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
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








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Nicholas Comyn Esqr.  
with the Respects of  
Major Genl. Ripley  
**FACTS**

RELATIVE TO THE

**CAMPAIGN ON THE NIAGARA.**

IN 1814.

170541

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BOSTON:

**PRINTED AT THE PATRIOT-OFFICE.**

1815.





## ADVERTISEMENT.

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THE following Documents are given to the public without comment. Some explanatory facts are stated ; but in such instances the persons who can bear witness to them are invariably pointed out. The object is to elicit truth, and to do that justice to a gallant Army, whose merits are yet but imperfectly known to their countrymen.

WITH a view to render the developement of truth complete, and to remove the veil of mystery which a system of puffing intrigue has spread around the transactions of the Niagara Campaign, any officer who deems the present statement incomplete, is requested to forward his own statement, certified upon honor, to the *Patriot Office*, at *Boston*, and it shall be published in the form of a supplement.

THE object, it is repeated, is not to raise an artificial reputation at the expense of any officer, but to unfold to the Country, and to the Army, the real events of a Campaign as they existed in fact, and as they ought to exist in history. Perhaps this developement has been too

long delayed. It is possible that the Public may cease to feel the interest which the moment of triumph excites. But in any event, now that the period of enthusiasm is over, and conflicting opinions caused by temporary excitement are done away, it is confidently believed that an appeal may be made with effect, to the reason and intelligence of the community.

It is not, however, without regret, that there exists a necessity for this appeal. It would have been much more gratifying to have derived from the honest integrity of a Commanding General that fair exposition of facts and deductions for which it becomes now necessary to resort to the statement of officers of the Army, and the justice of the nation.

## CAMPAIGN ON THE NIAGARA.

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*A STATEMENT of facts respecting the late Campaign on the Niagara frontier, which fell within my knowledge while acting as Volunteer Aid to Brigadier General RIPLEY, of the United States Army.*

ON the night of the 3d of July, 1814, General Ripley crossed the Niagara River with his Brigade, above Fort Erie, and landed his men in good order notwithstanding the embarrassing situation the General had been placed in for want of means of transportation, having only two gun boats, and two small boats, for the crossing of his whole brigade. The gun boats could not get nearer the Canada shore than about three quarters of a mile, and the small boats would not contain more than about fifty men each—fortunate for the General, the enemy made no resistance on our landing, or he must have lost a great many of his men, as, he could not land at a time more than one hundred men. On the morning of the battle of Chippewa, General Porter was ordered out on the left of our two lines, first and second brigades with his volunteers and Indians to skirmish with the enemy, who at that time were constantly annoying our flanks. Shortly after General Porter entered the woods, he was attacked by a large body of the enemy's *light troops* and Indians; during this time Generals Brown, Scott and Ripley, with several other officers, were met together at the White-house.

General Ripley on hearing the constant and heavy firing between General Porter and the enemy, mentioned to General Brown, that Porter was engaged and ought to be supported. General Brown immediately ordered General Scott to get his brigade in readiness for action, and gave the same orders to General Ripley, which were immediately complied with.

General Scott had scarcely his brigade in motion, before the enemy made their appearance in line of battle on his right. Gen. Scott advanced his brigade to meet the enemy, and commenced the action. General Ripley had his brigade formed in line of battle, and remained some time exposed to the enemy's artillery, waiting for orders; at length he received orders to advance with his Brigade on the left of General Scott, in the woods, which he immediately complied with, and although not particularly engaged in the action of that day, his brigade was in advance of the first, anxious to have an opportunity in sharing in the honor of the day. The enemy had been beaten over the Chippewa Rivers, and obliged to take shelter behind their works. The whole of our army had orders to return to camp. Some few days after our army marched to Queenstown, I received orders from the War Department to join my regiment at New York.

I cannot in justice to my feelings dismiss this subject, without expressing the high opinion I entertain for that worthy gentleman and soldier, Brigadier General Ripley.

(Signed)

D. NOON,

*Major 41st Infantry.*

*Albany, 13th March, 1815.*

P. S. I forgot to mention that on the day the battle was fought at Chippewa, General Ripley did more than once solicit orders from General Brown to *attack the enemy on the left of General Scott*, and he certainly was much disappointed in not receiving orders sooner than he did.

(Signed)

D. N.

*Maj. 41st Inf.*

## *Operations of the Army after the Battle of Chippewa.*

THE battle of Chippewa presented this singular phenomenon in military history : an enemy, inferior in numbers, cross a bridge, advance a mile and an half, attack us ; are repulsed at all points, and by little more than half our force ; and yet they are suffered to retire across the bridge with their artillery, and their whole force, only leaving their dead and wounded on the field. The victorious army remained four days on their former ground, and then took up their line of march in pursuit. On the 10th of July, they arrived at Queenstown ; on the 14th, they received intelligence that Gen. Rial was at the 12 mile creek with the main body ; and Col. Scott of the 103d was at the 10 mile Creek, with the advance, consisting of militia, Indians, and the Glengary light infantry, which had come up from York. The militia of the country were called out, and collecting *en masse* from Long-point to the bay of Quinti, a distance of 120 miles. The position of Gen. Rial was 10 or 12 miles from our camp at Queenstown ; and about the same distance from Fort George, and his regular force was ascertained to be about 10 or 1500. He had been reinforced with the garrison of Burlington Heights, 800 strong, and the Glengary light infantry from York, 400 strong. His force consisted of these corps, a part of the Royal Scots, and the 100th regiment. He had left the 41st and the 8th to garrison forts George, Mississauga and Niagara, together with the seamen and marines of two brigs in the river.

With these facts known to the General Staff of the American army, Major General Brown called a conference of officers. Gen. Scott was for investing Fort George. Gen. Ripley made a proposition to march that night, with his brigade and Towson's and Biddle's artillery, and attack Gen. Rial at revellie, so as to bring him to action, and for Generals Scott and Porter to be kept within supporting distance ; and Colonel Hindman to bring up the park of artillery in reserve. The reasons General Ripley assigned for this movement were,—that if we moved against Fort George, we could not carry it. To think of storming it, was out of the question ; and to invest it, would be perfectly absurd, for we had only our 18 pounders to besiege a place where by dismantling Niagara,



30 heavy pieces of artillery could be brought to bear upon us. That if we invested Fort George, we should waste a few days, which would give the enemy opportunity to reinforce from Kingston; and if this were allowed them, as we only had an effective force of 26 or 2700 men, our movement must resolve itself into a retrograde one for our own security. But on the other hand, if we attacked Rial, and broke him down before he could be reinforced, the peninsula was within our power. This proposition was supported by Gen. Porter, Col. McRee and Col. Wood: Col. Hindman gave no opinion: Gen. Brown, Gen. Scott and Col. Gardner, were opposed to it, and in favor of investing Fort George. The movement was made on Fort George the 16th of July; and on the 23d, without even opening a single trench, the forces retrograded. They fell back to Chippewa the 24th; and on that evening, Gen. Drummond arrived with three fresh battalions from Kingston; several battalions of militia were concentrated, and Gen. Rial, with a force about 3000 strong, moved forward his camp to Lundy's lane.

For the truth of these facts we refer to all the officers of the General Staff above named.

It may be proper to give a statement of the forces of the two armies at the commencement, and during the battle of Niagara as nearly as their force can be ascertained.

|                                         |           |       |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Royal Scots, 2 battalions consolidated  | . . . . . | 800   |
| 8th,                                    | . . . . . | 350   |
| 41st,                                   | . . . . . | 600   |
| 100th,                                  | . . . . . | 400   |
| ** 89th, from Kingston                  | . . . . . | 700   |
| ** 103d, from Kingston                  | . . . . . | 800   |
| ** 104th, Flank Companies from Kingston | . . . . . | 220   |
| Glengary Light Infantry, from York      | . . . . . | 400   |
|                                         |           | <hr/> |
|                                         | Regulars, | 4276  |

\*\* Those with this mark, *reinforcements*, the others were engaged in the battle of Chippewa.

|           |           |       |
|-----------|-----------|-------|
| Regulars, | . . . . . | 4276  |
| Militia,  | . . . . . | 1250  |
| Indians,  | . . . . . | 480   |
|           |           | <hr/> |

Grand Total, 6006

The reinforcements, excepting Glengarians, arrived about nine o'clock.

## *Operations of Gen. Ripley's brigade at Niagara.*

*Minutes of the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled in the Court House, in the village of Troy and State of New York, in pursuance of the following General Order, issued by the War Department.*

*Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 16th Feb. 1815.*

### GENERAL ORDER.

A Court of Inquiry, of which Major General Henry Dearborn is President, and Brigadier Generals Moses Porter and Daniel Bissell, members, will sit in Troy, in the State of New York, immediately after the General Court Martial now sitting in that place, shall have finished its business; to inquire into the conduct of Brigadier General E. W. Ripley, during the last campaign, and particularly in relation to his conduct immediately after the battle of Niagara of the 25th of July, 1814.

The Court will hear and report such testimony, documents, and evidence, as it shall deem important, and give its opinion on the case.

E. A. Bancker, Esq. Army Judge Advocate, will attend the court as recorder.

*By order of the Secretary of War,*

(Signed)

D. PARKER,

*Adj. and Ins. General.*

*Troy, March 14, 1815.*

*The Court convened pursuant to the preceding General Order.*

Present,

Major General H. DEARBORN, *President.*

*Members,*

Brigadier General PORTER. Brigadier General BISSELL.

E. A. BANCKER,

*Judge Advocate.*

The prescribed oaths being administered, and the Court organized as above. Brigadier General Eleazar W. Ripley, of the United States Army, appeared, the General Order was read, and the in-

quiry into the subject matter enjoined by the same was commenced by the examination of Captain *McDonald*, as follows, *to wit* :

*William McDonald*, Captain in the 19th regiment of United States Infantry, being produced and sworn as a witness by General Ripley—Testified,

That in the campaign of 1814, before and during the battle of Bridgewater, near Niagara, he was acting Aid to Brigadier Gen. Ripley. On the morning of the 25th of July, the army under the command of Major General Brown, was encamped on the upper side of Chippewa Creek; many of the men were that day engaged in washing, and about half an hour before sun-set, were still out, when a firing was heard, which they in camp ascribed to General Scott's being engaged with the enemy, as he had marched out with his brigade about two hours before.

When General Scott first marched out, it was the general impression that he had done so for the purpose of parade and drill. Our army at this time consisted of two brigades of regular troops, commanded by Brigadier Generals Scott and Ripley, and a small corps of 5 or 600 volunteers under Gen. Porter.

The total of Gen. Ripley's brigade, may have amounted to about 900: the effectives from 7 to 800. The day before at Queenstown heights, he recollected hearing General Scott say that *his* brigade contained about the same number—perhaps rather less.

About the 16th of July, they had intelligence that Gen. Rial, of the British army, lay at 10 and 12 mile Creek, with 1500 men. According to the general impression, he had a fortified encampment—to the best of his knowledge no precise information was received of the force and position of the enemy between the 16th and 25th of July.

On the day last mentioned, the proportion of those who formed the washing parties and scattered men of the camp, amounted in the second brigade alone to 150 or 200 men. There were parties from the other brigade also, but he could not state the number.

When General Scott moved out in the afternoon, no idea was entertained that there would be an action, nor had they any knowledge of the vicinity of the enemy—the first information they had was from the firing.

In the order of the encampment, the first brigade under Gen. Scott rested on the Chippewa; the second commanded by Gen. Ripley, about two hundred yards distant, with their front to the Niagara,

and at right angles to the first. The encampment embraced the angle formed by the Niagara and Chippewa, which at that place formed a junction. Across the Chippewa was a bridge, over which General Scott had passed and advanced about two miles, when the firing of musketry commenced. Immediately on hearing it, Gen. Ripley ordered his brigade to be formed. By the time this was effected, the report of artillery was distinguished. Soon after, orders were received from Major Gen. Brown, through some of his staff, for the second brigade to advance and reinforce Gen. Scott. Gen. Ripley immediately on receiving the order, marched with his brigade, across the Chippewa, and when about half a mile in the rear of the scene of action, it being then near dusk, despatched the witness in advance to Major Gen. Brown, to ascertain the situation of the enemy, and what point he should march to, and form his brigade.

The witness on his way to General Brown, met his aid, Captain Spencer, proceeding with orders to General Ripley, to form his brigade in the skirts of a wood on the right of General Scott's. The brigade accordingly continued to advance, and was in the act of forming the line, when General Ripley remarked to Col. Miller and other commanders that, to form a line in that place would be of no consequence, as they could not advance in *line*, through the woods—and they were not then within striking distance of the enemy.—He added, that he would take upon himself the responsibility of moving further on towards the enemy, before he formed. The witness left the brigade for a few minutes to apprise Gen. Brown, of this movement, but did not find him, and immediately rejoined General Ripley.

The march from the encampment to the scene of action was prompt and rapid, and the brigade for one half the distance was on a long trot to keep with the General's horse.—While passing the woods in pursuance of General Ripley's determination to advance, the fire of the enemy was very heavy, and their shot and shells fell about us in great quantities, but was more particularly directed at General Scott's brigade on the left, which the second was then in the act of passing. The impression was, that the first brigade was at this time suffering very severely from the continued and destructive fire poured in upon them, and General Ripley in consequence remarked to the witness and Col. Miller, that he would detach the 21st regiment, commanded by the latter,



to carry the enemy's artillery, adding that unless this was done, they would destroy our whole force, or compel us to fall back. It was then completely dark, and though it was known their artillery was posted on an eminence, we had no knowledge of their number, or how they were supported. The distance of General Scott's line from the enemy, must have been between three and four hundred yards at that time, and there was then no firing of musketry from it.

After General Ripley's suggestion to Col. Miller, the latter immediately made dispositions to execute it—displayed his regiment by forming a line on the left of the road nearly fronting the enemy's artillery. General Ripley, at the same time he gave the order for the 21st to storm the battery by an attack in front, directed the 23d to form in column, and march against the enemy's flank. About the time the 21st was preparing to move as directed, the witness met General Brown, who enquired for General Ripley, and asked what dispositions he had made; the witness informed him, he approved of it, appeared quite elated with the intelligence, and accompanied him to General Ripley. Some conversation took place between them, and in a very few minutes both battalions were in motion; the 21st commanded by Col. Miller, the 23d by Major McFarland, but led by General Ripley in person.—While the 23d was advancing to operate against the enemy's flank, and about 150 yards distance from the height, they received a fire in front from perhaps 50 or 60 musketry which threw them into confusion for a few minutes, and caused them to fall back about 50 or 60 yards. The regiment however speedily recovered and formed into column, sooner than he has ever known one formed for parade—though perhaps not with equal accuracy. Some difficulty occurred in forming the platoons, in consequence of their having been broken; but their numbers were guessed at, and wheeled into column with a view to despatch and to facilitate the movement. The whole was accomplished under the particular direction and immediate agency of Brigadier General Ripley. His exertions to effect it were very great, and no one could be more active than he was. The whole interval from the moment the fire was received in front, until the actual re-organization of the column in readiness to advance, did not exceed five minutes. They then marched directly and displayed upon the enemy's flank. While this was performing Col. Miller had advanced pursuant to his orders against



the front, and succeeded in carrying the enemy's battery, consisting of seven pieces of artillery; to wit, two brass twenty-fours and smaller ones. Having passed the position where the artillery had been planted, Col. Miller again formed his line facing the enemy, and engaged them within twenty paces distance. There appeared a perfect sheet of fire between the two lines. While the 21st was in this situation, the 23d attacked the enemy's flank, and advanced within twenty paces of it, before the first volley was discharged; a measure adopted by command of General Ripley, that the fire might be effectual and more completely destructive. The movement compelled the enemy's flank to fall back immediately by descending the hill out of sight; upon which the firing ceased. Prior to the fire of the 23d, the enemy were closing in upon Col. Miller's command, which appeared to be hard pressed, and as he conceived was recoiling; the force opposed amounting to double his number; but by the prompt aid of the 22d, the heights were gained, and cleared of the enemy. After this was achieved, the 21st and 23d formed in line by order, and under the direction of Gen. Ripley, leaving the batteries which had been carried in the rear. While thus circumstanced, a detachment of the 1st regiment, which consisted of from 100 to 200 men, and had remained in the rear, joined them on the heights, and was by Gen. Ripley formed into the line. He could not say what had detained the above detachment so long from the scene of action.

Shortly after the line was formed, Gen. Ripley sent him to ask Gen. Brown whether the captured artillery should not be moved off the field towards Chippewa. The witness met Gen. Brown, ascending the hill, and delivered his message: The latter replied, there were matters of more importance to attend to at that moment, and he should see Gen. Ripley himself. He appeared highly elated, and rode with him to Gen. Ripley; but the witness did not hear the conversation which passed. The heights thus gained, were a very commanding position, and contained all the enemy's artillery, capable of *enfilading* in every direction. While the second brigade thus occupied the heights, Gen. Scott's brigade was about three hundred yards distant, and no enemy between them. The firing from it had by this time nearly ceased.

After Gen. Brown's interview with Gen. Ripley, he left the hill, as the witness understood, in search of Gen. Scott. The 25th regiment then joined the second brigade, was formed on the right,

nearly at right angles to the 23d regiment, its left resting on Towson's artillery, and disposed so as to flank the enemy in case they attacked. The artillery under command of Major Hindman and Captain Towson, had come up but a few moments before, in consequence of Gen. Ripley's request communicated by the witness to Major Hindman, and complied with by him.

While Gen. Ripley's line was thus formed on the eminence, the enemy advanced upon it in considerable force—out-flanking its right and left, and far exceeding it in numbers. On finding them approaching, Gen. Ripley ordered the brigade to reserve its fire until the enemy's bayonets should touch, in preference to firing first. This was done with a view to observe the flash of their muskets, and to take aim by the assistance of their light. The order was obeyed: the enemy advanced within ten or twelve yards of our right, composed of the 23d regiment. After receiving their fire, we returned it: the action then became general: a tremendous conflict ensued for about twenty minutes; at the expiration of which, the enemy gave way, and again fell back out of sight. We having much the advantage of the ground, the enemy generally fired over our heads, but the continual blaze of light was such as to enable us distinctly to see their buttons. An interval of half an hour followed, when the enemy advanced a second time, nearly in the same manner, attacked precisely in the same point, but did not approach so near, before the firing commenced. Our left had by this time been thrown forward by order of Gen. Ripley, and the line formed nearly parallel, with the addition of Gen. Porter's volunteers on the left, and Gen. Scott with the three remaining battalions on the right; but the latter were so situated, as not to be engaged. The contest was more severe, and he thinks, longer continued than the last. The same precautions were enjoined by Gen. Ripley, with respect to his men reserving their fire, and the reception of the enemy was equally warm. Some part of our right and left gave way; but our centre, composed of the 21st Reg. stood firm, with the exception of some platoons which also fell back: the enemy were repulsed, and retired again from the contest. Gen. Ripley, in person, rallied the detachments which gave way on the right, and succeeded in bringing them back into action before the retreat of the enemy. An interval not to exceed three quarters of an hour, ensued; during which, all was darkness and silence; scarce interrupted by a breath of air. The men had nei-

ther water nor whiskey to refresh themselves, after the fatigues they had endured.

*The Court adjourned to Wednesday, the 15th March, 1815, 11 o'clock, A. M.*

TROY, MARCH 15, 1815.

*The Court convened pursuant to adjournment—the same Members present.*

THE examination of Capt. *McDonald* being resumed—He stated, That at the expiration of the interval last mentioned, the enemy advanced a third time to recover their artillery. It was our impression that they had been reinforced, and this was confirmed by prisoners who were taken at the time. The advance of the enemy was similar to the two preceding ones, and the fire was again opened by their line. Gen. Ripley's brigade reserved their fire as before. The duration and order of the conflict—its result, and the retreat of the enemy, were in all essential points, similar to the last.

In every attack, the enemy were repulsed. Gen. Ripley made every possible exertion to inspire and encourage his troops; exposed his person during the hottest of the fire of the enemy; and as he considered, more than was necessary. The witness several times endeavoured to prevail upon him to retire, but without effect. His perseverance was unremitting; sometimes acting as file closer as well as commander. He gave his orders with perfect coolness and deliberation, and attended as far as possible, to their proper execution. The witness never knew him more collected.

Gen. Ripley's position was never more than ten or twelve paces in the rear of his line. He received two balls through his hat, and his horse was wounded during the several encounters. He, Lieut. Col. Nicholas, and the witness, were the only mounted officers of the second brigade.

After the last attack, the second brigade for three fourths, or one half an hour, remained on the hill with very little change of position: its left was perhaps thrown back. In the interim, General Ripley despatched the witness with orders to General Porter, to send fifty or one hundred volunteers of his command, directing them to report to Col. McRee, and remove the captured artillery from the heights to the camp on the Chippewa. He de-

livered the orders, saw the volunteers detached, and marched on the hill.—Owing to there being no drag-ropes for the artillery, no horses on the ground, and the guns being unlimbered, it was found impracticable to remove them, and the volunteers were then employed in removing the wounded. Prior to the attempt to remove the captured pieces, he saw no artillery corps on the ground, they having retired in consequence of their ammunition being expended and some of their caissons blown up, by the enemy's rockets and shells.

On the return of the witness, after communicating the preceding order to General Porter, preparations were made for the second brigade to retire, agreeable to orders from General Brown, as General Ripley at the time informed him. He also stated that Generals Brown and Scott were both wounded and had left the field. Our army accordingly retired unmolested, and it was his impression at the time, that the whole column did not exceed 700 when the retrograde movement was made. It was understood that vast numbers were employed in carrying off the wounded. Others had given out for want of water. When the second brigade marched to the field of battle, they met a considerable number of the first brigade returning to camp, some slightly wounded, and others carried off by those who were uninjured. Many wounded were left on the ground after the battle, they being scattered over a considerable extent, and the night dark, it was impossible to find them. He does not think any wounded of Brigadier General Ripley's brigade were left unless some who attempted to get off without assistance, and failed.

When General Ripley gave the order for the Army to retire, he directed the several commanders of battalions to collect all the wounded; and in the interval before retiring, he used every exertion to have this order properly executed.

While the army was moving back and afterwards, he knows of no other measures being taken to furnish horses, supply drag-ropes and bring off the artillery which remained on the heights with the exception of the smaller ones, which had been rolled down the hill.

After 12 o'clock at night the army regained their camp. The witness added, that the pickets and washing parties were not brought up, nor at all engaged during the action. Shortly after the return to camp, about one o'clock, Major General Brown directed Brigadier General Ripley.\*————\* The General Order dissolv-



ing the Court, which follows, was at this period of the investigation, received by the President, and no further testimony was heard.

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the minutes and proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of which Major-General H. Dearborn was President, so far as the Court proceeded in the investigation of the subject matter enjoined by the General Order constituting said Court.

[Signed]

EVERT A. BANCKER,

*Judge Advocate.*

The undersigned officers, who served in Gen. Ripley's brigade at the battle of Bridgewater, do certify on honor, that the narrative given in the foregoing minutes of Captain McDonald's testimony, corresponds with our knowledge and recollection of the conduct of Gen. Ripley, and the operations of his brigade during that action.

*Albany, March 17th, 1815.*

[Signed]

N. S. CLARKE,

*Capt. & Brig. Maj. 2d Brigade.*

Lieut. JNO. P. LIVINGSTON,

*Adjutant 23d Infantry.*

JOHN W. HOLDING,

*Lieut. and Brig. Major to Gen. Miller,  
and Adj. of the 21st Reg. of Infantry at  
the Battle of Bridgewater.*



*ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE.**4th March, 1815.*

## GENERAL ORDER.

THE Court of Inquiry, of which Major-Gen. DEARBORN is President, which was ordered to investigate the conduct of Brigadier-General RIPLEY, during the last campaign, is discharged from that service :

The Congress of the United States having approved his conduct by a highly complimentary resolve, and the President being pleased to express his favorable opinion of the military character of Gen. RIPLEY, he will honourably resume his command.

BY ORDER.

[Signed,]

D. PARKER,  
*A. & I. General.*

*Operations of Gen. Scott's Brigade at Niagara.*

DELHI, January 15th, 1815.

*Dear Sir,*

AT your request I send you a statement of facts which transpired under my view during the action at the falls of Niagara on the 25th of July last. By this, you will be able to ascertain, if my attendance and testimony will be material at your Court of Inquiry, and hope you will think it may be dispensed with.

On that day the left division of the Northern Army lay at Chippewa, on the south side of that creek, except the ninth regiment, which was posted in and near the Block-House, on the north side of the Chippewa, near the junction of that creek with the Niagara, in advance towards the enemy. It was my lot to be the

officer of the day. During the day, the Captain commanding picket No. 1, on the Niagara road, informed me he had discovered the advance of the enemy to consist of one troop of the 19th light dragoons, and two companies of infantry.

With a glass, which was at the picket, the enemy were plainly seen across the bend in the river, at and near the falls. They were at the house of Mrs. Wilson near the falls, and many officers in British uniform were to be seen. These facts were immediately related at head quarters. I was told the enemy could not be in force, as they had thrown a large portion of their forces across the Niagara, from Queenstown to Lewiston. It was apprehended to be the intention of the enemy to advance up the river on the American side, to Schlosser, where our sick, ammunition and other stores then were. Not having the means either of transporting these stores to the west side of the river, or troops to the other side to defend them, Gen. Scott was ordered to march immediately to Queenstown, with a view to induce the enemy to re-cross the Niagara. I was immediately relieved as officer of the day, and ordered by Gen. Scott to put my regiment, without delay, in light marching order. This order was obeyed. And in less than fifteen minutes, Gen. Scott's brigade, with Towson's company of artillery, and Captain Harris with a troop of U. S. and volunteer dragoons were on their march for Queenstown. Having proceeded down the river about two miles and an half, we came in sight of the enemy's advance. General Scott, now halted his column which I ought to have before stated consisted (in addition to those stated) of the ninth regiment, and which I had honor to command. The eleventh regiment commanded by Lt. Col. (then Major) McNeil, the 22d regiment commanded by Col. Brady, and the 25th regiment commanded by Col. (then Major) Jessup, amounting in all, according to the best estimate I can now make, to about 700 men. The ninth consisted at that time of 150 rank and file.

The enemy immediately began to retire before us; but from the information of the inhabitants, it was thought they intended to give us battle. General Scott now ordered me with the ninth regiment to the left of the road, and to keep within supporting distance of the column; having gained my position, the column again moved forward. After marching in quick time about half a mile, and coming to a narrow piece of woods north of Mrs. Wil-

son's, and between her house and the village at Lundy's lauc, the enemy commenced a fire upon our advance, which consisted of Captain Harris's command, and a company of infantry commanded by that gallant officer, Captain Pentland, of the 22d infantry. The column were again halted, and I received orders to take my position with my command in the column of line. After this order was executed, General Scott detached the 25th regiment under the command of Col. Jessup to the right; to seek and attack the left of the enemy's line. The ninth, twenty-second and eleventh regiments now passed the advanced corps by order of General Scott, and moved into a smooth field on the north side of the before mentioned woods, and west of the Niagara road. It was now about half past five o'clock, P. M. the enemy commenced firing upon us from nine pieces of artillery (two of which were brass 24 pounders,) and within cannon distance. They also opened at the same time a brisk fire upon us from a heavy line of infantry posted to the right, and obliquely in front of their artillery, often advancing into the field so far as to have the rear of the battalion or regiment in advance clear of the woods. General Scott, ordered "form line to the front." The right of the column being in front, this order was immediately executed by the *echelon* movement of companies to the left. The 22d and 11th regiments moved in column until gaining their respective distances, formed line in the same manner. At about the same time the company of artillery under the command of Col. (then Capt.) Towson, an officer above my encomium, was moved up and formed on the right of the ninth regiment, and by its frequent and incessant discharges highly animated the spirit of the troops. Under this formation the action continued for nearly an hour, when I heard that the 11th regiment being out of ammunition and their gallant leader Col. McNiel severely wounded, and all the Captains of that regiment either killed or wounded, had retired from the field. These facts were related to me by Capt. John Bliss of that regiment, who though severely wounded, gallantly offered his services to me, as did also Major, (then Capt.) Harris, of the Dragoons, his command being unable, from the nature of the ground, to act. I cannot forbear to mention that Lt. Crawford, adjutant, and Lt. Sawyer, as well as several other officers, whose names I do not now recollect, of the 11th regiment, joined my command, and rendered me very able and essential services, particularly those gentlemen whose names I have mentioned.



Soon after the 11th regiment had retired, Col. Brady of the 22d regiment being severely wounded, and that regiment having also exhausted its ammunition, shared the same fate with the 11th, and many of the officers, as well as rank and file, joined the standard of the 9th, and fought the enemy with a spirit and bravery bordering upon desperation. I regret that the names of those officers are not at present recollected, and that I have not any documents in my possession by which I can ascertain them.

Col. Towson finding from the elevated situation of the enemy's artillery that he could not bring his artillery to bear upon them, had nearly or quite ceased firing, and from at least 20 minutes before sundown, the field was contended for by the enemy against the 9th regiment alone, and those who had joined its standard. During this time, Gen. Scott sent his aid, Capt. Worth, with orders to *advance* upon the enemy with a view to charge him. We ceased firing, and advanced with supported arms, until the order was countermanded: probably in consequence of the shattered condition of the 11th and 22d regiments. Throwing forward our right to meet the enemy, who were pressing very hard upon our left, the regiment again commenced firing more briskly, if possible, than before. A circumstance occurred during this time, which, though highly gratifying, fills me with remorse to mention; and nothing but the honor of my corps, would induce me to do so.—The bearer of the battalion colors of the 11th being cut down, I presumed those colors had fallen to the ground, and it was the peculiar good fortune of Lieut. Otis Fisher, of the 9th regiment, to find and raise them, into the hand of the standard bearer of the 9th regiment, who was at that time Corporal Keniston, senior Corporal of the color guard. Sergeant Dewing, to whom they had been entrusted, (for want of a sufficient number of officers,) having been severely wounded, and compelled to leave the field.

Major Harris again came to me, and offered me his services. I desired him to inform Gen. Scott that the rule for retreating was fulfilled. Gen. Scott soon came and ordered me to maintain my ground, and gave me the pleasing information that Gen. Brown was approaching with Gen. Ripley's brigade, and Gen. Porter's volunteers.

At this moment, Gen. Scott's horse was wounded and rendered useless.

At about 9 o'clock, as I suppose from the circumstance of its being then dark, the arrival of Gen. Ripley's brigade and other reinforcements was announced.

At this moment the enemy ceased their fire, and retired from the field.

General Scott ordered all the men of the 11th and 22d regiments who could be found, to be collected and formed into one battalion. While we were doing this, Gen. Scott announced to us the capture of Maj. Gen. Rial; the men gave three cheers, which drew a shell from the enemy, which passed our line, and exploded in the column of artillery, commanded by Lieut. Col. (then Major) Hindman, and blew up a caisson of ammunition belonging to Captain Ritchie's company.

A brisk and heavy fire of musketry informed us that Gen. Ripley with his brigade had attacked the enemy on the hill with a view to carry their park of artillery. The firing on the hill soon ceased, and the battalion composed of the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments being formed, the command of it was given to Col. Brady, who yet continued on the field, though severely wounded. He was assisted by Major Arrowsmith, of the 22d. General Scott's brigade major, Capt. Smith of the 6th, and his aid-de-camp, Capt. Worth, of the 23d, being both severely wounded, and having left the field, Gen. Scott accepted an offer from me to act as his aid.

General Scott then formed the remainder of the brigade (except the 25th regiment) into column, and moved across the field in a westerly direction, and formed them in line on the south side of a narrow lane a little to the south of, and running nearly the same direction as Lundy's lane. I was then ordered by Gen. Scott, to find Gen. Brown, if possible, and desire him to give orders for the disposition of General Scott's brigade. I rode on the hill, and the enemy again commenced an attack, with a view to regain their artillery; but they were soon repulsed, and I found Gen. Brown, who rode with me to see Gen. Scott. After Generals Brown and Scott had conversed a few minutes, I was ordered by Gen. Scott to take command of the Consolidated Battalion (Col. Brady being too much exhausted by the loss of blood to command, though he declined leaving the field.) My orders were to march the battalion to the top of the hill, and form there as a second line. They were formed in Lundy's lane, with the right towards the Niagara road; and their left in the rear of the captured artillery. This artillery and the American field artillery, under command of Maj. Hindman, occupied the summit of the eminence near the old church. Next on the right of his artillery was the 22d regiment, and then the 25th regiment on the extreme right. On the left of



the artillery was the 21st regiment, with some other troops consolidated with it ; then the 1st infantry. Gen. Porter's volunteers occupied the extreme left. The army was thus situated when information was received, that the enemy were again advancing, and their near approach was discovered by a sheet of fire from both armies, who were not to exceed thirty yards from each other, and nearly in parallel lines.

Gen. Scott having been absent from us a short time, for the purpose, as I supposed, of ascertaining the situation of the enemy, returned and asked me in a loud and animated voice, "are these troops prepared for the charge?" and without giving me time to answer him, he added, "Yes, I know they are prepared for any thing," and he ordered me to form them in close column, left in front. This being done, Gen. Scott ordered "Forward and charge my brave fellows," and leading the column himself, we passed through our line between the pieces of our artillery, and came in contact with the left of the enemy's line, a short distance past the centre, which immediately gave way. Owing however to the darkness of the night our column had become in some degree irregular, we passed the extreme left of Gen. Porter's volunteers, and formed our men in line. Gen. Scott again ordered me to form the troops "in column at half distance, right in front." This order being executed, Gen. Scott again led the column to the charge with a view to turn the enemy's right flank, but finding that flank supported by a heavy second line, his charge was withdrawn. Gen. Scott then passed through the American line, and joined Col. Jessup with the 25th regiment on the right of that line, and was there wounded. The remainder of Gen. Scott's brigade were again formed a small distance from the left of Gen. Porter's volunteers. This was executed in the presence of Major Gen. Brown. He informs me that he was wounded at this period. In executing formation, I received the most essential services from Lieut. Cushman, acting adjutant of the 9th regiment, and Lieut. Crawford, adjutant of the 11th regiment. Lieut. Brady of the 22d also rendered me the most substantial service on this occasion. In my opinion he has merited the particular attention of the War Department, as much as any officer in the army.

This formation being executed, Major Jones, assistant adjutant general, generously offered to ascertain the position of the contending armies, and inform me at what point the troops then

under my command could be led into action to the greatest advantage, and without injury to our own men of other corps. Having been dismounted since the first charge, this offer was of the greatest service to me, and most gladly did I accept it. Major Jones then reconnoitred in the most gallant manner, under an incessant fire of musketry, the situation of the American line, and reported it to me. From this report I was induced to lead the troops under my command to the summit of the hill. Firing had now ceased on both sides. The thickest and most impenetrable darkness prevailed. All was still, and nothing to be heard but the groans of the wounded and dying. Moving forward to gain the summit of the hill, I was hailed by Gen. Scott, who informed me of his wounds, and ordered me to push forward and join the 25th regiment, under the command of Col. Jessup, who was also severely wounded. Gen. Scott informed me, he was then compelled by the severity of his wounds to retire from the field, and ordered me in case the enemy should again return to the contest, to seek an opportunity to *charge*, and drive them from the field with the bayonet. In a short time after, Gen. Brown hailed me, and inquired for Gen. Scott. I informed him that he was wounded and gone from the field. He then informed me of his own wounds, and said he must also retire, and that I must look to Gen. Ripley for orders, as the command of course devolved on him. I then moved on, and formed my men on the right of the 25th regiment, and the extreme right of the American line. Col. Jessup and myself now had some conversation as to our own situation and that of the army. His command and my own were consolidated, and consisted of all the effective men of the first brigade remaining on the field which I do not think exceeded 150 or 200 men exclusive of officers. The men were exhausted with fatigue and the want of water. The enemy had retired from the field, but in what direction was not known. From the length of their lines which we had during the action discovered by our own and their fire, we had reason to believe they were far superior to us in numbers. To refresh our men on the field would be hazardous in the extreme, and we were liable to be flanked on our left, and cut off from our camp at Chippewa. Under these circumstances, not knowing the situation of General Ripley's brigade or General Porter's corps, it was decidedly my opinion that the army ought to return to their camp at Chippewa. Col. Jessup express-

ad to me the same opinion. He also directed me to take command of the troops of the first brigade while he went in search of General Ripley for orders and information. Col. Jessup suffering the most excruciating pain from his wounds, and it being excessively dark, was unable to find General Ripley, and soon returned to me, and again took command of the troops, and directed me to find General Ripley, if possible, and obtain orders and information as to the intended course of operations. I soon found General Ripley, and informed him of my wish, and my directions from Col. Jessup. General Ripley inquired the strength and situation of the first brigade, and while doing so, a person rode up to General Ripley, with orders from Gen. Brown (as I understood.) General Ripley then told me he had received orders from Major-General Brown, to collect the wounded and return with those, and the army, to the camp at Chippewa. Gen. Ripley then gave me orders to the same effect, as it respected the first brigade. His information and order was immediately communicated by me to Col. Jessup. He feeling that the action was over, and suffering severely from his wounds, did what most men would have sooner done: he gave to me the command of the troops of the first brigade, and retired from the field. He however continued near us, and probably would have joined us, had we been attacked. All the wounded who could be found on and near the field were put into waggons, which had been sent from the camp at Chippewa for that purpose, and sent off. Gen. Ripley was very particular in his orders, that the movement of the troops should be conducted with regularity and order, and so far as came to my knowledge, his orders were strictly obeyed. Not a shot was fired from the enemy, and our troops moved in as good order, and with as much regularity *from*, as *to* the field, and arrived at Chippewa between one and two on the morning of the 26th.

During the whole of this night, as well during the action as after it, I was impressed with a high sense of the merit of General Ripley as a soldier, and the gallantry of his brigade in capturing the enemy's artillery. He manifested on that occasion, while in conversation with me, all that coolness and deliberation for which he has become distinguished, and which was so peculiarly necessary at a moment big with the fate of the army under his command, and the honor and glory of the American arms.

Having a hope that this statement may, at some day, appear to



the world as an honest relation of facts, I should do great injustice to my feelings did I not mention the gallant conduct of Capt. Pentland, of the 22d regiment. Soon after the commencement of the action, he brought his company (which had been the advance of Gen. Scott's brigade) into action, on my right. This was done in the most *brave* and soldierly manner. His example and conversation had the most beneficial effect during the warmest of the action, and contributed greatly to keep the men steady and active in their duty.

As to the 9th regiment, which on that occasion I had the honor to command, I cannot make particular distinction as to the merits of individuals. Every man in the regiment, from the highest to the lowest, gave me the most perfect satisfaction. They maintained their ground against an overwhelming superiority of force, in a manner which has seldom been exceeded for gallantry in any age or country. It has been stated that their numbers were but 150 rank and file when they entered the field; and it will appear from the official return of killed and wounded, that 128, including every officer with the regiment, were included in that report. It is due to the memory of Lieut. Burghardt, who was killed at the close of the action, to say that he particularly distinguished himself, by continuing to do his duty in the most able manner, after being severely wounded in the left side, at the commencement of the action, although he bled freely, and was advised by me several times to go to the rear, he declined to do so, and continued with me until he was shot through the breast in the last charge.

On the morning of the 26th, at about 7 or 8 o'clock, Col. Gardner, adjutant-general, came to me with an order to make a field report, stating the strength of the first brigade, and to prepare them to march, and take possession of the field of battle immediately. I immediately took measures to ascertain the strength of the several regiments. The ninth regiment I counted myself, and recollect its effective force was 64 men. The strength of the other regiments I do not recollect. My impression now is, that the whole strength of the brigade, exclusive of attendants on the wounded, and the details for guard then on duty, did not exceed 5 or 600 men. The troops were formed, and took up the line of march at about nine o'clock. After crossing the Chippewa, I received orders from Gen. Ripley, to take possession of the works at Chippewa with the first brigade, which was done by bridging the ditch on the



south side of the breastwork, thereby making a platform for the men to stand upon.

From what I saw of our forces, which I do not think at that time exceeded 15 or 1600 men; and from what I had seen of the enemy's force the preceding evening, *I did think it the most consummate folly to attempt to regain possession of the field of battle*—and every officer with whom I conversed, among whom were many of the first distinction, *expressed their astonishment at such an attempt*, and their surprise that every exertion was not made immediately to take up the line of march for Fort Erie. The troops however re-crossed the Chippewa at about 12 o'clock, and took up the line of march for Fort Erie. We arrived and encamped in good order, in the field opposite the Black Rock ferry, on the evening of the 26th July.

The march from Chippewa to Fort Erie, was made in the most perfect order, nor was any thing left behind us which could be of any advantage to the enemy.

With the highest esteem and respect,

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

your obedient servant,

[Signed]

H. LEAVENWORTH,

Colonel U. S. Army.

NOTE. It is to be understood that Major Arrowsmith, of the 22d regiment, rendered me every service during the action, and after the command of the brigade devolved on me, which his short acquaintance with the troops would admit. He joined the brigade either a few minutes before or after the commencement of the action.

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*Extract of a Letter from Brig. Gen. JAMES MILLER to a friend in Boston.*

FORT ERIE, Sept. 4th, 1814.

Sir,

I improve the opportunity which a short indulgence from duty allows, of hastily communicating to you the occurrences of the action of the 25th, and the present situation of the army, which is now closely invested by the enemy at this post.

On the 25th Gen. Scott was detached from our position at Chippewa by Gen. Brown, with directions to occupy Queenstown. He marched with his own brigade, and in two hours the sound of his musketry informed us that he was closely engaged with the enemy. At this time, the 2d brigade and other corps were quietly remaining in camp. All immediately marched, without calling in our piquets and other parties, to the support of the 1st brigade — We found them at the distance of three miles, gallantly supporting a most unequal conflict. Our arrival was a little past sun-set, and soon changed the aspect of the field.

The enemy's artillery was advantageously posted upon an eminence commanding the plain. The destruction which it dealt through our ranks, suggested the imperious necessity of carrying the height. This General Ripley directed to be done with his own brigade—the 21st regiment\* advanced and charged the battery in front : he led the 23d upon their *flank*—both these regiments present, were less than 700 men. The movement was performed in the most heroic manner by both regiments, and in a few minutes we found ourselves in possession of the whole park, consisting of seven pieces, and the enemy was routed in every direction. But his line was soon formed in rear of the artillery, and several most desperate charges were made to regain the ground and artillery, from which he had been driven : he was repulsed as often as the attempt was renewed, with great slaughter. During two or three charges the contest was carried on by the 2d brigade. Gen. Porter soon brought up his command to support it : and Lieut. Col. Jessup, with the 25th regiment, also arrived at the same point. The action closed at 11 o'clock, and we found ourselves in complete possession of the field, the enemy having been driven at every point. We remained near an hour, when Gen. Brown ordered General Ripley to retire to the camp—this movement was effected in perfect order, but through some unfortunate circumstance, the trophies of our victory, the artillery, were not carried off. As General Brown remained in command upon the field until we retired, I do not consider General Ripley in the least accountable for this neglect, more especially as I understood that the order was to retire immediately. Some have shewn a disposition to detract from the merit of Gen. Ripley, and to charge upon him the commission of all the errors which

\* General Miller at this time commanded the 21st regiment, and led it to this charge.

occurred. I am, however, fully satisfied of his good conduct generally as an officer, as well as of his discernment and ability in the field on this day.



ALBANY, 20TH MARCH, 1815.

Brigadier General RIPLEY,

Sir,

Agreeably to your request, I will state to the best of my recollection, the amount of the order given you by Major General Brown, in his own tent, about 1 o'clock in the morning of the 26th July, 1814, and of some conversation that took place, between the General and myself, at Judge Barker's, some days after you had taken your position with the army, then under your command, at Fort Erie.

After the troops had retired from the field of battle, on the night of the 25th of July, to their encampment at Chippewa, I accompanied Brigadier Gen. Ripley, to Major Gen. Brown's tent. General Brown was then confined to his bunk, in consequence of a wound received on that occasion—considerable conversation took place respecting the battle, and of the relative strength of the two armies; both were of opinion that there was not much difference in our loss, but were of opinion that that of the enemy was greater than our own, as many of their valuable officers had been captured, and were then in our possession. Gen. Brown ordered Gen. Ripley to have the troops refreshed, and at *revellie* in the morning to take up his march for the field of battle, and that if the enemy appeared in force, *to be governed entirely by circumstances.*

Gen. Brown, at Judge Barker's, sometime between the 5th and 10th of August, asked me many questions respecting the battle of Niagara. After relating to him the circumstances which came under my own view, the General expressed his pleasure at our recollections having served so correctly, and that to Gen. Ripley he was under strong obligations, for to his gallantry and uniformly good conduct he was indebted for the safety of the army.

(Signed)

W. McDONALD,  
Captain 19th Infantry.

*Certificate of Major S. Burbank.*

I certify on honor that I was an officer in Gen. Ripley's brigade at the battle of Bridgewater on the 25th July, 1814; that I belonged to the 21st regiment under the command of Col. James Miller; that when the brigade arrived within about one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's park of artillery, I heard Gen. Ripley give orders to Col. Miller to advance with the 21st regiment and charge the enemy's battery. Gen. Brown was not present at the time the above order was given.

I further testify, that I have seen *Capt. McDonald's* statement, given before a Court of Inquiry at Troy, and so far as my knowledge extends, the facts are correctly stated.

(Signed)

S. BURBANK,  
*Major by brevet, U. S. Army.*

*Boston, June, 1815.*

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TROY, (N. Y.) March 15th, 1815:

GEN. RIPLEY,

Sir,

I have the honor to state to you, that a few minutes after the close of the action of the 25th of July, 1814, near the falls of the Niagara, on returning to the heights at Lundy's lane, from which I had a few minutes before been absent, I overtook Capt. Austin, the senior aid-de-camp of Major Gen. Brown, who was in quest of you; and fearing *himself* that he should not be able to find you, he requested me to bear an order to you, which he had in charge from Gen. Brown, and which he delivered to me in the following words: viz. "that Gen. Ripley after collecting and sending off the wounded, would retire in good order, and in case the enemy pressed upon him, would face about and fight him." Agreeably to the request I delivered the order to you on the heights.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

With the greatest respect,

Your obedient and humble servant,

(Signed)

N. S. CLARKE,  
*Capt. 11th Inf. Brigade Major.*



SACKET'S HARBOR, 6th March, 1815.

*Sir,*

In compliance with your request, I shall state to you such facts as come within my recollection, that transpired at the battle of Bridgewater, U. Canada.

On the night of the 25th July, 1814, at the battle of Bridgewater, Major Austin, aid to Major Gen. Brown, gave orders to Brigade Major Clarke and myself to communicate to Gen. Ripley that Generals Brown and Scott were wounded, and the command devolved on Gen. Ripley; and that it was Gen. Brown's orders that Gen. Ripley should march the troops from the field of action to the mouth of Chippewa Creek, where the army had encamped previous to the battle, without delay; and if he was attacked in making his retreat, he should defend himself. This order we received at the White House, about half a mile from where the battle was fought. We accordingly made all haste to inform you of this order, which order Brigade Major Clarke communicated to you, Sir, in my presence. Previous however to your receiving this order, there were, I should say, ten or twelve waggons going to the field of battle, to carry off the wounded: they had arrived as far as the White House, when they were ordered not to proceed any further, but to return to camp. I cannot say who gave the order for them not to proceed any further.

Your most obedient,

Most humble servant,

(Signed)

JNO. P. LIVINGSTON.

*Adjutant 23d Inf.*

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*Statement of Lieut. Col. Hindman.*

After the enemy was repulsed (at Bridgewater) the last time by our troops on the hill, I rode to the rear to bring up my spare ammunition waggons. On my return with them I met Gen. Brown, who gave me orders to the following effect: "Collect your artillery as well as you can, and retire immediately; we shall all march to camp." He observed, that we had done as much as we could do; that nearly all our officers were killed or wounded;

that he himself was wounded, and he thought it best to retire to camp. I proceeded to execute my orders. The firing had ceased. *In my opinion not more than fifteen hundred men could have been collected in our camp for battle on the morning of the 26th July.*

(Signed)

J. HINDMAN,

*Brev. Lt. Col. U. S. A. commanding  
Artil. on the Niagara Frontier.*



SACKET'S HARBOR, March 15th, 1815.

*Sir,*

In answer to your inquiries relative to the action of the 25th July, at Bridgewater, I would observe that being at that time severely indisposed with the fever and ague, I had an opportunity of witnessing but few of the movements or transactions of the day. I can state, however, that Brig. Gen. Scott crossed the Chippewa River with his brigade (about 900 strong,) in the afternoon of the 25th, about two hours before sunset, and marched down the Niagara. That about sunset, while the troops were paraded for roll call, a heavy fire of musketry was heard from the direction Gen. Scott had marched; that the second brigade was immediately formed, and marched with the greatest expedition to reinforce Gen. Scott. Immediately after the second brigade had marched, I collected about fifty men of the 21st and 23d regiments, most of whom had returned to camp from washing, and other parties, on hearing the firing, and followed with as much expedition as possible. On arriving near the field of action, and being unsuccessful in attempting to join my brigade, I saw the adjutant general, who ordered me to remain with my detachment on the ground, (I had halted till I was conducted to it,) and in the mean time to prevent the soldiers returning to camp. About eleven o'clock at night, as Major Gen. Brown was returning to camp, he observed to me that our troops were about withdrawing from the field, and ordered me to remain with my detachment where I then was till they had passed, and then follow them to the camp. Soon after the troops passed in good order, under the command of Gen. Ripley, to the best of my judgment about 600; and I with my

Detachment followed agreeably to orders, and the whole arrived in camp about 12 o'clock at night.

I have the honor to be

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

MORRILL MARSTON,

*Brevet Major 21st Inf.*

*Brig. Gen. E. W. Ripley.*



On the morning of the 25th July, 1814, the American army, under the command of Major Gen. Brown, being then encamped at Chippewa, U. C. I was detailed and assigned to the command of a piquet, which agreeably to the directions I received, was posted on the lower side of the Chippewa creek, near the banks of the Niagara river, on the road leading from Chippewa to Queenstown heights, about a quarter of a mile from the encampment.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock, A. M. I discovered a part of the enemy on an eminence near the falls, a mile and a half, or two miles in advance of the piquet. The party was stationary, and continued so during the day. Of this I gave immediate notice to the officer of the day. Between 12 and 1 o'clock, a few of the enemy's dragoons approached very near the piquets, and were fired on by some men concealed in advance; and frequently in different directions small parties of the enemy were observable from the piquets, of which the officer of the day was informed; who, when he visited the piquet observed, that the information he had received was communicated to the General, who ridiculed the idea that the enemy were in force near the falls.

Between 5 and 6 o'clock, P. M. General Scott with his brigade, marched past the piquet on the road to Queenstown. The parties of the enemy in view retired at his approach.

Near the falls, and on the ground occupied by the enemy, (as heretofore mentioned) Gen. Scott's advance were fired on, and a few minutes after, the action became general. Captain Spencer, General Brown's aid, rode up and inquired "where was the firing?" and when informed returned to camp. Having received orders, I moved with the piquet to join Gen. Scott, and not far in my rear was the 2d brigade, under General Ripley. The movements dur-

ing the remainder of the battle, are detailed in Captain McDonald's testimony, which, as far as my knowledge extends, is correct.

General Ripley was singularly *brave* and *active*.

[Signed]

A. W. ODELL,

*Capt. 23d Infantry.*

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PITTSBOWN, Rensselaer County, (N.Y.)

20th March, 1815.

*Sir,*

IN conformity to your wishes, as expressed to me at our last interview, I avail myself of the present opportunity (the earliest that has since occurred,) to detail such of the events as came under my observation, in which you had an official agency, or personal interest, at the action of Bridgewater on the 25th July last; together with the relative situation of the two armies on the morning subsequent to that sanguinary conflict.

The testimony of your aid, Capt. McDonald, before the court of inquiry convened to investigate your conduct at Troy, is so accurate, full, and luminous, that a repetition would be superfluous.

I shall content myself, therefore, at present, with declaring that so far as my observation extended, the narrative of Capt. McDonald contains a faithful and correct statement of facts relating to the operations of your brigade, and of the army, after you assumed the command, from the commencement to the termination of the action; excepting, that the witness was, in my opinion, generally incorrect in his estimate of distances; which would, I think, have approximated nearer to accuracy, if he had substituted *feet* for *yards*. During the action I was a witness to your indefatigable zeal and activity. When hostilities had ceased for the night, I well recollect your anxiety to render the victory complete, by securing the enemy's artillery; and when that was found to be impracticable, your humanity, as exemplified in your attention to the wounded, was no less conspicuous than your valor in the field.



On the return of the army to camp, the corps to which I belonged was stationed at the bridge on the opposite side of the Chippewa, to guard that pass from surprise. Just after the dawn of day on the next morning, the army was put in motion; but the sun had acquired a considerable elevation, before our column had taken up a line of march towards the ground occupied by us, the preceding night. In this interval justice compels me to say, that your exertions were unremitted to arrange, concentrate, and precipitate your force upon the enemy, with the least possible delay. A variety of causes, however, tended to retard the fulfilment of your designs and wishes; among which the death or disability of many of our ablest officers, the extreme fatigue of the troops, and the dispersed and deranged state of the different corps, may be enumerated. Corroborative of the latter estimation, I shall remark, that, of the company which I commanded, consisting of forty-five effectives on the field, of which seventeen only were killed or wounded, I was able to muster but nine, on the return of our regiment to Chippewa bridge the preceding night.

Having proceeded about half a mile on the Queenstown road, I was ordered (by Gen. Ripley) in conjunction with Lieut. Riddle, of the 15th infantry, to proceed with our respective companies through the woods on our left, advance towards the enemy, and reconnoitre his position, strength and movements. His order was executed. On unmasking from the woods, we discovered the enemy posted on a height, about a mile in advance of the ground where we left him. His whole battery was planted on an eminence upon the right of the road; his left extended in line, so far as I could see, through an orchard towards the Niagara, by which that flank was undoubtedly protected. His right was in column near the battery, in force, apparently more than sufficient when displayed into line, to extend to a wood, difficult to be penetrated. The column and line of the enemy was in British artillery and infantry uniform. I saw no dragoons, (a few *videttes* and *patroles* excepted) no Glengarians, militia nor Indians. The enemy's numbers, which I endeavored to ascertain with as great degree of comparative accuracy as possible, must have been at least, one quarter, or one third part greater than your whole effective force. His position was commanding, his flanks well covered, his centre impenetrable, unassailable, and it would, in my humble opinion, have been an act of rashness bordering on insanity, to have attempted

an attack on a *veteran foe*, possessing every advantage, excepting zeal, intelligence, and intrepidity.

I am, General,

Your sincerely and faithfully  
devoted friend and servant,

[Signed]

SAMUEL TAPPAN,

1st. Lt. 23d reg. U. S. Inf.

General RIPLEY.

ALBANY, MARCH 16th, 1815.

Sir,

You requested my opinion as to the British force opposed to us at the battle of the Niagara Falls, &c. I have ascertained from a number of intelligent friends, in and from Canada, as well as from my family, which left Burlington on the 12th of October last, that the British force at the battle of the Niagara Falls, including militia and Indians, amounted to nearly five thousand; the militia from the District of London, from the Home District, and the District of Niagara, were called out; the latter were called out *en masse*. After the militia being discharged, by a General Order of Drummond, the regular force that afterwards appeared opposite Black-Rock, drawn up in their separate lines, appeared, in my opinion, to be about three thousand strong. Information from Canada since, confirms me in that opinion.

I have the honour to be

Your obedient humble servant,

[Signed,]

AB'M. MARKLE,

Major. U. S. Army.

General RIPLEY.

BOSTON, JUNE 9th, 1815.

Dear General,

I LAST evening mentioned that I, while a prisoner of war, had made some minutes of what I saw and heard respecting the force of the enemy on the 25th of July last: I find that I have left them at my father's at Rehoboth. I will therefore state from recollec-

tion, the situation as well as the force of the enemy, as far as they fell under my observation.

I was taken by the 103d regiment, who were formed on the left of General Rial's brigade, nearly at right angles, with their left thrown forward: there appeared to be on this wing about two regiments. There was a column of troops between the river and the height, and as I supposed on the Queenstown road. I also saw a column of men on the twelve mile creek road, with their front nearly opposite to Lundy's house, at least one thousand men; they were standing at ease, and had not been in any part of the action; in their rear were militia and Indians. I also saw about two hundred mounted Indians. I remained nearly an hour in the rear of their line, say fifty paces, and then was taken to 12 mile creek, where I arrived, the sun about two hours high, in the morning. I was there informed by officers who were wounded at Chippewa, that the reinforcement under General Drummond amounted to four thousand, but they might have spoken in round numbers. But from a conversation with Col. Talbot, at 40 mile creek, four days after the action, the reinforcement would stand thus:—regulars *two thousand five hundred*, militia and Indians *one thousand*.

General Rial's force is as well known to you as to me, and perhaps better. I met three detachments of men on my way to Kingston; two near York, and one near Kingston, of about five hundred men each: and a detachment at Kingston to march in a few days.

I am, with high respect,

[Signed]

DAVID PERRY,

*Capt. 5th. Inf.*

*Brig. Gen. E. W. Ripley.*

I, John Castello, a private soldier in the grenadier company of the British 104th regiment, state, that I arrived with my regiment and the 89th, at the 12 mile creek, on the 24th of July, from Kingston. The 89th, 103d, and flank companies of the 104th reg. marched together from the 12 mile creek, on the 25th, and came up with the British army, then engaged at Lundy's lane with the Americans. We arrived at half past 9 o'clock in the evening. After the action was closed the British army lay during the remainder of the night in Lundy's lane, about a quarter of a mile from the



heights—towards the Niagara river. Before sun-rise on the morning of the 26th, the whole army was paraded—there were at least 3400 British troops in the field at that time.


[Signed] JOHN <sup>his</sup> X CASTELLO.  
mark.

ALBANY, MARCH 21st, 1815.

We certify, that the above named John Castello, made and subscribed the foregoing statement in our presence.

[Signed] JAMES C. BRONOUGH,  
*Hospital Surgeon, U. S. A.*

[Signed] A. W. ODELL,  
*Capt. 23d Infantry.*



*The following is the statement of Sergeant Dean Weymouth, of the late 21st regiment infantry, respecting the state of the enemy's forces at, and after the close of the action of the 25th of July, 1814, at Niagara, in which he was wounded and made prisoner.*

Previous to the close of the action of the 25th July, 1814, at Niagara, a reinforcement of 2000 men from Kingston, joined the enemy on the battle ground—at the termination of which he retired, with a force estimated at 5000 strong, about half a mile down Lundy's lane, and encamped until the next morning at day light, when he drew up his forces in three lines, viz. front, rear and reserve—the former on the plain, the two latter in the woods. At 9 o'clock, A. M. this army moved up to, and covered the battle ground, where the above named Sergeant lay wounded, from whence they removed the cannon left the night previous,—and remained, shewing readiness to renew the action, about one hour, at the same time reconnoitring the American army, until they discovered from it, a disposition not to meet them,—when the enemy moved forward his whole force, about three quarters of a mile, where he remained till afternoon, whence he retired to the battle ground, and continued two days before he moved towards the position of the American army, which was at Fort Erie, by reason of the destruction of Chippewa bridge.



The enemy's army was said to have retired, not knowing the position of the American army, to avoid stratagem, until day-light, when they confidently expected with their additional force, having drained forts George and Niagara, to renew the action successfully.

The above was taken, at the request of Major General Ripley, early in the month of June last.

[Signed]

JAMES T. B. ROMAYNE,

*Major, U. S. A.*

*Brigade Inspector.*

BOSTON, AUG. 7th, 1815.

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### *Events after the Retreat to Fort Erie.*

On the 26th of July the army retrograded on *Fort Erie*, and encamped opposite to Black Rock. This movement received the express sanction of Maj. Gen. Brown. On the 27th Gen. Ripley, *contrary* to the opinions of the engineers, directed the troops to assume the position on the *left* of Fort Erie. He issued an order to Lieut. Col. Towson to build a battery on *Snake Hill*, (which covered the left of the position,) taking the opinion of the engineers as respected its construction. He also directed in person the positions where the lines were to be drawn. Col. McRee in the first instance thought it not necessary to entrench at all; and at first his opinion preferred the heights opposite Black Rock. It is believed, although there were many conflicting opinions at the time, that not an officer of the army can now be found, who will assert that General Ripley could have hazarded a battle with the enemy on the 26th of July, without assuredly losing the army; for in less than five days, a force more than

double our number invested us, notwithstanding the militia and Indians had been discharged, and the garrisons ordered from Forts George and Niagara.

### *Captain Kirby's Certificate.*

In compliance with the request of Gen. Ripley, I certify to the following statement of occurrences on the Niagara frontier, subsequent to the action at the Falls on the 25th of July last.

The army had assumed its position at Erie, and from the 27th was employed, under the command and direction of Gen. Ripley, in completing the defences of that post. On this duty every man not on guard was engaged until about the 5th or 6th of August, when Gen. Gaines arrived and assumed the command. Within this period much labor had been performed, as the different parties had relieved each other in such a manner, that the work was carried on as well by night as during the day. *Fort Erie*, which protected the right flank of the camp, had been much improved; a *redoubt* had been thrown up on *Snake Hill*, which covered the left; and these works had been connected by a line of intrenchments and *abbatis* that formed the front. The lake was in our rear. Gen. Gaines, after his arrival, made no alteration in these dispositions.

The enemy did not appear in force until the 3d of August, when he drove in our *piquets*, effected a *reconnoissance* of the camp, and made preparations for its investment.

On the 30th of July I was sent by Gen. Ripley, with some communication, to Gen. Brown at Buffaloe. While with Gen. Brown he spoke of the action of the 25th, and in the course of his remarks, mentioned in high terms the good conduct of the second brigade, particularly of the 21st regiment belonging to that brigade, and expressed his approbation of the conduct of Gen. Ripley on that occasion.

At day light on the morning of the 13th of August, the enemy opened a new battery on the fort and camp, firing hot shot and

shells: this cannonade was vigorously continued through that day, night, and succeeding day. At this time Gen. Ripley commanded the left wing; and as expectations were entertained of an assault, much vigilance was exercised to guard against a surprise. It was an order to keep one third of the men, exclusive of the regular guards, standing in the works through the night; and it was the constant practice of Gen. Ripley to be either himself awake, or when he slept to employ one of his staff in watching all that occurred, and in continually visiting the different parts of his command. On the night succeeding the 14th, I was called by him at 11 o'clock, with directions to be particularly observing, as he was apprehensive of an attack before morning. About half past twelve, the fire of the enemy slackened, and in an hour had entirely ceased. I called Gen. Ripley, and notified him of the circumstance. As their shot passed through the camp, and would have annoyed a column of their own in its approach upon this flank, and as this cessation of fire might have the effect of putting our men off their guard, and from other indications, Gen. Ripley told me that he was satisfied that the enemy meditated an attack. He immediately ordered the brigade to be formed in the lines; and after having seen the men turned out, directed me to report to Gen. Gaines his belief that the enemy were in motion. I proceeded to head-quarters, and found the General, together with his aid, Capt. Harris, in the act of mounting their horses. I communicated my message, and he turned towards the left flank of the camp, where, before our arrival, the attack had commenced. It continued in separate charges for 18 or 20 minutes, when the enemy was repulsed with great loss, leaving 150 prisoners in our possession. The attack on the right flank did not begin till about the close of the action on the left; and I believe that the troops had not been alarmed, or turned out, previous to the firing of the second brigade on their left. The left of our position was esteemed the weakest point, and we afterwards ascertained that the strongest column of the enemy advanced upon it.

During the period occupied in the assault, the command of Gen. Ripley was at all times in order; reinforcements were sent to different points without confusion; and the enemy were promptly met, and overpowered with ease.

(Signed) REYNOLD M. KIRBY,  
*Aid-de-Camp*

ALBANY, March 20th, 1815.

### *Major W. S. Foster's Certificate.*

In compliance with the request of Gen. Ripley, I certify that on the 27th day of July, 1814, I took the command of the remains of the 11th regiment, amounting in the aggregate for duty (including those who were washing on the day of action at Bridgewater, and who were not engaged, and sixty men of my company who were with me at Schlosser, and some fifteen or twenty men who escaped from the action of the 25th of July, 1814,) to one hundred and twenty-five or thirty men: That on the 27th of July the army, under the command of Gen. Ripley, took up its position at Fort Erie; the right of the army rested at the Fort, the left at a place known afterwards by the name of Snake Hill. The enemy, far superior in numbers, was near us, and an immediate attack was expected from the 27th of July to the 6th day of August. The General was indefatigable in erecting works to defend (if possible) his position against the expected attack. The work was carried on without cessation, as well by night as day, by officers as well as men. The fort was much strengthened, and defended the right flank of the army. A strong redoubt was thrown up for the protection of the left flank. The centre of the army was protected by a breastwork, ditch, and a double row of *abbatis*: this breastwork connected the fort with Snake Hill.

On the 3d of August the enemy attacked and drove in our piquets, and reconnoitred our camp and works: he chose however rather to make his approaches regularly than to attack and carry the position by storm.

On the 6th or 7th of August Gen. Gaines arrived, and took the command of the army: no alteration of Gen. Ripley's works, for the defence of the army, was directed by him; but they were ordered to be completed as soon as possible. On the night following the 12th of August, two of the three schooners then at Erie, were cut out by the enemy, and drifted down the river. These schooners annoyed the enemy very much by their fire upon his working parties, and assisted us in the defence of the place. On the 13th of August the enemy opened his batteries, with bombs, shot, &c. and continued his fire until almost dusk, on the 14th, when one of our caissons was blown up by a hot shot: from its being near the Fort, the enemy supposed it to be our principal



magazine: he immediately mounted his works and gave three cheers. From the circumstance of his being elated at the explosion of the caisson, from the weather being favorable, and from his keeping up his fire, with little intermission, until half past 12 o'clock on that night, many were induced to believe (as was the case) that we should be attacked before light. The attack commenced on the left flank, which was defended by General Ripley's brigade, commanded by him. His brigade was in good order, and by being prepared and having no confusion, he was enabled to repel their determined and repeated attacks, and to make about 160 prisoners, without assistance from any other division of the army.

The reason why I have mentioned the regular order of the General's brigade, and that there was no confusion, was owing to the positive knowledge of these facts, from my position in the command of the 14th regiment, which placed me so near as to be perfectly able to hear all words of command given, in his brigade, as well as in the enemy's column.

This column, which the General defeated, was supposed to be the greatest that moved against us.

(Signed)

WM. S. FOSTER,

*Major U. S. Army.*

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### *Col. Woodmen's Statement.*

After the enemy was repulsed at Bridgewater the last time by our troops on the hill, I rode to the rear to bring up my spare ammunition waggon. On my return with them, I met Gen. Brown, who gave me orders to the following effect: "Collect your artillery as well as you can and retire immediately, we shall all march to camp." He observed that we had done as much as we could do; that nearly all our officers were killed or wounded; that he himself was wounded, and he thought it best to retire to camp. I proceeded to execute my orders—the firing had ceased—When upon the hill with the troops, I inquired for General Ripley, to

communicate the orders I had received. I did not see Gen. Ripley at that time.

Immediately after this, I turned my attention to getting off the enemy's brass 24 pounder, and for this purpose detached Lieut. Fontaine, of the artillery, with orders to take it from the field, and afterwards ordered Lieut. Kineard, of the artillery to assist him. I then rode to the bottom of the hill, and after great difficulty, procured some horses, and at the same time ordered several waggons to the top of the hill, to bring off the wounded. On my return to the gun, some of the waggons having previously reached the hill, I discovered the gun and waggons in possession of the enemy; some of the men and horses were captured—I left the field at the same time. When I reached the troops on their return to camp, Lieut. Fontaine informed me, that I had left him but a few minutes, before the enemy charged his little party at the gun, and made them all prisoners. He escaped by dashing through their ranks on horseback, it being dark.

*In my opinion*, not more than fifteen hundred men, could have been collected in our camp for battle, on the morning of the 26th of July.

(Signed)

J. HINDMAN,

*Brevet Lieut. Col. U. S. A.*

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### *Major Harris's Statement.*

BOSTON, AUGUST 23, 1815.

Sir,

IN compliance with your request, I have the honor of stating to you the conversation which passed between myself and that highly distinguished officer, Lieutenant Colonel Towson, of the artillery. When he retired from the field, at the close of the action at Niagara, I asked him if the enemy's pieces could not be brought off; he replied that he had no horses; I offered him those of my troop—he asked if I had harnesses; answering him in the negative, he

observed, it was then impossible to bring them off. Our force the next morning, I presume, did not exceed 1500 men.

Your obedient servant,  
 (Signed) SAMUEL D. HARRIS,  
*Brevet Major Artillery,  
 late Captain Regiment Dragoons.*

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*Statement of a British Officer.*

ALBANY, MARCH 17, 1815.

I certify, that Capt. Loring, aid-de-camp to Gen. Drummond of the British army, and prisoner at war to the U. States, informed me in the month of January last, that Gen. Drummond had about two thousand infantry, and four or five hundred light dragoons, which were not brought into action at Bridgewater, near Niagara Falls, on the 25th of July. He also stated, that the two thousand infantry were a part of the reinforcement from Kingston, and arrived at Bridgewater sometime after the action commenced.

(Signed,) WM. BROWNING,  
*Capt. 9th Infantry.*

It was expected by the nation that General Ripley would be immediately placed in arrest for the disobedience of orders stated in Gen. Brown's report of the 7th of August. Instead of that, Gen. Ripley received the following communication :

HEAD-QUARTERS, CALEDONIA,  
15th August, 1814.

*Sir,*

You have permission to be absent for *eight weeks*,—at the end of which you will please to report to the Commanding General on this frontier in person.

*By order of Maj. Gen. Brown.*

With great respect,

(Signed)

C. K. GARDNER,

*Adjutant General.*

Brig. Gen. E. W. RIPLEY,  
Fort Erie.

In May last, Gen. Brown wrote a letter, which was shewn to Gen. Ripley by Mr. Dallas, acting secretary at war ; the substance of it is given from recollection.

WASHINGTON CITY, MAY, 1815.

Hon. Alex. J. Dallas,

*Sir,*

My report of the 7th August created an impression, in relation to Gen. Ripley, which I by no means intended. I did not intend to implicate his courage, his talents, or his zeal.

In that report I stated, that I had given him orders to meet and beat the enemy on the morning of the 26th July. This order was not given until after the command of the army had entirely devolved upon Gen. Ripley ; and I am fully convinced, that circumstances afterwards occurred, to satisfy the judgment of Gen. Ripley that the order could not be executed.

Justice to myself, as well as to the army, requires that I should make this statement.

(Signed)

JACOB BROWN.



This is the substance of a letter which was written to the war department. Without resorting to extraordinary reasons, which never existed, the letter at once illustrates the motives of Gen. Ripley's conduct in relation to Gen. Brown. Previously to the writing of it, Gen. Ripley had no intercourse with Gen. Brown, farther than was rendered necessary by military etiquette. Had the letter been made public, the necessity for this developement would not have existed.

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It is a painful task to scrutinize the action of Niagara; it shall be done briefly, and only in relation to the enemy's artillery; attempts having been made, by some officers attached to the General Staff, to throw the censure of its not being removed upon Gen. Ripley.

The artillery was captured. That it should at once have been removed to the rear is obvious; this could have been effected in one hour, merely by ordering up the spare horses that were with our reserve of artillery. It then would not have been subject to contingencies. Instead of that, less than half our force was defending it in a most desperate manner: that force by killed, wounded and stragglers continually lessened: the enemy was reinforced, and when he retired from the contest, simply retreated under the hill, about 200 yards from our line. Our force had become so diminished, that the last charge compelled the whole line to recoil, and it was with unexampled difficulty that it was rallied. It had become reduced to not more than six hundred, exhausted and almost without officers. Gen. Brown remained on the ground (not on the height, but in the rear) in command. His wound was a flesh wound in the thigh, which did not dismount him. Under these circumstances Gen. Ripley first discovered our own artillery to be gone, and in full march toward Chippewa;—in consequence, as he afterwards learnt, of orders from Gen. Brown to Col. Hindman. Next came a peremptory order to collect the wounded and retire. Gen. Ripley was satisfied that his troops could not withstand another charge. He attempted to remove the artillery by means of detachments. It was unavailing. Under these circumstances was he to obey or disobey the order? Had he disobeyed it, and been destroyed by another charge, what would have been the consequences to himself personally and to the army? His force was too weak to admit of assuming that responsibility by a delay; and no military man could have done it.

When Gen. Brown ordered Col. Hindman "to get off his artillery as well as he could," he might have ordered him to take his pieces to the rear; and then return with his horses and harness and remove the artillery of the enemy; but previously to

## APPENDIX.

Gen. Ripley's being ordered to retire, all our artillery had been marched for Chippewa, and it was not till ten days after, that Gen. Ripley ascertained by whose orders.

It will be observed, that our force was almost demolished in defending the captured artillery. In this consisted the radical error. Either when the artillery was captured, we should have determined to sleep upon the battle-ground, in which case all our stragglers, piquets, and fatigue parties in camp should have been brought up,—or the artillery should at once have been removed to Chippewa, and thereby have saved the severe loss sustained in defending it. Had it been removed when Gen. Ripley made the first request, our loss would have been small, and the "trophies" would have been secured.

When the troops reached Chippewa, it was computed, that there were one thousand men in camp, exclusive of the column which had retired. Had one of the Staff been sent, two hours before, to collect this force, the necessity of retiring would in all probability have been obviated.

While the column was moving on Chippewa, Col. Hindman discovered five or six horses. He immediately returned, with a view to remove the artillery. His statement, as first given, is incomplete, owing to a mistake of the copyist; it is therefore repeated in full.

The 25th regiment, under the gallant Col. Jessup, was detached from the brigade of General Scott, when he first advanced toward the enemy. Between that period and the time it was found on the right of the heights, there is of course no narrative of its operations. It was ordered into line, with the second brigade, by General Ripley. This regiment had operated on the enemy's flank, in a most heroic and successful manner. Major Ketelham had captured Major General Rial. It is worthy of remark, that Colonel Jessup had fought closely against the enemy's flank with no other force at that point to sustain him, had preserved his regiment entire, and had captured half as many prisoners as his whole force in the field. This fact evinces a gallantry and judgment not less remarkable than that of Colonel Leavenworth, who was able to maintain his ground, and advance with supported arms, previously to the arrival of the second brigade, and that with one half of the officers and men of his battalion killed or wounded.

General Moreau advanced it as an invariable position, that no troops could remain unbroken after one quarter were killed or wounded. Many incidents evince that this will not apply to our service.

It is proper to observe here, that when Gen. Miller and Capt. McDonald speak of the formation of Gen. Porter's line, they have reference to the period of its being formed on the left, in line with the second brigade. Gen. Porter and his gallant volunteers immediately after the heights were carried, and before any charge was made to recapture the artillery, came up and formed at right angles, with the left of the 2d brigade, with their left thrown to the rear. In this situation, they repulsed the flank movements of the

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enemy. After one or two charges, their left was thrown forward so as to form a prolongation of Gen. Ripley's line.

It is due to that corps that Gen. Ripley should declare, as other declarations have been imputed to him, that he never spoke of it but with the highest and most sincere respect. A respect created by witnessing its uniform good conduct in the camp and in the field. No corps for its gallantry, its patience, and its hardihood, deserves more credit from its country.

General Ripley states in the most positive manner, that from the period of his entering the army until the present moment, he has been neither the author nor adviser of any publication whatever, either in the newspapers or in any periodical paper, excepting such official documents as have borne his signature.

The irregularity of the arrangement of the foregoing papers is the result of haste and employment in other pursuits.

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## NOTES.

*Note to page 14.* "Gen. Scott, with the three remaining battalions on the right; but the latter were so situated as not to be engaged." This ought to be, "were so situated as not to be engaged in line with the 2d battalion." It is probably an error in transcribing.

*Page 22.* "At this moment the enemy ceased his fire, and retired from the field."

This retiring was merely falling back to the main body situated in the rear of the artillery. General Rial committed a great military error. His force consisted of at least 2500 men. No officer has estimated them at less. His sharpshooters and militia were in the woods through which Gen. Scott advanced. The moment Gen. Scott debouched from the woods, Gen. Rial should have pushed forward every effective man. But instead of this, he was unwilling to leave Lundy's height, because it afforded a strong position. He simply threw forward his right wing, so as to attempt to reverse Gen. Scott's left; and sent detachments to the front. A bold and gallant forward movement at once with his whole force and the bayonet, would have settled, in fifteen minutes, the fate of that portion of the American army. Had Gen. Drummond been there, he would have done so; but he did not arrive until afterward.



Quarter Master Sergeants.

Adjutants.

4  
1  
1  
4

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1871



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*Regimental officers of the first brigade, July 23d, 1814, fit for duty.*

|                                         |           |         |      |             |              |       |             |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------|---------|------|-------------|--------------|-------|-------------|
| First brigade,                          | Colonels. | Majors. | Adj. | Q. Masters. | Pay Masters. | Capt. | Subalterns. |
| Casualties of officers of the 1st brig. | 1         | 3       | 3    | 3           | 2            | 8     | 29          |
| Killed, wounded and missing in the      | 1         | 3       | 4    | 2           | 1            | 7     | 28          |
| action of the 25th,                     |           |         |      |             |              |       |             |

|                                      |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regimental officers of the 1st brig. | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| after deducting casualties.          |   |   |   |   |   |   |

It is due to Colonel Leavenworth, to remark that he marched with the troops on the morning of the 23d in command of the first brigade; and it is possible that many officers who were reported sick, were yet sufficiently well for an action. Every battalion of this brigade was on the morning of the 26th, commanded by a subaltern, one only excepted, and that by a captain.

*Second brigade officers fit for duty, July 23d, 1814.*

|                           |           |         |            |              |           |             |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|
| Second brigade,           | Colonels. | Majors. | Adjutants. | Qr. Masters. | Captains. | Subalterns. |
| Casualties in the action, | 4         | 2       | 2          | 4            | 4         | 25          |
|                           | 1         | 2       | 1          | 2            | 1         | 11          |

|                               |   |   |   |   |   |    |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Reg. officers of the 2d brig. | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 12 |
| after deducting casualties.   |   |   |   |   |   |    |

It will be seen by this list that both brigades were extremely destitute of officers before the action of Niagara—there being few more than a sufficient number to officer one regiment. After three quarters of this small number had been killed or wounded, with what hope could the action have been renewed?

This calculation is made from the official report of the army, July 25d, 1814; and the official list of officers killed, wounded and missing, affixed to the report of the battle of the 25th.

APPENDIX.

*Effective force of the army, July 26th, 1814, as near as can be ascertained.*


|                                                                        |   |   |   |       |       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|-------|-------|
| GRAND TOTAL, 23d July, (effective rank and file),                      | - | - | - | -     | 2549  |
| Deduct casualties, rank and file, (see official report of the action), | - | - | - | 723   |       |
| Deduct Major Keleham's company, sent to Buffalo with prisoners,        | - | - | - | 60    |       |
| Deduct Stragglers, who crossed in the boats with the wounded           | - | - | - | 200   |       |
| at Buffalo, and afterwards recrossed to Fort Erie.                     | - | - | - |       |       |
|                                                                        |   |   |   | <hr/> | 983   |
|                                                                        |   |   |   |       | <hr/> |
| Grand Total, effective rank and file, July 26th,                       | - | - | - | -     | 1566  |
| Deduct Artillery,                                                      | - | - | - | -     | 222   |
|                                                                        |   |   |   |       | <hr/> |
| Grand Total effective Infantry, July 26, 1814.                         | - | - | - | -     | 1344  |

It will be observed that the troop of Dragoons is not taken into view in all these calculations.— It could not act in the field, and was more than out balanced by the three troops of the British 19th Light Dragoons.














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