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NATIONAL POLITICS.

RESULT OF THE WAR.

Local passions and partial interests will prevent many from perceiving the true result of the war. Those who considered the war as the means by which the party in power were to be overthrown, and of ascent to their places, will be apt to be dissatisfied with the peace.

Those who profited by the continuance of the war, either in places, contracts, or any other means of gratification or aggrandizement, may not probably perceive the peace exactly in the fairest point of view.

Others again, who will consider peace as necessary to their individual interests or views, will go into the opposite extreme.

It is through the medium of the influence of the war on the political concerns of the nations with each other, that we can view the peace with the greatest certainty of duly estimating the true value and the result of the war.

Ever since the treaty of 1794, the U. States have stood degraded in the eyes of the European nations; in that treaty not only our own rights as an independent nation were betrayed, but a wider latitude was given to the usurping spirit of restraint on the freedom of commerce and the seas. We suffered an enlargement of the principle of contraband, and basely connived at the capture of our own cargoes, upon the base condition of payment for the cargoes by the captors. All the outrages from that period, to 1806, were the fruit of this abandonment of national honor and independence.

The repeal of the embargo by the tenth congress, gave as heavy a blow to the character of the nation for wisdom and firmness, as the British treaty had given to national morality and honor: and Mr. Quincy's libel in congress was only the echo of opinions repeatedly uttered by the British agents in all our cities for several years before; Mr. Quincy had only the merit of giving the sentiment a legislative currency.

One result, however, has been to prove that we could be kicked into a war; and that when kicked, we could turn about and kick the enemy into a peace.

Before this war, just closed, we were so wholly ignorant of every thing necessary to maintain and to conduct a war, that the first year was a series of the most extraordinary movements, exciting at once anguish and ridicule; every thing that was done appeared the reverse of what ought to be done.

The experience of that war, tended to produce more correct ideas, but the second year produced only such further experience as led to the paths in which war could be conducted with effect; and this experience was on the verge of being realized when peace was concluded.

Before the war, it was the opinion of the secretary of the treasury, that the war could be conducted for several years with only an outlay of ten millions and some small loans; we have learned that this was a fatal error, and we shall know better, should we be ever involved in war again.

We have learned by the war, that it is necessary to begin with an adequate instead of an inadequate force.

We have learned that science should be encouraged, that an army requires discipline, and that the time to provide for battle is not when the enemy is present.

But we have learnt what is of very great importance to ourselves to know, and what all the world will perceive. We have shown to the world that a free representative government, even at the moment when it thinks itself the weak, is really the strongest government in existence.

England has been able by subsidy or the purchase of a few cabinet ministers in the courts

of Europe, to arm all the nations of Europe, and by her subsidies to subjugate France.

But the same corruption could not be accomplished with a whole people extended over an immense territory like the United States, and therein the superiority of popular government has been manifested in the most fortunate manner.

This result has been the more manifest and important, both in its operation and manner, by the fact that by means of commercial agencies, religious and political emissaries, and other means, England had contrived to deprive the union of the physical and moral force of three of the states of the union, and a paralyzing disaffection in two more, so as to obtain from the union itself, an indirect alliance of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut; and a partial suspension of the physical and moral force of Delaware and Maryland.

The war has resulted, nevertheless, in demonstrating, that the union of a free people was sufficiently strong, when five out of eighteen of the states were faithless to themselves, and favorable to the enemy.

The union has learned, and the world has seen, that thirteen of the states are competent to sustain the independence of the nation, and to protect the faithless states from "their own worst enemies, themselves."

The result of the war is, in another point of view, propitious; we have seen that the enemy has possessed all the advantages which he could possess from the unrestrained licentiousness of the press; from the constant eulogies bestowed by presses within the bosom of the country on the enemy; and by the most laborious treachery to which the press could be perverted in attempting to spread destruction and disunion, and to weaken and defame the government, and favor the enemy, during the whole course of the war. The result of the war has shewn the superiority and the strength of free government in this most conspicuously.

The result of the war has shewn that the prostitution of the pulpit, and the establishment of Bible societies subservient to the views and policy of the enemy, could not seduce a free people from the defence of their rights and liberties.

The war has shewn that with equal force, and often with inferior force, we can meet and beat the British by land and water—and this has been demonstrated—

In the naval victories of lake Erie, lake Champlain—and

In the actions with the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java; besides the actions of the Frolic, Wasp, Peacock, &c.

This has been manifested by land, in three battles on the Niagara strait; in the battle of La Tranche; and at Orleans in a manner unprecedented in human annals.

And it cannot ever be lost sight of, that these splendid and signal achievements have been obtained, while three of the states were actually in rebellion; while one of them suffered its territory to be occupied unmolested by the enemy—refused aid to assist itself—and was publicly and in the most audacious manner carrying on measures to defeat the protecting measures of the union, and to prostrate the nation at the feet of the enemy.

The war has resulted in proving, what was heretofore disgracefully held fourth by one part of the union to terrify and defame other states, that the menaces of danger from the back population are ideal; and teaches the important truth that whenever we may be at war, we shall find in that class of the population a powerful means of defence.

The result of the war has shown that the geography of the south are superior to the most experienced and hardy veterans of Europe.

The result of the war has shown that the militia of the eastern states, about which so much lofty boasting has been heard year after year, is a mere name; since it has never appeared even in defence of its own soil, and has shrunk from the obligations of common defence which is due to the social body.

The war, in its result, has shewn that the nation can exist in honor and glory and success, in

war and in peace, without the aid and in despite of the hostility of Massachusetts and Connecticut.

These truths are now notorious to the union and to the whole world—

And the nations of Europe see in the result of this war of only three years, that the resistance of a popular government, part of it in a state of seduction to the enemy, has been able to repel and defeat and triumph over the nation which has been successively marshalling them against each other for more than 20 years past.

From a state of humiliation in the eyes of the world, we stand on an elevation which now commands the respect of all the world.

The conclusion of the treaty, appears to have been a measure very sudden, and not at all consistent with the language of the regent on the opening of the session of parliament; nor with the apparent predominance of the British influence on the continent of Europe.

It has not been the policy of Great Britain, in any period of her history, to conclude a peace under terms of ignominy or discomfiture; the only instances in our remembrance are a peace with the Seven United Provinces in the 16th century, in which there was a speedy rupture; and the peace with the United States of America in 1783, which she continued to violate till 1794. In both these cases, like the present, England made peace under the most humiliating defeats of her naval and military force.

But in those former periods, her situation, relative to the powers of continental Europe, were very different. The United Provinces were aided by France, and the armed neutrality of 1780 kept the naval usurpation of England in complete check. The case is at this moment in every respect the reverse as to England.

Her subsidies have kept all Europe in conflict and commotion for 23 years, and the peace of Europe has been concluded by the boasted efficiency of her bribery; every court in Europe has been her stipendiary; she has been alternately at war and at peace, and in alliance with them all; and her capital has been the theatre of her exultation, where the emperors and kings of Europe have been paraded for the admiration of John Bull, like the lions and royal tigers and bears, exhibited in the tower of London, as the evidences and emblems of the magnitude and extension of English power—Paris and Vienna exhibited the predominance of her influence, while the torch of emigration consumed the capital of America.

It is indeed true that the signal defeats and the unprecedented destruction of her veteran troops on the Niagara frontier and at La Tranche—the defeat and the flight of her naval squadrons on lake Erie, lake Ontario, and lake Champlain; and the signal evidence given to the nations of Europe, of American naval superiority, are considerable drawbacks. The severe chastisement inflicted on England by the U. States, is an ample admonition to her, and a reproach to the coalesced powers which cannot but make a powerful appeal to the pride and the understanding of the statesmen of Europe—who see what can be done by a young nation with only ten or twelve ships of war of every denomination, against a power impudently pretending to hold absolute rule on the seas.

The considerations, in reference to her relations with Europe, gain additional force when brought into view with the general scope of her commercial policy, which never before abandoned the pursuit of a rival, without paralyzing or destroying the commerce and naval power of that rival: the reverse in every particular has been the operation of her hostility against the United States; we have no doubt lost all that carrying trade which we possessed from 1794 to 1809, and which excited so much of British envy and animosity; but the greatest amount of that commerce to the United States was a mere incident, not in the strictly natural order of commerce, but arising out of the troubled state in which England had placed all Europe, the tyranny which she exercised on the seas over all the minor naval powers of that quarter of the globe, and against whom she necessarily directed her whole force of power and policy, until she destroyed them either by seduction and internal distraction as in Holland, Portugal, and Spain, or by vio-