sign of a man's honesty, when I find him shifting his ground of argument or complaint against his neighbour. Before the war began, after the set-

tlement of that old affair of the Chesapeake, I never used to hear of any thing but the British Orders in Council as the grand cause of complaint.—I remember well, when Mr. Madison made a settlement with the British minister Erskine, there was not a word said about *any* complaint but the Orders in Council; and I recollect still later than that, Mr. Munroe, our Secretary, told Mr. Foster, the very last British minister who was here, that if Great Britain would repeal *her Orders in Council*, she should have as *full and free a trade* as she ever had.

Now, my brother farmers, why should we change our language? It is *now* said we are at war on account of the Impressment of our seamen.

The British repealed their orders in council nine months ago. I ask, whether this practice of impressing *British* seamen out of our vessels, is not as old as the French war? I am told—yes. I ask again, were not as many mistakes committed *twenty years* ago in taking some few Americans instead of Englishmen, as there have been of *late*? I have been told, *many more*.

It being then settled, that this war is continued, and all its evils sustained merely because Great Britain insists upon taking *her own* seamen out of our merchant vessels, when they *run away* and get into *our* service, and because a very few instances of mistakes or abuse in exercising this right have occurred, I then sat down, after looking as deep as a plain farmer could do into the question, and gave my neighbours the *reasons*, why I was opposed to shedding one drop of blood, or even *one* million of dollars in such a cause.—My reasons were,

1. I never could see, why nations ought not to be as honest towards one another, as men in their private dealings. Now if my neighbour's son, or bound apprentice runs away, the law allows him to enter my inclosure and even my *house*, and to take him away, if he takes shelter there. I never could see any reason, why Britain should not take her *own* subjects, out of our merchant ships. I am confirmed in this opinion, by the declaration of our late Lieut. Governor, William Gray, in his letter published by the House of Representatives of our state, in which he states, that if Great Britain will give up the right of searching our *public ships*, we ought to be content.

She has long since done this—and Mr. Gray adds, that he hopes we shall never be *mad* enough to engage in *war* with either of the great European nations. This authority has greater weight with me, since I learn, that this Mr. Gray is entirely devoted to the politicks of Mr. Madison.

2. My second reason against continuing the war for the question of Impressment of British sailors is, that I find, that Great Britain six years ago, offered to place this question on such a footing as appeared to our two ministers, Mr. Munroe and Mr. Pinkney, to be both honourable and advantageous to the United States. I learn that one of these men is now our Secretary of State, and the other our Attorney General, and I cannot perceive why the people should not be satisfied with what was considered so advantageous and honourable to two great and learned men of Mr. Madison's party.

I cannot see that there can be any justice in continuing a war, when such *honourable and advantageous* offers have been made, and may now be obtained.

3. I have been also very much staggered, and indeed altered in my opinions on this subject, by the able arguments of the Rev. Mr. Taggart, representative from Hampshire county in this state, to Congress, who has proved, that we have scarcely *any* seamen under impressment at this time. and that the evil, if there ever has been any, has been much exaggerated by designing men.

4. Our own legislature made an enquiry into this subject, and I think the committee are entitled to thanks for their labor and accuracy. From this report it appears, that out of 21,000 seamen employed by a great number of merchants of this state, of all political opinions, only 35 seamen had been impressed for nearly fifteen years; and of those only 12 were Americans, and of these all but ONE had been discharged. Governor Gray, whom I mentioned above, has been forty-five years in business. and he never had, as he swears, but *two* seamen impressed by the British, and *three* by the French. I cannot look upon this, therefore, as a great national grievance.

5. When I look into my own town, I find though the war has lasted twenty years, we never had a man im-

pressed. I invite all honest farmers to make a like enquiry in their own towns and neighbourhood. If they find few or no cases of impressment, they will conclude with me that there has been "much cry but little wool." They will also recollect that in many cases where the men are said to be impressed, it turns out in evidence, that they entered *voluntarily*, or were impressed on board of British merchant ships, into which they entered voluntarily.

6. It is important here to enquire whether we shall not lose more than we shall gain, if Great Britain should agree that our ships shall protect **HER** seamen against **HER** search and impressment.

This will be a *certain* loss to her, and no gain to us ; because in proportion to the number of *British* seamen we employ, will be the diminution of our own, or the reduction of their wages ; now we ought not to fight for that which if obtained, will injure those for whom the war is pretended to be prosecuted.

7. This war is carried on to relieve our *own* seamen, and by the report of our committee it appears, that not more than one in sixteen hundred has suffered for fifteen years—Now if the war has caused more than two thousand of our seamen to go into foreign prisons, and probably will send all the rest there, it may be called a war for any thing else, but not a war for the protection and relief of seamen.

Lastly. We have only to consider finally, whether we shall in any way attain the objects of the war. Great Britain has anew declared, that she will forever maintain for herself the *same rights* which we maintain for ourselves, and which France maintains and exercises against all the world—now this may be impudent in Great Britain to be sure to pretend that she has *as much right* to her *own* seamen as we and France have to ours ; but still I ask, whether she will be likely to yield this point, until our three great frigates and six small ones shall have taken her 250 ships of the line, and three hundred frigates.

If people think we shall succeed, I should like to have them begin by raising the blockade of the Chesapeake, for as I understand it, all our great and small

frigates are in port but two, and yet our President cannot go a fishing from the seat of government, without asking leave of the *British admiral*. I thought this national humiliation required a fast, rather than feasting. This to my mind does not look like forcing Great Britain to give up her claim to *her own* seamen.

On the whole therefore, I conclude, that *we are at war* for the right to employ *British* seamen—for the right to employ our neighbour's apprentices and minors, and that we have very little chance of success in the object, and that if we had full success it would do us more harm than good.

I am therefore against a war of which this is the sole object.

2. What has the war cost, and what will it cost?

The government though a Republican one, and though we were told that Republicks should have no *secrets*, has neglected to lay before the people the *actual* expenses of the last nine months of war.

If any of us had leased a farm on half profits, we should be very much dissatisfied with our tenant who only demanded a large sum to carry on the farm for the next year, and yet refused to let us know how much money it cost the last.

But we have some rule by which to judge. The Government borrowed sixteen millions last year, including the new *paper* money, which instead of *new* emission, they choose to call treasury notes.

This was over and above the ordinary revenue. The war has then cost for nine months, sixteen millions; and yet we hear of soldiers and sailors, and contractors and furnishers unpaid—I am afraid we shall find a great debt yet behind.

As to future expenses, Mr. Cheeves, chairman of the committee of ways and means in Congress, states the annual expenses of the war at forty millions—at this rate the war will cost us in five years 200 millions, which is 70 millions more than it cost us to achieve or procure our Independence—a pretty heavy debt for the privilege of protecting *British seamen* from their *own* sovereign!!

My brother farmers, you do not yet see any of this

new *paper* money, because it is circulated only among the merchants, but you will have to *redeem it at last*. It is the *land* which finally pays all the public burdens.

3. What have been the fruits of this war, and what will be its fruits?

A farmer naturally inquires about the *crops*—If he finds his land always producing bad crops, he calls it bad.

If he finds a mode of cultivation always injurious and unproductive, he changes it for another.

Shall we act in an *opposite* principle in our political concerns?

We were told that we should conquer Canada in three months; we were only to move and they would retire; we were to take possession of it as we would reap a crop of rye or oats. For my part, I was one of those who did not see, even if we did reap it as with a sickle, that it would produce any thing but tares, and chaff, and straw.

I could not see, that burning the houses of some poor Frenchmen in Canada, who can but just subsist, and who can pay no taxes to Great Britain, would tend to relieve our seamen (if there are any) who are impressed.

But still I did think, Mr. Madison knew what he *could* do. I supposed when Gen. Hull told the Canadians that he had an overwhelming force, that would look down all opposition, that he would take the country as easily as he wrote his proclamation.

But what has been my surprize and mortification to find, that we have had three successive armies cut off, have lost a thousand men by the sword, and four thousand by capture; that we have not gained one inch of ground, but have lost a whole province, the Michigan Territory?

I am not over superstitious, but when I consider the invasion of Russia and Canada, by the allied powers of France and America; I am constrained to believe in the justice and overruling providence of God, who has declared that he will “break the rod of the oppressor and scatter the nations which delight in war.”

As to what *will* be the fruits of this war, the event is only known to God. But when we see our generals *alarmed* for the safety of *our own* posts, instead of boast-

ingly carrying their arms into the peacefull territories of an unoffending neighbour ; when we see the mighty state of Virginia forced to distrust the power of the Union, and raising a *standing* army of her *own*, to defend the trembling and terrified inhabitants of her sea-coast, I can predict as little for the future as for the past.

Some weak men there may be who may presage a happy issue from the partial success at sea. We have indeed gallantly achieved three naval victories, but such was the acknowledged superiority of our enemy in numbers on the ocean, that two out of the three ships captured were wisely and prudently destroyed, because it was dangerous to attempt to bring them into port.

These partial successes are a cause of as much confidence, and no more, than if we had captured three videttes of the enemy in *single combat*. This would have proved the superior courage of our own videttes or guards. But what cause of exultation does it afford, when we know that Great Britain has 250 such ships, and that, learning wisdom from experience, she will send them out in *such numbers* as will defy the valour and defeat the exertions of our gallant seamen ?

We have three greater, and five smaller frigates ; If the whole force was now combined, they could not, without rashness and certain destruction, enter the Chesapeake.

The *capital* of our nation is now blockaded and that blockade never can, and never will be raised by any force we now possess, or can create during the war.

Discouraging and desperate as are our prospects on land, they are more so on the ocean. On neither element has our adversary yet shewn his force. On neither I fear shall we eventually be successful, for the God of battles cannot be with us in this warfare.

4thly. Who dances, and who pays the piper ?

The President dances, for he has his 25,000 dollars a year, whether the country thrives or is impoverished and ruined ; he has the patronage of ten thousand appointments created by the war.

Gen. Dearborn dances, for he receives an enormous salary, and rations, and perquisites.

Gen. Varnum dances, for he has two or three sons in public offices.

Gen. King dances, for he is employed in raising troops, and perhaps he has so much a head, as we sell cattle, for selling men to the government, to spill their blood in a disastrous war.

All the contractors, military officers, commissaries and other dependants in the army dance, and make their fortunes at the publick expense.

But the farmers, fishermen and mechanics *pay the piper*. We pay it by the certain fall of our farms, our produce and our labour. Some of us do not yet feel it, and we are weak enough to believe that the day of reckoning will never come. We are like silly men, who, as long as they can get money on mortgage, live as if the hour of redemption would never arrive. We shall soon find the sheriff at the door, when we are unprepared.

We *now* pay the piper, in the increased price of foreign articles, our rum, tea, sugar, and English goods, as well as in the diminished value of some of our own products, our lumber and other articles; but we shall next summer feel it in the direct taxes, which will in July next, be levied on our land and cattle, to an amount three or four times that of our state tax. You have thought it would not come, you are deceived. I have read all the acts of Congress, and you will feel it soon, as certain, as speedy, as inexorable and as dreadful as death.

5thly. How much will Massachusetts pay towards this war, and what will be my proportion of this expense?

I shall take as my guide in this enquiry, the calculation of Mr. Cheeves, one of the most eminent speakers in Congress, in favor of the war. He estimated the annual expense of it, at 40 millions of dollars. To prove that this is not overrated, I have already shewn that the expense of the last nine months, was sixteen millions, though we had not more than ten or fifteen thousand men under arms. When our standing army of fifty thousand men, shall be complete, and our four 74's and six new frigates are built, I am afraid the expense will much exceed Mr. Cheeves' calculation, since being friendly to the war, he has doubtless made it as small as possible.

Of the forty millions thus yearly expended, Massachusetts must pay according to her census and representation, one ninth part, or four millions four hundred thousand dollars every year.

We farmers, accustomed to deal in hundreds and tens, cannot easily form an idea of these great sums.

I have taken the pains to calculate our proportions, compared with what we now pay, and I find from figures, that our yearly state tax is only one thirtieth part of what the National Government will impose upon us.

Thus for example, our state tax is 133,000 dollars, and the town in which I live, pays five dollars on every thousand, or 665 dollars. Now I find our little town will pay towards *the war every year*, nineteen thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars. My own state tax is usually five dollars and I am a pretty good liver, and it will during the war, be every year 150 dollars; and if the war lasts five years, our town's proportion will be 100,000 dollars, and my share will be 750 dollars, this is more than I can pay, besides all my state, town, and parish taxes, and much more than I am *willing* to pay for the protection of *all the seamen* in his Britannic Majesty's service.

I know they flatter us, that we shall have no *direct land tax*, but I have looked over the debates in Congress, and I find that they have adjourned to an early day on purpose to lay them. Besides, weak as they think us farmers are, I can see that if they *tax spirits*, and foreign produce, I must finally pay it because I am a consumer. But Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, says he cannot get along without a *land tax*. I am not one of those spendthrifts, who are easy when great debts are accumulating, merely because I am not to day called upon to pay them. I know interest is running on, and will finally eat up all my substance. I am therefore against this war.

6thly. Whether the war has borne, and whether it is likely to bear equally upon all the states?

The war has borne very unequally upon the different states. While the northern states have been, and will continue to be great sufferers, the southern states

have been great *gainers* by the war, for they have been enriched by it.

No man dreads *disunion* more than I do, and no man so much disapproves the sowing jealousies, and making distinctions between the states; but then I am not such a fool, I am not such a slave to my fears of disunion, as to *approve* of measures which ruin my own part of the country, my own native town and state, and enrich the other states who voted for it.

Now for the facts; Massachusetts owned more than one third part of all the shipping in the United States, and yet its representatives in Congress are only one ninth. As the shipping interests are the greatest sufferers by the war, so it follows, that Massachusetts must in this one article, lose three times her fair proportion. The fisheries and lumber trade, which are two others of our staples, and are nearly peculiar to us, are almost, or quite ruined. In these articles alone, we suffer more than all the states south of New-York do, from all sorts of losses. Our trade in salted provisions has also met a great check, and would have been ruined if Britain had begun the war in earnest, which she never did till now. Next season we must kill our cattle as the South Americans do, for their hides and tallow, and abandon their flesh to the birds of prey.

While we thus suffer more than any other people from the loss upon our own products, we pay four or five times our fair part of the expenses of the war, or at least of the present taxes.

This is because we are much greater *consumers* (in proportion to our numbers) of articles subject to taxation.

Thus there are one million and more of slaves, who are duly represented in Congress, and yet *they consume no taxable* articles; but a poor inhabitant of Barnstable county, or of the province of Maine, if they are a little weakly, and want a cup of tea, must pay the double duty of 25 cents a pound.

So on *all spirits* we pay 60 cents a gallon, but the southern people make their own spirits, and pay nothing. I see Mr. Quincy proposed to put the *same tax*

on their whiskey, which *they rejected*. They like the Union, but they do not like equality; they like the war, but *we* must pay for it.

So when the direct taxes come, if the whole was to be raised upon the polls, a poll tax every year in our state, would be 44 dollars a head; yet in the southern states, their black labourers are not counted as polls, and the tax must there be levied on the rich planter.

The war is therefore much more heavily *felt here* than there, even when the burdens are fairly proportioned.

While *we* in Massachusetts have been suffering in our shipping, ship building, fisheries, lumber trade, and country products, while houses and stores, and wharves as I am told, in the towns, are falling in value every hour, the southern states have been enriched beyond all measure, since the war. Their flour, and rice, and wheat, have been sold at prices higher than was ever known, and so *cunning are they*, and so afraid is President Madison of making them *opposed to the war*, that after all his parade and angry speeches about *Britain's licenses* to carry their flour, it evaporated in smoke, and Congress rose, without forbidding that thing which the President represented as *so naughty*. Why so? Why, because it would be as much as his life would be worth, to forbid those high spirited Virginians to send out *their flour even to the British armies*. But he can make the cool and calculating yankees give up their trade, and even their last coat without danger of losing his popularity.

What made the war operate more cruelly on us, was, that 100,000 of our population, are supplied with bread stuff from the southern states, and we had to pay them these enormous prices, so that they have been enriched at *our* expense.

This, brother farmers, will explain to you, why the southern representatives all continue to vote for war, though the cause of war is removed.

7thly. What may be the effect upon us, of the late disasters of the French in Russia?

I never can think of the vast successes of the Russians, and the total overthrow of the French armies,

without mixed feelings of fear and pleasure, gratitude to God, and admiration for that distant, but wonderful people.

When I consider that for twenty years, success had always attended the arms of Bonaparte, except in Egypt; that he had often subdued powerful nations in one campaign, I cannot but look upon the late total destruction of his army, as a signal interposition of divine providence. That a nation on the borders of Asia, thirteen hundred miles from France, should have been made the instrument of the liberation of the world, bespeaks something more than human contrivance. It must have been God, who hardened the heart of the French Emperor, and emboldened him to penetrate with all his forces, into the centre of Russia. It must have been the same divine power, which so blinded his usual faculties, as to induce him to stay at Moscow, until the severity of the season rendered his retreat desperate. It must have been HIM who inspired the Russian generals and soldiers, with the heroism which they displayed—who gave speed to their horses, vigour to their arms, and courage to their hearts.

I cannot but rejoice, that the invader has been humbled, and the oppressed relieved. I wish I was not obliged to make a comparison of the events in Europe, with those which have passed in *our own* country. *We* made a diversion of the British force, just at the critical moment when Bonaparte would have asked us so to do. Just as *he* attacked Russia, the *same* month, and almost the *same* day, I believe the *very same*, we declared war against the king of Great Britain, who was three thousand miles off, and did not know it for two months afterwards. *We* also *invaded* his provinces, but those provinces were under much greater disadvantage than Russia was. She was prepared, Canada was not. Russia is as populous as France. Canada is thirty times less populous than the United States.

The interposition of divine providence against us, and in favour of Canada, was therefore more striking. The case of Gen. Hull alone, is a proof of it. That man was as proud as Pharaoh. He told the Canadians he came to overwhelm them—that if they submitted, they should

be free—if they defended their estates, he should punish them severely; he even added, if a certain class of the inhabitants of the British territory, should be found fighting, he would give no quarter, which means that he would murder them in cold blood. God hardened his heart, as he led Pharaoh into the Red Sea, and swallowed him up, and all his host, so he delivered General Hull and all *his* host, into the power of a hand-full of British troops.

If any man should be disposed to deny that the hand of Providence is manifest in this thing, let him consider the loss of two other powerful armies, which have since been delivered up to a foe, whose numbers are so small that their achievements are little short of miracles. If it be asked what I say to our naval successes? I answer—*There* we are not *invaders*—but the successes at sea are transient, and will not avail us against the force our enemy will have on our coast, in thirty days. Our triumphs are nearly over. Heaven will never, I believe, prosper us in this war.

But I ask, what is to become of us, if Bonaparte makes peace, as he talks of doing with Britain? Will he include us as his allies? Or will he leave us to fight it out alone? We may not be conquered, but when all the British force is liberated in Europe, the conflict between us will be a dreadful one, too dreadful for such a cause. Even if peace is not made between the European powers, France may withdraw her troops from Spain, and Lord Wellington and his veteran army, who have beaten the French wherever they fought them, may be sent to fight Gen. Dearborn, and some raw recruits.

As a sober man, I cannot but lament the folly of declaring war, and the still greater madness, in persisting in it after its cause was wholly removed.

8thly. What ought a plain honest farmer to do, to contribute his mite towards a peace? in other words, what is the quiet, natural, easy road to peace, commerce, and prosperity?

We who live out of the busy world, are apt to think that it is of no consequence to public affairs what *we* think or do. Never was a greater mistake—The ques-

tion of *war* and *peace* in the next Congress may turn upon the vote of one single obscure farmer, in Oxford County in Maine, or in Barnstable, or Norfolk, or Bristol.

A *soldier in an army* might as well reason in the same manner, and therefore run off in a battle, and if *all his* neighbors reasoned in the same way, it would be as bloodless a victory to the enemy as general Hull's. A little wheel in a watch, or a complicated machine, might as well be taken out without disturbing the movements, as a man, a private obscure man, can be permitted to *live* in the *neglect* of his political duties.

In three counties in this state, in the late election of members of Congress, there was either *no* choice, or a friend to *the war* was elected by a majority of some twenty or thirty votes. Now if *one farmer* in each town had not neglected his duty, *all the members* in the next Congress from this state would have been in favor of peace, and as Congress will now be so nearly balanced it is probable that this alone might have given us peace.

It is the same with the state elections—If this great and powerful state of Massachusetts should re-elect Governor Strong with an increased majority, it will satisfy Mr. Madison that it is vain to think of carrying on the war. For indeed in a free Government how can a war prosper, to which the people in whom all power resides are opposed? So if the Senate should continue in the *war interest* as it did last year, what will Mr. Madison say? He will say “the Legislature of Massachusetts is divided—The upper house is in *favor of war* and of my measures, I am therefore safe.” But if this great state and New-York, which is as much opposed to the war as we are, should unite, and respectfully tell the general Government that they must have peace, that their people called for it, do you think they would refuse to make peace? No, not *one hour*, not if we *were determined*.

Why, New-York and Massachusetts together make nearly two millions of souls, and there are not more than six million whites in all the United States.

If Norfolk, Bristol, Barnstable, Cumberland, and Essex, ~~choose~~ *choose peace Senators*, we may look upon the

war at an end. I cannot believe Mr. Madison mad enough, against such a force, to continue it—The road to peace then is through the coming elections, and every man ought to feel and act as if the war or peace depended on his *one vote*, for it may so turn out, since the Senator from his county may come in by *one vote*, and the peace majority in the Senate may depend on one Senator, though we hope and expect better things.

I shall now conclude with some remarks on governor Strong and deacon Phillips, considered merely as *peace men*, and general Varnum, and general King, as *men of war*; in which, I shall particularly notice the militia drafts to which in case of the election of the latter you will be subject.

I dislike all comparisons of private character—I am an enemy to slander in every form, but in choosing men to public offices I always look to their public conduct. Governor Strong is well known to us all. His moderation, if it was his only good quality, would recommend him to me.

But as I feel an interest in the election chiefly as it regards its effect in putting an end to the war, I must give my vote for Governor Strong, because he is an open and avowed friend of peace.

To *him* we owe the preservation of peace within our own borders. But for him our cities would have been like Baltimore, stained with the blood of our citizens. But for him our sons would have been dragged to the frontier, there to perish by want, by sickness and by the sword, or to pine in the prisons of our enemy. Guarding conscientiously our constitutional rights, he refused to permit our citizens to be carried away by military force, against the express provisions of our constitution.

Now governor Strong, was either right or wrong in this refusal. If he was wrong, although I dislike the war, I should condemn him, because I believe in the precept of our blessed saviour, “render unto Cæsar, the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”

I inquired, therefore, whether he was right in refusing to order out the militia, when Madison ordered him, and I find our supreme judges determined, he act-

ed according to law. I find too, that though the President complained of it to Congress, yet neither he nor they have dared to exercise the unlawful power; from which I conclude, that Strong was right and *they* were wrong; for they surely would not give up their just rights to a man whom they do not like.

I therefore honour him, as a just, upright magistrate, who will preserve, and maintain the rights of the *people*. It is for *this very* purpose we choose magistrates.

I then enquired what general Varnum had done; and I found he was *one of six men only*, who brought this war upon us. There were but six majority in the senate in *favor of war*; if general Varnum had voted against it, it would have made a difference of two, for it would have taken one from the *war party*, and added one to the peace party. In that case, *our senators* would have been *united* against the war, for Mr. Lloyd, our other senator, voted against it. Now I think, that the united opinion of so great a state against it, would have affected four or five more votes, and thus general Varnum alone might have prevented the war. I then asked what led general Varnum to behave in this manner, and I found he had several sons in the pay of government, and that he had made a handsome fortune out of the publick. I found that he did not dare act against the wishes of the President. Now, though I have no wish to encourage a jealousy of the National Government, yet I wish this state to maintain its Independence. I love my native state, and I would support its dignity, and I cannot bear the thoughts of having a Governor, whose family is dependant for their bread and fortunes, on the general government. I cannot call such a man independent. But my chief objection to general Varnum is, that he voted for the war, and if he is elected, my only son may be drafted, and forced to fight in a foreign country, against the express provisions of the constitution.

As to Gen. King, I have two objections to him; the first is, it has been published in the prints, that he undertook to sell our votes, at the next choice of President, that is, he offered if the New-York people would vote

for a war President this time, Massachusetts would vote for a New-York President, at the election four years hence.

Now I do not know, who gave Gen. King this power. He is a great man, I hear, in his own opinion; but I never gave him a right to sell my vote, as he would sell cattle, or as he sells soldiers to Mr. Madison.

My second objection is, that he is so zealous in the war, that he is raising recruits for it in the province of Maine; if he receives as much a head, as I suppose he does, he may make 10, or 20,000 dollars by sending our fellow citizens to death and slaughter. I do not want a lieutenant governor engaged in such an employ. I much prefer a moderate, sensible, firm, and religious manlike, deacon Phillips.

These, my fellow citizens, are my reasons for preferring at the next election, *peace men*, to the *war party*.

I can see no benefit in the war; I can, in it, see loss, and expense, and disgrace. I can see no justice in it, now the great cause of it is removed. I shall therefore vote for the men of peace. I am glad to find I am not the only republican of this opinion; when I find such old and staunch republicans as general Heath, and a thousand others voting with me, I am persuaded I am right; and that it is no desertion of republicanism to oppose the war, and to vote for such moderate men as governor Strong and governor Phillips.

AN OLD FARMER.

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