

THE MILITARY MONITOR,

AND

AMERICAN REGISTER.

"THE PUBLIC GOOD OUR END."

VOL. I.]

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1813.

[No. 31.

THE MILITARY MONITOR, AND AMERICAN REGISTER, By T. O'CONNOR,

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NEW-YORK, 1812.

Official.

Adjutant-General's Office.

WASHINGTON CITY, 19th MARCH, 1813.
GENERAL ORDERS.

The frontiers of the United States will be divided into nine Military districts, as follows, viz.

Massachusetts and New-Hampshire	No. 1
Rhode Island and Connecticut	no. 2
New-York & the sea, to the High-lands, and the state of New-Jersey	no. 3
Pennsylvania, from its eastern limit to the Allegany Mountains & Delaware	no. 4
Maryland and Virginia	no. 5
The two Carolinas and Georgia	no. 6
The states of Tennessee, Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory	no. 7
Kentucky, Ohio, and the territorial governments of Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and Michigan	no. 8
Pennsylvania, from the Allegany Mountains to its limit, New-York, north of the Highlands, and Vermont	no. 9

To each of these districts will be assigned a commanding Officer of the army of the United States, and a competent staff.

The following rules are prescribed with regard to militia drafts:

1st. All militia detachments in the service of the United States, must be made under the requisition of some officer of the United States (regularly authorized to make such requisition) on the executive authority of the state, or of the territory, from which the detachments shall be drawn.

2d. In these requisitions shall be ex-

pressed the number of privates, non-commissioned and commissioned officers, required—which shall be in the same proportions to each other, as obtain in the regular army. The looser method of requiring regiments or brigades, will be discontinued.

3d. So soon as one hundred privates, eight non-commissioned, and five commissioned officers, shall have been organized as a company, under any requisition as aforesaid, they will be mustered, inspected, and received into the service of the United States; and upon the rolls and reports made in consequence thereof they will be entitled to pay, &c. And,

4th. Payment will be made through the regimental paymaster in all cases in which the corps shall be organized as a regiment; and in all cases in which it shall fall short of the number necessary to that organization, by the paymaster accompanying the army or division to which it may belong.

By order of the Secretary of War,
T. H. CUSHING, Adj't Gen.

The following is the correspondence between Commodore Bainbridge and the Navy Department, exhibiting his conduct and that of Capt. Lawrence, and our Consul Mr. Hill.

Copies of letters from Lieut. Gen. Hislop to Commodore Bainbridge and his Answer.
GEN. HISLOP TO COM. BAINBRIDGE.
St. Salvador, Jan. 3, 1813.

Dear Sir—I am justly penetrated with the fullest sense of your very hard some and kind treatment, ever since the fate of war placed me in your power, & I beg once more to renew to you my sincerest acknowledgments for the same.

Your acquiescence with my request in granting me my parole, with the officers of my staff, added to the obligation I had previously experienced, claims from me this additional tribute of my thanks. May I now finally flatter myself, that in the further extension of your generous and humane feelings, in the al-

leviations of the misfortunes of war, that you will have the goodness to fulfil the only wish and request I am now most anxious to see completed, by enlarging on their parole (on the same conditions you have acceded to with respect to myself) all the officers of the Java still on board your ship—a favour I shall never cease duly to appreciate by your acquiescence thereto.

I have the honor to subscribe myself, dear sir, your much obliged and very obedient servant,

(Signed) T. HISLOP.
Commodore Bainbridge.

ANSWER OF COM. BAINBRIDGE.
U.S. FRIGATE CONSTITUTION.

St. Salvador, 3d Jan. 1813.

Dear Sir—I have received your letter of this date, conveying sentiments of your feelings for my treatment towards you since the fate of war placed you in my power. The kind expressions which you have been pleased to use, are justly appreciated by me, and far overbalance those common civilities shewn by me, and which are always due to prisoners. I regret that the lumbered state of my ship prevented me from making you as comfortable on board, as I sincerely wished to have done. I have complied with your last request, respecting paroling all the officers of the Java. In doing so, your desire, in addition to my disposition to ameliorate as much as possible the situation of those officers, considerably influenced me.

Permit me to tender you (notwithstanding our respective countries are at war) assurances of sincere esteem and high respect, and to assure you that I shall feel at all times highly gratified in hearing of or from you. With fervent wishes for the recovery of the gallant Capt. Lambert, I have the honor to subscribe myself, very respectfully, &c.

(Signed) WM. BAINBRIDGE.
Lieut. Gen. Hislop, of the British Army.

GEN. HISLOP TO COM. BAINBRIDGE

St. Salvador, 24th Jan. 1813

Dear Sir—Allow me once more to express my sincere acknowledgments for this last instance of your kind attention to my wishes, by having complied with my request in behalf of the officers of the *Java*. Lieut. Chads delivered to me your very polite and obliging letter, and be assured that I shall feel no less gratification at all times to hear of and from you, than that which you are so good as to express you will derive in receiving information respecting myself.

May I request now that you will be so good, as to cause to be looked for a small chest, containing articles of plate, more valuable to me on account of having been presented to me by the colony of Demarara, where I commanded several years?

I have the honor to be, &c.

T. HISLOP.

(Signed) Commodore Bainbridge.

Lieut. Chads presents his compliments to commodore Bainbridge, and is extremely sorry to inform him, and Captain Lambert died a short time since.

St. Salvador, 8th Dec. 11 o'clock.

COM. BAINBRIDGE TO LIEUT. CHADS

Jan. 4. 1813.

Commodore Bainbridge has learned with real sorrow the death of captain Lambert. Though a political enemy, he could not but greatly respect him for the brave defence he made with his ship; and commodore Bainbridge takes this occasion to observe in justice to lieutenant Chads, who fought the *Java* after captain Lambert was wounded, that he did every thing for the defence of that ship, which a brave and skilful officer could do, and that further resistance would have been a wanton effusion of human blood.

COMMODORE BAINBRIDGE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

U. S. Frigate Constitution.

Sir—I have the honor of enclosing to you a copy of the correspondence which passed between Henry Hill, esquire, consul for the United States at St. Salvador, and myself, as well as copies of the communication which the governor of St. Salvador made to Mr. Hill, in complaint against the squadron under my command. Having the whole of the correspondence before you, you will be enabled to form an accurate opinion on the subject, and in doing so, I feel confident that you will see no cause of censure in the conduct of my squadron thus complained of. I am conscious that I felt and hope I shall ever feel the greatest disposition to respect the rights

of neutrals; yet at the same time, I trust we shall exact our rights as a belligerent when acting in that character; for as a neutral nation we had no rights left us.

I have the honor, sir, to be, with the greatest respect, your obedient servant,
WM. BAINBRIDGE.
Hon. Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

MR. HILL TO COMMODORE BAINBRIDGE.

Consulate of the U. States of America.

St. Salvador, 23d Dec. 1812.

Dear Sir—I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a letter just received from his excellency the governor of this city and province, with my answer thereto, by which you will perceive the pretended fear of his excellency regarding your squadron, and the interpretation he puts upon the act of the *Hornet* in appearing off this port yesterday evening. It may be well to avoid as possible any motive for exciting the fears of these people, or of mortifying their pride, so intimately connected with the English interest and honor, whilst at the same time I have no idea that on this or any other account we should omit any thing that is fair or honorable in endeavoring to annoy and distress the enemy's commerce on this coast or elsewhere, nor submit to the denial of any right, which as a belligerent we are entitled to, on neutral ground.

Remaining, dear sir, your very respectful and obedient servant,
HENRY HILL, consul.

Commodore Wm. Bainbridge, Commander of the ship of war of the U. S. on the coast of Brazil.

[TRANSLATED]

It is with the greatest surprise I have ascertained that the U. S. ship *Hornet*, lately received in this port in a manner the most amicable and analogous to the principles of neutrality adopted between the government of Brazil and the United States, makes part of a naval force which is employed in cruising upon this coast and at the mouth of this harbor, from which has arisen the utmost inquietude to the public and general commerce of the subjects of his royal highness the Prince Regent, our Lord, and the evil intention of these forces being confirmed by the strange event which has just happened in the afternoon of today, that ship having sailed in and out of this port without any obvious motive, which being without the least doubt a proceeding really hostile, and so much the more aggravating, inasmuch as it is contrary to what you voluntarily told me was the destination of that ship.

You are notified that I shall lose no time in acquainting his royal highness of this strange proceeding, in a manner the most circumstantial, soliciting from his infallible justice the necessary orders to take from it that just satisfaction and vengeance, which nations have settled between themselves as due to an infraction of neutrality reciprocally stipulated.

Dieu vous garde,
CONDE DOS ARCOES.
Bahia, 22d Dec. 1812.

MR. HILL'S REPLY.

Consulate of the U. S. of America.

St. Salvador, 22d Dec. 1812.

Sir—I acknowledge the receipt of the letter which I had the honor yesterday evening to receive from your excellency. I can but express my surprise, that there should exist the least cause of alarm or inquietude, except on the part of the British merchants in this city, in consequence of the supposition or fact of an American squadron in these seas, or from the appearance in and off this port of the U. S. ship of war *Hornet*, and more particularly that the approach of this ship to the mouth of the harbour yesterday afternoon with her colors flying, (being already known as a national ship of the U. S.) should be called by your excellency a hostile act, or construed into a breach of the neutrality of this port, especially when the object of this ship must be well understood, from the circumstance of a British sloop of war of equal or superior force lying sheltered within the harbor. Had any aggression have been committed by the *Hornet* or any other vessel of the United States, on the Portuguese commerce, or any insult to the sovereignty or real violation of the declared neutrality of this country have been offered, it certainly would be a matter of extreme regret, and have afforded just cause of indignation and alarm, since hitherto the most perfect peace, harmony and good understanding has existed between the two countries, and I am happy to have it in my power to assure your excellency, that whilst the United States will expect the free enjoyment of their belligerent rights in the neutral territory of the dominions of Portugal, on their part her neutrality is duly appreciated, and that the ship *Hornet*, (and I presume all other vessels of the United States) has the most positive orders "not in the least to violate the most strict neutrality, or by any act to interrupt the friendly understanding and amicable disposition and relation, which happily subsists between his royal highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and the government of the United States."

I have the honor to remain, with due respect and consideration, your excellency's most obedient servant,

(Signed) HENRY HILL, Consul.

To his excellency the count *Dos Arcos* captain, gen. and gov. of the province and city of St. Salvador, &c. &c. &c.

MR. HILL TO THE GOVERNOR,
Consulate of the U. S. of America,
St. Salvador, 3d Jan. 1813.

Sir—I have the satisfaction to participate to your excellency that Commodore Bainbridge, having become acquainted through me of the interest manifested by your excellency for the liberation of lieutenant general Hislop and his staff, has resolved to take upon himself the responsibility of paroling those officers here, as well as the commander of the late British frigate *Java*, on board which they were captured, and captain Marshall, a supernumerary marine officer in the service of his Britannic majesty—taken also by the commander on board that frigate.

In this act of liberality on the part of commodore Bainbridge, your excellency will only perceive the friendly and generous spirit by which he is actuated, in desiring to correspond as far as in his power with the wishes of your excellency, and to mitigate the evil arising out of the event of war, from the misfortunes of individuals, whom a brave commander will never recognize, as the enemies of his country, in the character of prisoners of war.

I have the honor to remain, with sentiments of respect & consideration, your excellency's most obedient servant,
(Signed) HENRY HILL, Consul.

THE REPLY.

The Count *Dos Arcos* presents his compliments to Mr Hill, requesting him to make known to commodore Bainbridge his very sincere acknowledgments for the beneficence which he has had the goodness to show towards lieutenant general Hislop and the other officers passengers in the *Java*—profiting of this occasion to renew to Mr Hill the sentiment of his consideration and esteem.

Palace, 4th Jan. 1813.

COMMODORE BAINBRIDGE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

U. S. Frigate *Constitution*.

Sir—I have the honor of enclosing to you a copy of a correspondence which passed between the American and British consuls at St. Salvador, relative to a challenge offered by captain Lawrence, commander of the United States ship *Hornet*, and refused by captain Green, commander of his Britannic majesty's ship *Bonne Citoyenne*, a vessel in

size and force greater than the *Hornet*. Captain Green's excuse I have no doubt will be viewed by those who see it in its proper light. He certainly was not warranted in questioning the sacred pledge I made to him. The confidence I had in the gallant commander, the brave officers and crew of the *Hornet*, (all of whom exhibited the most ardent desire for the contest) induced me to take the responsibility of the pledge, from which I certainly should never have swerved; and the strong proof I can give of that confidence, is leaving the *Hornet* four days together off the harbor in which the *Bonne Citoyenne* lay, laid, and from which he could discover that the Constitution was not within 40 miles of it; therefore at any period captain Green could have been certain of contending with her alone; finally, to prevent his having the least possible excuse, I went into the harbor of St. Salvador, and laid three days, where he could have detained me 24 hours on application to the Governor; these three days the *Hornet* remained off the harbor, & the *Bonne Citoyenne* continued safely at anchor.

On my leaving the coast of Brazil, I left captain Lawrence to watch her, and have no doubt, should he fall in with her, that the result will be honorable to his country and self. Having stated to you, sir, mere facts, I now beg leave to observe, that I consider the refusal of captain Green to meet the *Hornet*, as a victory on the part of the latter vessel.—Our enemy, (who are brave) in the victories which we have obtained over them, have attributed them to our having a superior force, when in fact the difference of force has not been comparable with the superiority of effect done by us; but in the present instance they have not the least shade of coloring, for the *Bonne Citoyenne* is a larger vessel & greater force in guns & men than the *Hornet*, but the high state of discipline and excellent order which the *Hornet* is in, makes me feel confident of a favourable result in the issue of an action between them. Permit me, Sir, to take this opportunity of expressing to you the satisfaction I have received from Cap. Lawrence's conduct in every instance since under my command, and I respectfully recommend him particularly to your notice, as a most meritorious officer.

I have the honor, sir, to be, with the greatest respect, your obedient humble servant,
WM. BAINBRIDGE.
Hon. Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

MR. HILL TO THE BRITISH CONSUL,
Consulate of the U. S. of America,
St. Salvador, 28th Dec. 1813.

Sir—The following is an extract

from a letter, received yesterday from captain Lawrence, of the United States ship *Hornet*, now off this port.—When I last saw you, I stated to you my wish to meet the *Bonne Citoyenne*, and authorized you to make my wishes known to captain Green. I now request you to state to him, that I will meet him whenever he may be pleased to come out, and pledge my honor that the Constitution nor any other American vessel shall interfere.”

Commodore Bainbridge of the Constitution frigate, confirms to me the request of capt. Lawrence, in these words—“If Capt. Green wishes to try equal force, I pledge my honor to give him an opportunity by being out of the way, or not interfering.”

In communicating these sentiments to you, sir, of commodore Bainbridge and captain Lawrence, with a request that you will participate them to captain Green of his Britannic majesty's ship *Bonne Citoyenne*, now in this port I trust you will perceive no motive on their part or on mine, that does not result from national hostility, and the honor of our respective countries—or that ought in any respect to weaken the bonds or diminish the regard of private or social duties—and that you will believe I have, according to my sincere wish and best judgment, in conveying through you to captain Green the request of captain Lawrence, been guided by those feelings of delicacy on this occasion, and regard for the meritorious character of captain Green, with which the slight acquaintance formed here with that gentleman, has inspired me.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
(Signed) HENRY HILL, consul.
To Frederick Linderman,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bahia.

MR. HILL TO CAPTAIN LAWRENCE,
Consulate of the U. S. America.

St. Salvador, 29th Dec. 1812.

Dear Sir—Since writing my letter of this evening, which will be handed you with this by capt. Davis, I have received an answer from Mr. Linderman, the British Consul, communicating captain Green's reception of your challenge, which I transcribe.

“Port de St. Pedro, 28th Dec. 1813.

Sir—I transmitted your letter of yesterday to capt. P. B. Green, to whom the substance is directed, and having received his reply, I herewith insert it *verbatim*—“I hasten to acknowledge the favor of your communication, made to me this morning, from Mr. Hill, Consul of the U. S. of America, on the subject of a challenge stated to have been offered through Mr. Hill by captain

Lawrence, of the United States sloop of war Hornet, to myself, as commander of his B. M. ship Bonne Citoyenne, anchored in this port, pledging his honor, as well as that of commodore Bainbridge, that no advantage shall be taken by the Constitution or any other American vessel whatever on this occasion. I am convinced, sir, if such a rencontre was to take place, the result could not be long dubious, and would terminate favorably to the ship which I have the honor to command; but I am equally convinced that commodore Bainbridge could not swerve so much from the paramount duty he owes to his country, as to become an inactive spectator, and see a ship belonging to the very squadron under his orders fall into the hands of an enemy—this reason operates powerfully on my mind for not exposing the Bonne Citoyenne to a risk upon terms so manifestly disadvantageous, as those proposed by commodore Bainbridge. Indeed nothing would give me more satisfaction than complying with the wishes of captain Lawrence, and I earnestly hope that chance will afford him an opportunity of meeting the Bonne Citoyenne, under different circumstances, to enable him to distinguish himself in the manner he is now so desirous of doing. I further assure, that my ship will at all times be prepared, whenever she may be, to repel any attack made against her, and I shall also act offensively whenever I shall judge proper to do so."

You have here, sir, captain Green's sentiments, and, with commodore Bainbridge, will form such opinion of them as they merit. On sending off the supplies required by the Commodore, I shall write you more fully, and shall be full in my communications to him also, which I pray you will mention to him, and accept the renewed assurances of real esteem, with which I remain your most obedient servant,

(Signed) HENRY HILL, Consul.
James Lawrence, Esq.,
Commander of the U. S. ship Hornet.

FOR THE MILITARY MONITOR.

Defence of New-York.

No. XXI.

Whatever may be the constitution of a state, its freedom must be precarious if it should, no matter by what mean, become, in any form, subjected to foreign interference.

In the event of the United States pressing Canada from the British, the latter would not endeavour to reconquer it; they would look to a conquest of part

of the United States as the gage for the reunion of that colony to the possessions of the British crown, they stand pledged never to forsake the loyalists of Canada. I mention these things merely to shew that we should now, while we have time, prepare for meeting the British on our own shores: For a moment let us suppose them at peace with the French, and in possession of New-York, how could we drive them out of it? would we be willing to treat on the *status quo*, that things should return to the state in which they were before the war? If so, what becomes of the faith of our government, who, through General Hull, have offered freedom to the Canadians. No American I hope could be found so degenerate as to listen to a treaty on the basis of "actual possession," yet humiliating as it would be to do either particularly the latter, France and Spain afford examples of ceding integral parts of their dominions, witness the retention of Calais by the English for centuries till the reign of Queen Mary. In another instance, the same nation presents another still more disgraceful, in the ruin of the harbour and the demolition of the basin of Dunkirk, to satisfy the naval jealousy of England who cannot bear the apprehension of maritime rivalry. Gibraltar she has retained upwards of a century, nor would she relinquish it even to the Spaniards, though its cession should be the price of placing Ferdinand the seventh on the throne of his ancestors! Such precedents of military nations endowed with a high sense of honor and national pride, the governments of which could unite the whole force of their people by a command, yet submitting to the stern law of necessity, should be a lesson to Americans, that patriotism should not be confined to mere "resolution" they should be carried into effect and every man in the country directed towards the best means of annoying the enemy.

The war with England now will be as dissimilar to the war of the revolution as the naval combats of that period are to the decisive engagements of Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar. An English army is no longer what it was in 1778 and 1782—a series of misfortunes under incapable commanders has introduced other men on the stage, who have acquired experience from an uninterrupted succession of events and have learned to act from principle, and it must be confessed that though the victories of Talavera, Corunna and Albuera have produced but barren laurels yet in conjunction with the storming of Rodrigo and Badajoz, the battle of Salamanca; and indeed the whole campaign in Portugal; the military character of the En-

glish nation now stands higher than at any former period of the present or preceding war—the English army at this time is properly speaking an army of Veterans; and though these would not wholly compose an expedition for an attack on New-York they would bear such a proportion of officers and men to the whole number as must render a military body of such a composition far superior to any equal number we could oppose to it. New raised regiments may handle their arms gracefully and perform evolutions with precision on a parade; but the general who depends on them uncovered when opposed even to an inferior number of old soldiers will find himself woefully mistaken.

How stands our military character? I wish I could say that it was stationary—thinking otherwise, truth compels me to express my opinion, which I shall frankness.

While Europe was changing her military system, we seem to have overlooked the necessity of having any! the veterans of the revolution are daily descending to the silent and solitary mansions of the dead—while those that remain, through age, infirmity or wounds are an incapable service.

Young men crowd the ranks, brave it is true, but ununiform even in the elementary principles of the old school. Having no opportunity of contrasting their chaotic state with the order of an European military corps, they either do not feel their own deficiency or else they think their native bravery will compensate for the trifling want of discipline: if proofs are required, they refer to the deeds of their fathers in the course of the revolutionary war, thus evincing the truth of the maxim, that mens reason is often guided by their passions than they are by it. Miserable delusion! fatal security! fatal indeed, as "security in whatever regards war is ever productive of the greatest misfortunes" the American militia will always be good, when employed in a country the natural advantages of which will compensate for their want of discipline.

AMICUS.

FOR THE MILITARY MONITOR.

MR. EDITOR,

I have been looking for some time, in your paper, for the *British Official Manifesto*, or *declaration of war against the United States*; but as you seem determined not to give your readers, this excellent morceau,* I take the liberty of giving you a translation of it in plain English, and request you will give it a place in your REGISTER. CANDOR.

The Prince Regent has earnestly endeavored to preserve the relations of peace and amity with the United States of America; as may be fully proved by Messrs. *Erskine, Jackson, Foster, Henry, Tecumseh* and several others. This, his Royal Highness's anxious wish, having failed, he deems it right to declare the causes of war.

No desire of conquest can be imputed to his Majesty, as may be evinced by the *midness of his government*, over the *conquered territory of Michigan*, and his refusal to accept the state of Connecticut, which the ambassador Henry might have secured to his Majesty.

His Royal Highness does not mean to rest on the favorable presumption to which he is entitled—but offers the following reasons in justification of his conduct, and of the war against America.

1st. The ruler of France had contemplated the subjugation of England, by assembling a competent naval force in the British channel, which was entirely defeated by his Majesty's fleets.

2d. The ruler of France attempted the subjugation of England by the Milan decree, and his "confidential system."—(France and America must be considered the same, because Napoleon loves the Americans.)

3d. The ruler of France had trampled openly and systematically on the most sacred rights of neutral powers; and advanced principles of maritime law un-sanctioned by any other authority than his own arbitrary will.

(France and America, are all the same—two in one.)

4th. France had declared that she would confiscate every vessel that should be visited by British ships of war.

(For the benefit of America.)

5th. The government of the United States resolved, at the same moment, to resist the aggressions of both belligerents, instead of requiring France, in the first instance, to rescind her decrees.

(America, certainly must not be serious in resisting France—they are but one in politics, Jefferson and Madison, are members of the legion of honor.)

6th. The American government offered to take part in the war against Great Britain, in case France would repeal her Berlin and Milan decrees, unless England would also repeal her Orders in Council.

(This should not be doubted, although never before heard of by the American people.)

7th. The American President withdrew the restrictive laws against France, although her decrees were only conditionally repealed, as announced to the American minister by the French government, on the 5th of August 1810.

(What a dupe is this American President; witness his belief, that the Orders in Council

"will have been rescinded on 1st November next"—*Erskine*.)

8th. The American government declared war against Great Britain, on the very day after the conditional revocation of the Orders in Council, which were revoked for the benefit of America.

(Not of course to satisfy the manufacturers of England, as falsely represented.)

His Royal Highness, having now given a detail of the causes of war, will further state that—

1. The fear of affecting a neutral, will never deter his Royal Highness from whatever act, he may please to call "retaliation."

2. His Royal Highness can never resign his undoubted (assumed) right of impressing British seamen, although naturalized in America, from American vessels, but he allows a similar right to exist in the American government, with respect to Yankee seamen—

(American seamen naturalized in the British navy, of course excepted.)

3. His Royal Highness will never make any restitution for spoils on American commerce, under the Orders in Council.

(They were committed to injure Napoleon.)

4. The government of the United S has no right to notice the affair of the Chesapeake, because the aggression was acknowledged, the conduct of the British officer disapproved—

(Witness the promotion of the British commander.)

And reparation tendered by Mr. Foster.

(What large pensions have been paid by G. B. to the widows of the murdered crew of the Chesapeake!)

5. The mission of Henry should not be noticed, as the British government knew nothing of it—

(The refusal, in Parliament, to produce the correspondence of Ministers on that subject to the contrary notwithstanding.)

6. The exciting of Indians to make war on the United States is not true.

(What a liar Madison must be.)

7. The United States government is most certainly under the influence of France.—Witness the following favors received from Napoleon,

"The contemptuous violation of the commercial treaty of the year 1800 between France and the U. States.

"The treacherous seizure of all American vessels and cargoes in all harbors subject to the control of the French arms."

"The tyrannical principles of the Berlin and Milan decrees and the confiscations under them."

"The subsequent condemnation under the Rambouillet decree, antedated or concealed to render it the more effectual."

"The French commercial regulations which render the traffic of the U. States with France almost illusory."

"The burning of their merchant ships at

sea, long after the alleged repeal of the French decrees."

His royal highness will still pursue the policy which the British government has long and invariably maintained; and, confidently looks forward to a successful issue to the present contest.

* The great length of the puerile British manifesto has prevented its insertion in the Monitor.—We doubt whether many of our readers wish to see it, to the exclusion of other matter. We will however insert it, whenever scarcity of news, and of useful communications, will admit.

[EDITOR.]

The Military Monitor.

NEW YORK,

MONDAY MORNING, MARCH 29, 1813.

Subscriptions will be received by the following

Gentlemen, who have kindly offered to act as agents to the MILITARY MONITOR.

Mr. John Binns, Philadelphia,
Editor of the Delaware Republican, Wilmington, D.

Editor of the American, Baltimore.

Mr. Joseph Milligan, Georgetown, Colum.

Mr. Wm. F. Gray, Frederickburg, Va.
Editor of the Virginia Argus, Richmond, do.

Editor of the Intelligencer, Petersburg, do.

Mr. James O'Connor, Norfolk, do.

Mr. John Hoff, Charleston, S. C.
Editor of the Pennsylvania Republican, Harrisburg, P.

Editor of the Intelligencer, Lancaster, P.

Orders for PRINTING, Military Blanks, Lawyers' Blanks, Justice Blanks; Books; Pamphlets; Hand-Bills; Cards, &c. with which we may be favored, either in the English, French, Spanish or Portuguese languages, will be expeditiously attended to, and on moderate terms.

Orders for the MILITARY MONITOR, will be received at the PRINTING OFFICE, No. 6, Church-st. near St. Paul's Church.

SOUTHERN INFLUENCE.—It is among the inconsistencies of the present times, that the cant of "Southern influence" is cried up, by persons professing to adopt the conduct and principles of Washington, as the model of their political faith; although he reproved, in very direct and positive terms, every such distinction and prophesied the greatest evil to his beloved country, from the propagation of such dangerous and unconstitutional tenets.

Independent of the wholesome advice of the political father of our country, we could find, in common reason and existing facts, sufficient proof of the fallacy of this doctrine.

The war is supposed to ruin Massachusetts, while it does no injury to Virginia; and this is advanced, as a reason, why the citizens of the former ought to oppose the war; and why those of the latter may, without injury to themselves, support it; and this extraordinary position is grounded on the fact that Massachusetts owns a great number of ships, while Virginia owns comparatively very few. This conclusion cannot be admitted, unless it can be proved, that Britain makes war on shipping; and not on their cargoes; and on

sailors, but on soldiers, this not being the case, let it be inquired, what constitutes the cargoes of Massachusetts ships? we answer, emphatically, the produce of the Southern states. The tobacco, flour, cotton, lumber &c. of the Southern states are generally exported in Northern vessels; and, when the latter are driven from the sea, the crops of the Southern farmer must rot on hands. Evil, growing out of a state of warfare, may oppress one part of the people more, and thereby, to its disadvantage, it would still not be the advantage of the people of Massachusetts to permit England to progress in her spoliations on American commerce. These spoliations had long since commenced, and were progressing to that state of perfection, that would soon leave Massachusetts without shipping and without commerce.

It should be observed that the war-law was passed by a majority of a congress, in which each state was represented in proportion to its population, and that therefore it is as much the measure of Massachusetts as it is of Virginia, and of Connecticut, and of Georgia. But, says the pretended disciple of Washington, "the slaves are calculated in the population of the Southern states," and why should the Eastern advocate for the abolition of the slave trade be concerned with Georgia? It should be remarked, that the people of the Eastern states are honorably opposed to slavery; and in favour of such an abolition of it, as would give to every negro a vote, and a right to be enumerated in the general census, and represented in the general congress. Why then should any portion of the Eastern citizens complain, that a *far* of the Southern slaves should be counted, in order to determine the number of delegates, which a Southern state should send to the general congress? the fact is, that none but the adherents of England, cry up against the supposed undue influence of any particular portion of the union, in the transactions of the general government. The Virginian, as well as the New England man, wishes that negro slavery (introduced into this country by the British) could be abolished; nor is there a man, in any of the Southern states, but must perceive this sentiment generally to prevail. But the policy of general and immediate emancipation is doubtful, and is deemed a dangerous experiment; nor is it probable that the people of New England, if cursed with so great a number of black slaves, would agree to put their liberal principles into immediate execution.

There is perhaps no better argument against the policy of promoting this cry against Southern influence, than that the British are at present, as they have at all times been, endeavouring to promote it. In this respect the British may be styled the firewell.

The following extract, from the firewell address of the American Cincinnati, can never be too often read or too much impressed on those who would truly deserve the honorable name of Washingtonians.—The sentence ought to be inscribed on every flag bearing the image of that truly great man.

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs, as a matter of serious concern, that any

ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties, by geographical discriminations.—*Northern* and *Southern*, *African* and *Western*, whether designing men may endeavour to excite a belief, that there is a real difference of local interests and views. *One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts.* You cannot shield your selves too much against the jealousies, and heart-burnings which spring from these misrepresentations; *they tend to render alien to each other, those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection.*"

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

The valuable communication of X, on the formation of camps, came too late for the week's insertion; it will have a place next week.

Several other favors are unavoidably postponed.

Summary.

British Journalists and British advocates will be puzzled to account for the late bold, masterly and successful cruise of the United States sloop of war Hornet; Captain Lawrence, of 18 guns. This little vessel, not a ship of the line in disguise, but a small sloop of war, was employed, off the harbour of St. Salvador, to blockade the Bonne Citoyenne of 24 guns, and an armed British Packet (formerly the brig Fox of New York) mounting 12 guns, and a British schooner. The Hornet continued on her station until forced away by the British ship Montague of 74 guns, which came to relieve the blockaded ships. The Hornet, on her return to the United States, captured an English brig, which was sunk, after taking from her specie to the amount of \$25,000. But an English ship had heroism remains to be told. The Hornet met and engaged a vessel in every respect equal force; and in 15 minutes forced the British brig Peacock to strike her colors. It is to be regretted that the Peacock fled and sunk so rapidly, that several persons, including 3 of the crew of the Hornet, went down with her. The slaughter, on board the British vessel was great; that of the American proportionally small. If we have cause to exult at this new proof of the superiority of American tactics and prowess, when opposed to the "invincibles" of England, there is yet a cause of joy, not less impressive; if it is pleasing to learn that another British ship had been driven from the surface of the ocean, there is certainly a cause of still more exultation, an effect of still greater importance.—THE OPPRESSED NATIVE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, were released from captivity, after being compelled to take part in the engagement against their country and countrymen. Another British brig, the *Espeigne* of 18 guns, lay within about 6 miles of the Hornet during the action, and refused to risk a contest, altho' the American crew fired a second action, and remained within sight of the *Espeigne* for 6 hours. The official account of this action, we expect, will ap-

pear in our next, as will also an extract from the journal of the Hornet.

Among the prizes reported in the last week, are—

A British brig, arrived at Chatham, prize to the privateer Paul Jones.

The British brig Shannon, from Brazil, with 100 bales cotton, arrived at Bristol, R. I. a prize to the Yankee of Bristol.

Ship Mentor prize to the Sancy Jack of Charleston and Two Brothers of Philadelphia, arrived at New Orleans with a valuable cargo from London. The ship Nelson of 600 tons was on the bar of the Balize, prize to the Saratoga of New-York.

Ship Albion has arrived at St. Mary's, prize to the privateer Hazard of Charleston.

The Privateer Yorktown sailed on a cruise. This vessel has been fitted out in first style.

The British continue to blockade the Chesapeake and Delaware, and send cruisers to the mouths of the principal rivers in the bay.

The citizens of Norfolk continue in a state of alarm, but are prepared, to receive the enemy, should he attempt to land.

The enemy's striking force is receiving daily reinforcements—some reports say that a large body of troops will attempt one or more invasions; and it is not improbable, in this case, that an alliance with the blacks will be sought by the British. The latest appearance of British shipping to the eastward of Long-Island, indicate a disposition to extend the blockade along the coast.

We are from Norfolk that the boats belonging to the British squadron in the Chesapeake Bay, captured the private armed schooner Lottery, belonging to Hollins & M'Bair, of Baltimore, and Gun Boats endeavoring to secure their prize, our *White Bears* attacked and destroyed her.

Protection of our City.—The Corporation have granted permission to Col Izard to erect a temporary break work around the Battery. The work we understand is to be commenced without delay; and when it is finished, heavy cannon are to be stationed, at short intervals, along the whole line.

The United States loan is likely to be subscribed for in a shorter time than was anticipated. The legislature of Pennsylvania have passed a law directing the governor to subscribe one million of dollars.

Another person, suspected of being a British spy, has been taken in at Annapolis; & another, has been taken & confined at Norfolk.

TWO MORE.—Thomas W. Moore, British Consul, and the Captain of the British Packet *Mermaid*, were taken at Annapolis; and their papers sent to Washington.

FOREIGN.

Lord Wellington, it appears, continues to retreat. The following extract from a London paper is in part account for the reverse of fortune of this great General. The British ministry have changed his majesty's subjects into soldiers and sailors; and may soon learn the difference between an armed nation, and a swinish multitude.

"We observe with very profound concern, that the British army, the companions in the glory and fame of their illustrious General, has been insensible to the renown and reputation which a series of splendid actions, and a valiant and contended upon, has descended from the high character of British soldiers to acts of insubordination and irregularity, which have called out his reprobation."

Extracts.

FROM THE AURORA.

A SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE.

(CONTINUED FROM OUR LAST.)

No. VI.

The views we have taken in these numbers may perhaps present to those who are desirous of acquiring a correct knowledge of the *mechanical part* of the art of war, a more clear exposition of its nature and its intention, than they will find in any book in the language, which are generally written, for those who already know something of the theory or practice of military affairs.—We shall therefore add but a little more to what we have already said on the subject.

The manual exercise we pass over without a comment—it is very immaterial what the motions with a firelock are, if the loading & firing motions are well taught, and particularly if the soldier is so instructed as that he shall take pleasure in seeing it in good order, and is well acquainted with what constitutes the good qualities and the imperfection of the firelock, bayonet, the load, the method of making & preparing the cartridge, and use of auxiliary shot in close action.

The exceptions made to Steuben's tract being fundamental, they apply to all the subsequent parts of the instructions founded on them. The instructions for wheeling are so far correct and good as their principle goes, but when it is directed that they be taught, first at slow time, and then at quick, it is reversing the order of reason, which tell us to proceed from what is easy to the difficult; to perform what is useful and practical for mere sun-shine; and here the ludicrous oblique step is again recommended by Steuben!

The sixth chapter is the exercise of a company, which contains some correct modes of formation, but leaves the elementary collection on the parade, the ranking and sizing, wholly unprovided for; the ludicrous oblique is again enforced; and *slow marching* again inculcated. The seventh chapter is the exercise of a battalion; which is brief and harmless; the eighth chapter is on *points of view*; but the chapter is so *economical* of instruction, that unless a man has acquired considerable knowledge of military movements, it will puzzle him to comprehend what its inten-

tion is, although, there is a plate to illustrate it. 'The book of Steuben, nevertheless, says, what is very true on this subject, it says—

"The use of these (points of view) is a most essential part, of manoeuvres, which without them cannot be executed with facility or precision."

And yet this whole chapter on this essential part, amounts to 12 lines!—And throughout the remaining scanty pages there are only two vague allusions to those essentials, and which no man who is not already conversant in the subject can comprehend.

But the modern discipline has reduced this subject to a degree of perfection of the greatest importance; what is treated of as *points of view* by Steuben, is known in modern discipline, under the denomination of *guides of manoeuvre*, which consists in the distribution of commission and non-commissioned officers through a line of great or small extent, from the flanks of a platoon to the flanks of brigades and divisions; by which lines are formed in order of battle; the direction of columns of attack determined; the point of display or evolution of the column pointed out; and even the direction of routes in manoeuvres regulated by *moving guides of evolution* or moving points of view. This defect alone in Steuben renders it unfit for use in modern armies; since by adhering to it, an enemy expert in evolution, would possess all the advantages to be derived from rapid and precise evolutions, but as prophets are seldom believed in their own country, let us see what an enemy says on this subject; we refer to the celebrated British general Lloyd:

"By the strength of an army, I do not mean that force which arises from actual numbers alone, but that which is the result of a proper discipline and arrangement. This strength must be adequate to every purpose of war: equally proper to resist or attack an enemy whether cavalry or infantry, in an open or close country. By activity I mean the celerity and precision with which an army moves and each division performs the various evolutions of the campaign. *This property is most essential and cannot be acquired but by continual exercise*, nor even then, unless the organization of the troops and their discipline be calculated for facility of movement; so that when one system of discipline gives an immediate front to the enemy—while by another system, the evolution proceeds slowly—the first evidently possess the advantage; and let it be added that the most perfect military order is as firmly and compactly preserved in quick movements as in slow, if men are only trained to it; farther, perhaps quickness is the more ready means to preserve it, as well as to leave your enemy in doubt of your intention."

"An army superior in activity can always anticipate the movements of a less rapid enemy; and bring more men into action than they can, on any given point though inferior in num-

ber. This advantage must generally prove decisive and insure success."

In fine, military discipline partakes of the nature of all other arts; it must be conducted, in order to be effective, according to some known and uniform principles of art, by which the powers of multitudes, or portions of multitudes, may be directed with facility and precision, in perfect order and vigor, and where ever it shall be required.

This art, this method, this perfect order, this precision, this celerity and certainty, which are to be acquired by discipline, cannot be acquired in an arm chair, nor lounging on a couch, nor in taverns or in gambling houses; it is not the gift or inspiration of genius, for the perfect soldier, like the perfect painter, however, favored by nature, must still acquire from art the knowledge of the materials with which he is to unfold his facility; and this art, this mechanical knowledge, he must derive by practice—by the exercise of his faculties, not by being a spectator or by rarely dreaming about it—but by constant, assiduous, enquiring, habitual, mental & bodily exercise—not merely by being on the parade, but in it—performing as well as commanding.

Let us learn something from an ancient enemy; hear what the celebrated Machiavel says on the importance of exercise—"A general will find himself called upon for all his resources when he has to contend with an enemy, and with disease also; but of all remedies against disease, nothing is so powerful as exercise, and therefore it was that the ancients exercised their troops continually. Think of what importance exercise is; when in camp it keeps you sound and in the field it makes you victorious." Art of War, book vi.

We shall, for the present, close this subject, repeating once more what we have already twice said—

Discipline is a HABIT, acquired by repeated and well conducted practice, according to rational rules, in performing certain actions and movements, in the manner required and taught—and at the time and in the time commanded; and that habit so well established in every individual, that in performing any thing required to be done, the individual will, from him, perform it, according to the manner of discipline, in preference to any other manner.

From the Dublin Evening Post.

Unfortunately, the attention of the British and Irish People is not confined to military or political movements in either the North or South of Europe. War embraces in its range and in its rage the whole of the civilized world; the polished Nations of Europe,

the semi-barbarous Provinces of Russia, the FREE States of America, and the Savage Tribes of the Ohio and Mississippi, are all deep in its horrors, are all engaged in the work of death; and, as we must select a subject from the many connected with the miseries of mankind, we shall turn to that which at present engages the *best affections of the Irish heart*—the

AMERICAN WAR.

The existing war between Great Britain and the United States of America, presses so heavily upon the interests and happiness—upon the public welfare, and private feelings of the Irish People and involves so many considerations, closely connected with the Power—the Policy, and Prosperity of the Empire, that we shall, we apprehend, be frequently obliged to direct public attention to this important subject.—Our sentiments on the question are fully and unequivocally before the, almost innumerable readers, of *The Dublin Evening Post*. It is a misconception, in those who conceive us to have promulgated an opinion, that the Suspension of the Orders in Council would not satisfy America—we have said no such thing—this was not as a cotemporary would have it, the object of our argument on Saturday last.—On this point we are not, as a cotemporary would please to consider us, “committed with the Public.” Our arguments have been, and, on this subject, they must continue to be, hypothetical.—We have not had the assumption to say, what act of concession, or of justice would or would not satisfy America—no, that would be presuming too much, but we have put the question fairly, and distinctly, before the Reader—we have put it in a way, that *ought not at least* be misunderstood—we have said, and we repeat it, that if the American Executive, and the Representatives of the States in Congress, are sincere in the stand they have made—if they are sincere in the grounds which they have put forth as the cause of War, then we say, a suspension, or even a total revocation of the Orders in Council cannot be satisfactory to America—cannot restore us to the blessings of peace with that power! Viewing it in this light, and in none other, have we considered the subject, a new question arises—one that rests upon the honesty of the American Government—this, as the Noble Viscount, LORD CASTLEREAGH, would express it—this is the *hitch* upon which the whole turns. If the American Executive and the Representatives of the States are not sincere, in the grounds which they have put forth as the causes of War, then they have committed a fraud upon the American People—they have disgraced themselves and injured their country.—

If they are *insincere*—if they cease to combat for those great rights which they claim—if they yield up the independence of their Seamen, and the security of their Citizens at the shrine of Commerce—if they make Trade their idol, and Gain their god—if they are prepared to relinquish all that is honorable—if they are ready to receive a suspension or revocation of the Orders in Council as the paltry bribe for all that should be dear to a free State and to a magnanimous People, then will they have laid the foundation stone of American humiliation—then will they have lashed the United States, degraded and despised perhaps for half a century, to the car of British naval domination. But, we can discover no ground for suspecting their sincerity—no circumstance to justify an accusation of fraud—on the contrary, every arrival from America brings us accounts both of a public and private nature, fully to warrant a conclusion, that even a total repeal of the Orders in C. will not be held by the American Executive of sufficient value to induce a suspension of the horrors of War. In proof of this, and in addition to the many hitherto published, we transcribe the following paragraph from a Liverpool Paper.

“By a Swedish vessel, we have advices from New York to the 11th ult, which is two days later than those by the Pacific. Nothing had been heard from Washington as to the determination of Government in consequence of the British concession, as to the orders in Council; but it was then said, that the question of the *Impressment of American Seamen* had become a prominent feature in the discussion of the conduct of Great Britain among the Executive Authorities, and that Mr. Madison had declared that he would rather *forfeit his resistance than submit to conciliation until this point of defence were arranged.*

Yes, and were, “this point of difference” taken out—insolated from the rest, and arranged, we should find “another and another still succeed” till we had traveled through the whole catalogue of grievances, which the American Declaration States, as the grounds of war. This, we repeat, would be the base, unless it shall be proved that the Constituted Authorities of America are without sincerity—without honor—dead to the feelings of free men—lost to public virtue, and strangers to patriotism.

From the *London Statesman* of Nov. 9.

A private letter from Boston, dated October 2, observes, that the Americans have no great reason to exult in the case of the *Guerriere*, for the truth is, there is not a single British frigate on the station that will capture an American frigate. The Constitution is within six feet as long as the English seven-

ty-four. She has broad gangways, and has guns placed on them, three on each side. In the tops are backwoodmen, Irishmen, who will hit a small bird on the wing with a ball. The greater part of the crews are bona fide English, who came over during the short peace, and they have good reason for not being taken, and while the English Commanders were weakening their crews by sending them away in prize vessels, the Americans took no prizes, but burnt all, keeping their ships full manned. In fact, England must send out stouter frigates, and better manned, to have any success here. There is but one good frigate on this station, the *Acasta*, and she will be taken for the reasons mentioned. “I know,” continues the writer, “from a long residence at Plymouth, the English ships are manned with difficulty, that a frigate, whose complement may be 350 men, does not get above thirty prime seamen. If he takes five or six prizes, her complement is reduced to a number hardly sufficient to work the guns, and of these more than one half are landsmen. The Americans are all prime seamen, and are strongly manned.”

All the Americans, who were citizens of Michigan territory, under the U. States government, have been required by col. Procter, gov. of Michigan, to take up arms, or quit the country. Upwards of 100 citizens, who refused have been sent to Fort George, and may be expected across shortly.

The British government have issued an order in council, prohibiting single merchant ships from sailing for the British colonies and possessions in the West Indies and on this continent. A fleet of 38 sail of merchantmen, conveyed by the Cangaroo sloop of war, capt. Lloyd, sailed from St. Thomas’s on the 12th ult. for England. Another, under convoy of the sloop *Amaranth*, capt. Pringle, passed by the same place on the 11th for Newfoundland. (*Balt. Amer.*)

“The 8th inst. was held as a day of public rejoicing in the city of Charleston, on account of the late splendid naval victories obtained by our gallant little navy over the colossal naval power of Britain.” *ib.*