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# THE WAR.

"LET THE RALLYING WORD, THROUGH ALL THE DAY, BE 'LIBERTY OR DEATH.'"

VOL. II.—No. 38.

NEW-YORK.....TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1813.

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## THE WAR,

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## DOCUMENTS

Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, (inclosed in a message from the president to the house of representatives, in obedience to a resolution of the 31st Dec. 1813) explaining the causes of the Failure of our Arms on the Northern Frontier.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major-General Dearborn, &c.  
(Continued)

Head-Quarters, Niagara, May 13, 1813.

Sir—Com. Chauncey with the fleet and troops arrived here on the evening of the 8th, and in the course of the night the troops were debarked in a very sickly and dispersed state. A large proportion of the officers and men were debilitated. It was deemed expedient to give them time to recruit their health and spirits, and in the mean time for the fleet to return to Sacket's Harbor, and take on board 1000 additional troops—and orders were dispatched to Utica, Rome, and Oswego, to have the troops at those places forwarded here from Oswego. Backus' corps of light dragoons, about 400 principally dismounted, and 500 of the 11th regt. at Burlington, have been ordered to Sacket's Harbor. These, with 300 volunteers, and a full company of artillery, are to form a garrison at that place. Additional cannon will be mounted. Gen. Brown of the militia has been requested to hold 3 or 400 men of the immediate vicinity, in readiness to aid the garrison, in the event of any attack. My intention is to collect the main body of the troops at this place, and as soon as com. Chauncey returns and the forces from Oswego arrive, to commence operations in as spirited and effectual a manner as practicable. This change in the proposed system of operations, has been rendered necessary by a long series of the most unfortunate winds and weather that could have occurred at this season, and such as could not have been contemplated.

Col. Scott reached this yesterday in boats from Oswego, with 300 men. He was several days wind bound in different places, and narrowly escaped the loss of his boats and men. I had expected him on the 3d, and had almost given him up for lost.

Gen. Harrison is invested; and presuming on the uncertainty of events, I shall make calculations of a reinforcement to the enemy of British and Indians from Detroit. We shall be prepared for them; and shall consider a concentration of their force rather a fortunate circumstance than otherwise.

I observed in a former letter, that on my arrival here on the 2d the preparations for an immediate operation were not as complete as could have been expected. Gen. Lewis was at 14 miles distance. Winder, with his command, was at Black Rock. The boats had not been transported from Schlosser, not one of the scows completed; the heavy guns and mortars not placed in the batteries; two 18 and two 12 pounders not mounted; but with all these defects we should have made an attack on the 4th or 5th, if the fleet had arrived with the troops in health, on

the 3d, as was expected. I have the honor to be, &c.  
H. DEARBORN.

Hon John Armstrong.

[Here follows gen. Dearborn's account of the capture of Fort George—see vol. 1, page 215.]

Head-Quarters, Fort George, June 8, 1813.

Sir—I have been honored with your letter of the 26th and 27th ult. and a duplicate of one of the 19th of April. My ill state of health renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some place where my mind may be more at ease for a short time. Col Macomb proceeded with 200 men, with the commodore, to Sacket's Harbor. Lieut. col. Ripley has gone, by the way of Oswego, to the harbor, with his regiment, where he will be joined by several hundred recruits. He took charge of the provisions to Oswego. The commodore will not probably venture out until his new ship is fit for sea. The enemy has now the command of the lake, and as that is the case, my offensive operations below this must be suspended. I had intended placing a garrison at fort Erie and a stronger one at George; but as you have directed otherwise, I shall select Fort George as guarding the only harbor on the southern shore of the lake. Detroit will be the safest harbor on Lake Erie. I have, by the request of com. Chauncey, detached 200 men to aid capt. Perry in removing his armed vessels from Black Rock to Presque Isle. Com. Chauncey is unwilling to approach Malden unless he can have a reinforcement to gen. Harrison, of our regulars. As my command does not extend to Malden, I ask your directions on this subject. The commodore is anxious that his fleet on Lake Erie should proceed with troops to Michillimacinae and St Joseph, as soon as the business shall be decided at Detroit. On taking possession of this place, the inhabitants came in, in great numbers, and gave their paroles. I have promised them protection. A large majority are friendly to the U. States, and fixed in their hatred against the government of Great Britain. If they should generally be made prisoners of war and taken from their families, it would have a most unfavourable effect upon our military operations in the provinces. The whole country would be driven to a state of desperation, and satisfy them, beyond a doubt, that we had no intention of holding the provinces. The same effect would be produced on the Indians, who are now principally quiet, for fear of losing their valuable tract of land on Grand river. I had authorised the civil magistrates to combine in the due exercise of their functions, and cannot, with propriety, revoke this authority, unless specially directed.

The whole of our troops, officers and men, in the action of the 27th, discovered a degree of ardor and readiness for action, which evinced a determination to do honor to themselves and country. The animating example set by col. Scott and gen. Boyd, in landing and repulsing the enemy, deserves particular mention. I am greatly indebted to col. Porter, maj. Armistead and capt. Potten, for their judicious arrangements and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's fort and batteries, and to the officers of the artillery generally, who had the direction of the guns. I have the honor to be, &c.  
H. DEARBORN.

Hon. Gen Armstrong, Sec. of War.

[Here follows a letter from gen. Lewis to the secretary of war, of June 14—see page 7 of this vol.]

Papers referred to by gen. Lewis in the above-mentioned letter.

Head-Quarters, Niagara, June 6, 1813.

Dear general—You will please to proceed with as little delay as may be, and take command of the advanced army. Brigadier-generals Boyd and Swartwout, and col. Scott, will accompany you. I have ordered an additional escort of light artillery to be equipped as cavalry to attend you. You will attack the enemy as soon as practicable. Your force will insure success—every possible effort should be made for preventing the enemy's escape. May success and glory attend you. Yours, &c.  
H. DEARBORN.  
Maj. gen. Lewis.

Niagara, June 6, 1813.

Dear general—A ship having appeared this morning steering towards the head of the lake, which is undoubtedly one of the enemy's ships, and as others are appearing, you will please to return with the troops to this place as soon as possible. H. DEARBORN.

P. S. The object of the enemy's fleet must be either to cover the retreat of their troops or to bring on a reinforcement. H. D.

Major-gen. Lewis.

June 6, 1813.

It is possible the fleet in sight may be our own; a few hours will probably enable you to determine and act accordingly. H. DEARBORN.

Gen Lewis.

Dear general—I am induced to suspect that the enemy's fleet have an intention on this place. Two small schooners have been examining the shore very minutely for 3 or 4 hours this afternoon. They have gone on towards the head of the lake, and their ships appear to have taken the same course; they may take on board additional troops near the head of the lake and be here before you reach this place. You will please to send Milton's detachment and 500 of Chandler's brigade and col. Burn's light dragoons with all possible dispatch, they ought, if possible, to be here some time to-morrow forenoon. You will follow with the remainder of the troops as soon as practicable. It will be necessary to take care that your posts are not taken or lost. Gen. Swartwout and col. Scott should return as soon as they can. Yours with esteem,  
H. DEARBORN.

General Lewis.

## ORDERS.

Adjutant-Gen's Office, Head-Quarters,  
Fort George, June 10, 1813.

By reason of the temporary indisposition of maj. gen. Dearborn, the command of the troops on this frontier and of the 9th military department of the U. States, devolves on maj. gen. Lewis. All persons concerned are notified accordingly. By command,  
W. SCOTT, Adj. Gen.

Extract of a letter from col. James Burn, 2d light dragoons, to maj. gen. Dearborn.

"In the afternoon of the 5th, our advanced guard, consisting of light infantry under the command of caps. Hindman, Biddle, and Nicholas, a part of the rifle corps under capt. Lytle, and detachments of the 2d dragoons under capt. Selden, commenced a sharp skirmish with the advance of the enemy, said to be a detachment of the 49th regt. which soon retreated, covered by a thick wood; having, however, several wounded on both sides and one dragoon's horse killed. In the evening our advance retreated behind Stony Creek, where the army took a position for the night. The light infantry and part of the rifle corps on the right of the 25th regt. formed the right wing. The artillery under caps. Townsend and L. Leonard the centre. The 5th, 16th, 23d, and some rifle men, the left wing, and the cavalry in the rear. A strong picket guard was posted some distance in front, also strong flank and rear guards, in such a manner as to surround the whole encampment with sentinels—the troops lay under arms without any covering. Our numbers in the field did not exceed 1000. Three hundred effectives of the 13th and 14th regts. have encamped on the borders of the lake, about 3 miles distant, for the protection of the boats. The enemy forced our picket and attacked us about 2 o'clock in the morning, (which was very dark) with their army and Indians, expecting, no doubt, to throw us into confusion. Their views were, in this instance, however, frustrated; and when the day dawned none were to be seen except the killed and wounded, who covered the field of battle. The attack began on our right and was gallantly repelled by the fire of the light troops and 25th regt. commanded by maj. Smith. In a few minutes it became general along the whole line, and was nobly returned by the artillery of the centre commanded by caps. Townsend and L. Leonard, and by the troops of the left wing, viz. the 5th, under Lieut. col. Milton, the 23d commanded by major

Armstrong, and the 16th. The fire continued with little intermission for one hour, during which time the enemy attempted, by frequent charges, to break our line, but without effect, being obliged to give way by the well directed fire of our brave troops.

The 13th and 14th regts. (which had been detached the preceding evening) were active in making prisoners, and advanced with much ardor to the field, in hopes of sharing with the gallant 5th and 25th, 23d and light troops, the glory of another combat. But the unfortunate capture of brig. gens. Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action unknown to any part of the army and hurried to the enemy's lines, prevented the future operations from being carried into effect with the promptitude, which would assuredly have taken place had either of those officers been present to command.

You will be surprised to find our loss so small—that of the enemy exceeds ours much; they lost in killed about 60, many wounded, and upwards of 70 prisoners, all regulars, and principally of the 49th regiment. Several of their officers were killed, wounded, and missing. A flag was sent by col. Harvey, asking permission to make inquiries for them: also to be allowed to send a surgeon to attend their own wounded, which I readily granted. On the return of day-light I found the command of the army had devolved on me; and being at a loss what steps to pursue in the unpleasant dilemma occasioned by the capture of our generals—finding the ammunition of many of the troops nearly expended—I had recourse to a council of the field officers present, of whom a majority coincided in opinion with me, that we ought to retire to our former position at the Fort Mile Creek, where we could be supplied with ammunition and provisions, and advance or remain until further orders.

Every aid was afforded by the staff. The assistant adjutant-general, major Johnson, and brigade majors Jones and Wartenby, exerted themselves in rendering all the assistance in their power.

The army on this occasion has proved its firmness and bravery, by keeping its position in a night attack, in which the yells of the Indians, mingled with the roaring of cannon and musketry, were calculated to intimidate. The enemy charged repeatedly, and so dark was the night, that our army could not distinguish friend from foe; in one of these they succeeded in carrying off a 6 pounder, a howitzer and a caisson, to the great mortification of our brave artillery. I presume it was on that occasion also that we lost our generals, who were distinctly heard encouraging our men to fight. The squadron of dragoons remained formed and steady at their posts, but could not act on account of the darkness of the night, and the thickness of the adjacent woods. Much praise is due to the troops generally, but too much praise cannot be said of the conduct of the 5th and 25th regiments."

*Montreal, June 18, 1813.*

Sir—I deem it my duty to improve the earliest opportunity possible, to give you a more detailed account of the affair of the 6th inst. near Stony Creek, than I have before had it in my power to do.

On the morning of the 5th I arrived at Forty Mile Creek. The detachment under gen. Winder was then under marching orders for Stony Creek; after a short halt the whole marched for that place, and arrived there between 5 and 6 o'clock P. M. at which place a small picket of the enemy was posted, but retired on our approach. The advanced guard pursued, and soon fell in with a picket of about 100 strong, under col. Williams. A skirmish ensued. I hastened the main body. Williams retreated, and our advance pursued. The pursuit was continued rather longer than I could have wished, but returned to their proper positions in the line of march, not far from sunset. I had ordered the 13th and 14th, who were in the rear, to take a position for the night near the mouth of the creek, to cover the boats, (should they arrive) which would be on the route which I intended to pursue the next morning, and a favorable position presenting itself, I encamped with the residue of the troops, except captain Archer's company of artillery, which accompanied the 13th and 14th, on the spot where we had halted, with an advanced picket from half to three quarters of a mile in front, with express orders for them to keep out constantly a patrol. A right and left flank guard and rear guard were also posted. I gave positive orders for the troops to lay on their arms. Contrary to my orders fires were kindled, but there are doubts whether this operated for or against us, as the fires of the 25th, which were in front, and by my orders had been abandoned, en-

abled us to see a small party of the enemy, while the fires on our left enabled the enemy to see our line. On the whole, I think it operated against us. I did not expect the enemy would attack us that night, if he intended to fight; but perhaps this was not expected by all. I had my horse confined near me, and directed that the harness should not be taken from the artillery horses. I directed where and how the line should be formed in case of an attack. About an hour before day-light on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up, and the 25th which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed as well as the 5th and 23d, which was on the left, under the immediate eye of gen. Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket or some other cause, the British officers say, that they were not hailed, nor any alarm given until they were within 300 yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made on our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown to me, and were about to attack in the rear. I instantly ordered col. Milton with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances as might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point, if necessary, at any moment. I had observed that the artillery was not covered, and directed gen. Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left on our right, and not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right, to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards, before my horse fell under me, by which fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave major Smith such directions as I thought proper, to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning towards the centre, and when near the artillery, heard men who by the noise appeared to be in confusion; it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed, I expected it was that regiment. I approached them, and as soon as I was near enough I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 23d, in rear of the artillery. I hobbled in amongst them and ordered them to form; but I soon found my mistake: it was the British 49th who had pushed forward to the head of their column and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night, to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved their columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of their officers are aware. After seeing the situation of the column as I passed, I did hope and expect that gen. Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring col. Milton with the 5th (who I had still kept in reserve until I could have day-light to discern their situation) to attack this column, which I am sure he would have done to advantage; but to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and by endeavoring to learn what was taking place in the centre, he was also taken, as well as major Van de Venter. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed his partial success, and not a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who generally behaved remarkably well under all the circumstances; and however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all the circumstances may be taken into consideration, in making up your opinion upon the conduct of gen. Winder and myself in this affair, which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure. I regret that my decrepit situation, and the rapidity with which we have been brought to this place, has put it out of my power to give you a detailed account of the affair earlier. I am now able to walk some with the aid of a cane, and hope I shall continue to recover. I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN CHANDLER, Brig. Gen.

Major-General Dearborn.

*Head-Quarters, Fort George, June 12.*

Sir—As the general is unable to write, I am directed by him to inform you that in addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with, he has within the last 24 hours experienced a violent spasmodic attack on the breast, which has obliged him to relinquish business altogether, and the command is given over to major-general Leis, who will in future make the necessary communications to the department of war. The British fleet still rides triumphant in this section of the lake. I have the honor to be, &c.

S. S. CONNER, A. D. C. to Gen. Dearborn.  
Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to major-general Dearborn, dated

*War Department, June 19, 1813.*

"Your letters of the 6th and 8th inst. have been received. There is indeed some strange fatality attending our efforts. I cannot disguise from you the surprise occasioned by the two escapes of a beaten enemy; first on the 27th ultimo, and again on the 1st inst. Battles are not gained when an inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. Nothing is one, while any thing that might have been done is omitted. This maxim is as old as the profession of arms, and in no walk of life applies with as much force as in that of a soldier.

"Should Professor have returned from Malden, and been able to effect a junction with Vincent's corps at the head of the lake, it had been done for one of two purposes—either to dispute with you the possession of the peninsula, or more securely to effect their general retreat to Kingston. The latter is the more probable conjuncture of the two, and is strengthened by the appearance of Yeo on the upper part of the lake, and by the position which Vincent has taken there."

EXTRACT.

*Head-Quarters, Fort George, June, 20, 1813.*

Sir—"I have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. Brigadier-gen. Boyd is the only general officer present, and from resignations, sickness, and other contingencies, the number of regimental officers present fit for duty are far below what the service requires. A considerable proportion of our army being composed of new recruits, and the weather having been extremely unfavorable to health, the sick have become so numerous, in addition to the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far below what had been contemplated; but if the weather should become favourable, which ought to be expected, a great part of the sick will probably be fit for duty in a short time. The enemy have been reinforced at the head of the lake with about 500 men of the 104th regiment. A vessel carrying ammunition and other munitions of war, bound to the head of the lake, was captured four days since by commodore Chauncey's schooners, from which I conclude that the enemy will endeavor to keep up such a force at or near the head of the lake, as to prevent any part of our force in this quarter from joining or proceeding to Sacket's Harbor for the purpose of attacking Kingston, and such is the state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence of continuing rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult, without the aid of a fleet for the transportation of provisions, ammunition and other necessary supplies. The enemy would probably retreat on our approach and keep out of our reach, being covered by one or more armed vessels, which remain on this part of the lake. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of the advantage and forwarded reinforcements and supplies."

Extract of a letter from the Secretary of War to Major-Gen. Dearborn, dated

*War Department, July 1, 1813.*

"The leisure you now have, offers a fine opportunity for the adjutants and inspectors-general to attend to their particular duties. Some of the parties of which you speak from the enemy, may practice a trick on those who follow them. These last ought to be very circumspect. Chauncey will, I hope, soon reappear on the lake. A battle will then decide which of us shall be victorious for the campaign. I am afraid that we have all along acted on a belief, very pleasing, but ill founded, viz. that we were ahead of the enemy as to naval means and naval preparation on the lakes. Are we sure that our calculations with regard to Lake Erie have been better than those with regard to Lake Ontario? A week or two will decide this question."

[Here follows gen. Dearborn's letter to the War Department, dated 25th June, informing of the surrender of col. Boerstler, with his detachment, at the Beaver Dams. See page 15 of this vol.]

*War Department, July 6, 1813.*

Sir—I have the president's orders to express to you his decision that you retire from the command of district No. 9, and of the troops within the same, until your health be re-established and until further orders. I have the honor to be, &c. JOHN ARMSTRONG.

*Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn.*

*(Documents to be continued.)*

### RODGERS' CRUISE.

*Copy of a letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*U.S. frigate President, Sandy Hook Bay, Feb. 19, 1814.*

Sir—I have to acquaint you that I arrived at my present anchorage last evening at 5 o'clock, after a cruise of 75 days, and now have the honor to detail to you the particulars.

In pursuance of your directions, I sailed from Providence the 5th of Dec.; and although I expected to have run the gauntlet through the enemy's squadron, that was reported to be cruising between Block Island and Gayhead for the purpose of intercepting the President, I had the good luck to avoid them. The day after leaving Providence, I captured the American schooner Comet, of and bound to New-York, with a cargo of cotton, from Savannah, which had been captured by the Rammes and Loire, and in their possession about 48 hours. In a few hours after recapturing the Comet, a sail was discovered to the eastward, which I felt inclined to avoid, from the circumstance of the weather being hazy, and knowing that I was in the neighborhood of an enemy's squadron; from an advantage of wind, she was enabled, however, to gain our lee beam at a distance of 3 or 4 miles, owing to which I was induced to shorten sail, with an intention of offering her battle in the morning, should nothing else be in sight, and she not be a ship of the line. The weather becoming more obscure at 2 o'clock, prevented our seeing her until daylight, when she stood from us to the N. E. although the President was hove to to let her come up. From this date until the 25th, we did not see a single sail, except the Recovery, (a brig belonging and bound to Penobscot, from St. Bartholomew's in ballast) until after reaching the long 35 and 1st 19, being carried that far eastward by a severe S. W. gale, accompanied by such a heavy sea, as to render leaving to impracticable without infinite risk, when 2 large sails were discovered standing to the northward, and to which I gave chase, believing, as well from the situation in which they were first discovered, as the manifest disposition they afterwards shewed to avoid a separation, that one was a frigate and the other an Indianan under her convoy; in this I was mistaken, for on nearer approach I could discover the headmost was a frigate with 7 ports abaft her gangway, and the other a ship of equal or little inferior force; on discovering their decided superiority, and supposing them to be enemy's ships, I endeavored during the succeeding night to separate them by steering different courses and occasionally shewing a light; but was unable to succeed, for the headmost at one time was so near that she fired a shot over us, whilst her consort was but a few hundred yards astern of her. I now directed our course to be altered, made sail and continued the remainder of the night to show them a light occasionally, but to no effect, as at daylight they were discovered to be in a situation to unite their force. After this I shaped a course to reach a position to windward of Barbadoes, on a parallel of longitude with Cayenne, and did not meet another vessel till the 30th, when falling in with a Portuguese brig, and receiving information that she had been boarded 36 hours before by 2 British store ships bound to the West Indies with 300 troops on board, I crowded sail to the westward in the hope of overtaking them; in this I was again disappointed, and after a pursuit of 4 days, hauled further southward to gain the latitude of Barbadoes; and in that situation on the 5th of January, captured the British merchant ship Wanderer of 7 guns and 15 men, from London, bound to Jamaica, partly loaded with plantation stores, and after taking from her such articles as were of most value, sunk her. In the same position on the 7th, fell in with the British merchant ship Prince George, in the character of a cartel, with prisoners, which with 4 other British vessels had been captured by two French 44 gun frigates, the Medusa and Nymph, the same ships I had fallen in with 14

days before. On board of the Prince George I sent the prisoners captured in the Wanderer to Barbadoes on parole. On the 9th of January, while still to windward of Barbadoes, I captured the ship Edward, of 6 guns and 8 men, from London bound to Lagaira, in ballast—which vessel I also sunk. Having learnt from the master of the Edward as well as those of the Wanderer and Prince George, that they had been separated in the Bay of Biscay from their convoy, consisting of the Queen 74, 2 frigates, and 2 sloops of war, I was induced, owing to a belief that the convoy was still to the eastward, to remain to windward of Barbadoes until the 16th Jan. when finding they must have passed, I changed my ground and ran off Cayenne, and from thence down the coast of Surinam, Barbice and Demerara, through between Tobago and Grenada; thence through the Caribbean Sea, along the southeast side of Porto Rico, through the Mona Passage, down the north side of Jamaica and other leeward Islands, without meeting a single vessel of the enemy, or any other than 4 Spanish drogers and one Swedish ship, until I got near the Manilla Reef; near which, after capturing and sinking the British schooner Jonathan, loaded with rum and dry-goods, (the most valuable part of which I took on board) I hauled over for the Florida shore and struck soundings off St. Augustine, and from thence run on soundings as far as Charleston, passing within 4 or 5 miles of Columbia Island, and as near to Savannah as the weather and depth of water would allow, without meeting a single vessel except a Spanish ship from the Havana, bound to Spain, but steering for Savannah, in consequence of having sprung a leak.

Arriving off Charleston, (which was on the 11th inst.) I stretched close in with the bar, and made the private signal of the day to two schooners lying in Rebellion Roads, and which from their appearance I believed to be public vessels. After remaining all day off the bar with colors hoisted and the before-mentioned signal displayed, without being able to communicate with the schooners, I stood to the northward, and at 7 o'clock the next morning discovered and chased a ship to the southward, which, after pursuing 8 or 9 miles, led me to a second, (a brig under her topsails, with her topgallant-masts hoisted and flying jib-boom rigged in) and from thence to the discovery of a third sail, represented from the mast head to be a large frigate; on discovering the third sail, added to the manoeuvres of the first and second, I was induced to believe them part of an enemy's squadron, and accordingly hauled up and stood for the former, to ascertain her character; and after making her from the deck, perceived she was a frigate as reported. I now tacked and shortened sail, believing that towards night I might be enabled to cut off the ship (which was either a small frigate or a large sloop of war) and brig, from the third or largest sail, at this time 9 or 10 miles to windward; in this, however, I was not able to effect my purpose, owing to the weather sail (between sunset and dark) bearing down for the others. Judging now from their manoeuvres that after dark they would chase, I stood to the eastward under short sail; believing that in the morning I might find them in some disorder; at day-light however owing to the haziness of the weather, they were not to be seen; consequently, I wore and stood back to the westward to make them again, and in a few minutes discovered two (one on the lee, the other on the weather bow) to which I gave chase, but after chasing them about half an hour the weather becoming more clear, and two large ships suddenly making their appearance, (one on the weather and the other on the lee beam) I changed my course to the eastward, when the four immediately crowded sail in pursuit; but, owing to the weather, assisted by the enemy's manner of chasing, I was enabled to get clear of them without difficulty in a few hours. From this I pursued a course on soundings (except in doubling Cape Hatteras) to 18 fathoms water off the Delaware, where, in a log, I fell in with a large vessel, apparently a man of war. Shortened sail to topsails and cleared ship for action, but she suddenly disappearing and in a few minutes she or some other vessel near, being heard to fire signal guns, I stood on to the northward, from a belief I was near another squadron. From the Delaware I saw nothing until I made Sandy Hook, when I again fell in with another of the enemy's squadrons, and by some unaccountable cause was permitted to enter the bay, although in the presence of a decidedly superior force, after having been obliged to remain outside 7 hours and an half waiting for the tide. I am, &c. JOHN RODGERS.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, secretary of the navy.*

*From the Plattsburgh Republican, Feb. 3d.*

### MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

We understand that in conformity to orders from the War Department, maj. gen. Brown, and brigadier-gen. Macomb, marched from the French Mills, in two columns, on the morning of the 13th inst. General Wilkinson remained on the ground with the rear guard, consisting of Forsyth's riflemen, and a detachment of dragoons under lieutenant Wright, until 1 o'clock, P. M. The columns under Brown and Macomb separated about twelve miles from the Mills; the latter pursuing the route to Chateaugay, and the former taking the road to Sacket's Harbor. The general lodged that night with the rear guard, 9 miles from the Mills; Brown marched to Malone, six leagues, without halt; and Macomb encamped fourteen and a half miles from the Mills—the snow being, on an average, two feet and ten inches deep. On the 14th general Wilkinson pushed forward Macomb's column for this place, and himself lay down at Chateaugay, with a detachment of 1200 men, under col. Bissel, to protect his rear from insult. On the morning of the 15th, understanding the enemy had made no movement from the shore of Canada, the gen. left the command of the rear column with col. Bissel, the first officer of his grade in the army, and being much indisposed by previous exposition and fatigue, came on to this place. The next day, brig. gen. Macomb arrived with his column, and was ordered to move, the succeeding morning, with about 1500 men, into quarters at Burlington: On the 16th, col. Bissel marched into town with his column, bringing up every straggler, and took quarters here, which had been prepared for him.

On Saturday the 19th, the enemy at Cornwall and the Coteau de Lac, (by the agency of their loyal subjects scattered over this country) learnt that our troops had marched from Chateaugay on the 15th, and had arrived here, ventured to cross the St. Lawrence, with a motley tribe of regulars, provincials, a detachment of the Devil's own—sedentary militia, and their brethren, a band of savages. This martial body amused themselves at the French Mills until 1 o'clock, P. M. and then marched, with 8 pieces of artillery and two cart loads of Congreve rockets. At the fork of the roads, 17 miles from the Mills, a detachment was sent to Malone, and the main body passed on to Chateaugay, where it arrived about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 20th. Here, it is reported, a scene of plunder began, which greatly distressed several of the inhabitants; and every particle of beef, or pork, or flour, with every drop of whiskey which could be found, was seized on as public property, and carried away. By this gleaming, without discrimination between the individual and the public, it is believed that the enemy carried off between 150 and 200 barrels of all sorts of provisions, good and bad, public and private.

Owing to the precaution of the enemy, or the defection of the people in the quarter invaded, the intelligence of this invasion was not known here, before 12 o'clock on Monday the 21st; and it was then reported that the enemy, from 2 to 3000 strong, with 8 pieces of artillery and a body of dragoons and Indians, had encamped the night before near A'Chante, 3 miles east of Chateaugay, on their way to this place. Gen. Wilkinson instantly mount-

ed his horse, ordered the troops under arms, and at 5 o'clock 3000 men marched in 2 columns to meet the foe, under cols. Bissel and Purdy, with 7 pieces of artillery. The general followed half an hour after, and at 9 o'clock P. M. had reached Robertson's (10 miles) with the head of the front column, when he was met by advice that the enemy had commenced their retreat from Chateaugay at 4 o'clock the preceding morning, and had moved off under such sensibilities as to induce them to cut down the bridges which our troops had left for their passage. The detachment was of consequence remanded to their quarters—the enemy being 40 miles ahead of them, and the pursuit of course vain. About 11 o'clock on Monday the 21st, the front of the enemy was met about 11 miles from the Mills, and their rear about 18 miles.

In this innocent enterprise, the poor inhabitants on the roads have been pillaged of their all, and the enemy have lost more than 100 regularly by desertion; 50 have reached this place, and it is reported a large number took the road by Malone to Sacket's Harbor. Thus, without firing a gun, the enemy have gained a loss—and thus may they fare on all their plundering expeditions. Col. Scott, of the 103d regiment, and lieut. col. Morrison, of the 89th, it is said, commanded. If the virtue and enterprise of a single individual, could have wasted the intelligence to this place, on the day the enemy crossed the St. Lawrence, and he had advanced as far as he did, very few of the detachment would have ever got back, unless by exchange.

It is stated by a gentleman who left Malone day before yesterday, that the enemy did not destroy the arsenal at that place.

#### Plattsburgh, Feb. 24.

On Thursday 17th inst. a soldier belonging to the U. S. infantry, when on his way from the French Mills to this post, for some offence, was bruised and mangled in a most savage manner, by ensign Pike, of the 4th regt. He was found by a sergeant, in a languishing situation, in the road, and arrived back to the house of Mr. Loomis, where he lay till next morning and expired. A coroner's inquest was holden on the body. Verdict "wilful murder." Pike has been arrested by order of major-general Wilkinson, and is now confined in the gaol in this place.

#### Chillicothe, Ohio, Feb. 26.

**BRITISH CONSPIRACY.** Early on the morning of the 11th inst. col. Campbell obtained information that the British officers were conspiring with the prisoners at the garrison, for the purpose of forcibly effecting their escape. He immediately ordered 11 of the officers to be put in irons, and took such other measures as would render an attempt to escape ineffectual. It appears that a part of the plan was, that after the prisoners at the garrison had forced the guard, to set fire to the town, and while the citizens would necessarily be engaged in extinguishing it, to rescue the officers, and then all make their escape in the best manner possible.

The prisoners, 17 in number, were confined on the retaliatory principle. We do not know the number of those on parole in the town, who were to have assisted them, and set fire to the town. They have since been sent to Frankfort, Kentucky.

### NEW-YORK: TUESDAY MORNING, MARCH 8.

#### Late News from France.

Yesterday arrived at this port the sch. Criterion, capt. Waerman, from La Teste, which she left the 22d Jan. She brings advices that negotiations for peace between France and the allies were progressing at Mannheim, and were expected to end in a general pacification, with the exception of England. The basis of a treaty had been agreed upon, but not signed by the allies. Holland was declared independent.

#### SUMMARY.

A grand dinner was given yesterday at Tammany Hall to com. Rodgers.

The bill authorising a loan of 25,000,000 of dollars, has passed the house of representatives of the U. S.—Yeas 97, nays 55.

A number of British officers, prisoners of war, who were lately ordered from Burlington, Vt. to Cheshire, Mass. have all, except two, violated their parole of honor and deserted to Canada. It is reported that they have been arrested and confined in Montreal prison.

#### FLOATING BATTERIES.

A bill has passed the U. S. senate, and has had its third reading in the house of representatives, to appropriate half a million of dollars, for the purpose of erecting one or more floating batteries, to be moved by steam, on the plan of Fulton's War-Ship.

The plan which this bill proposes to carry into effect, was said, by Mr. Smith, a representative from this state, (in debate) to be the most perfect thing of the kind ever proposed to any government. The men would be perfectly protected, and the steam-engine, by which it would be impelled, would be entirely out of reach of the enemy. If set on fire by red-hot shot, the fire can be instantly extinguished by water from the engine; and the same engine will keep boarders at a distance, by the facility with which hot water can be ejected on them, in almost any quantity.

#### MILITARY APPOINTMENTS.

Major Snelling, of the 4th regt., has been appointed lieut. col. in the 4th rifle regt.

Major Croghan, who so gallantly defended the fort at Sandusky, has likewise been appointed lieut. col. of the 2d rifle regt.

Anthony Butler, lieut. col. of the 28th regt. infantry, to be col. of the 2d rifle regt.

David Gwynne, capt. in the 19th regt. infantry, to be major in the 2d rifle regt.

William H. Puthuff, capt. in the 26th regt. infantry, to be major in the 2d rifle regt.

William King, major in the 16th regt. infantry, to be col. of the 3d rifle regt.

William S. Hamilton, major in the 10th regt. infantry, to be lieut. col. of the 3d rifle regt.

Talbot Chambers, capt. in the 5th regt. infantry, to be major in the 4th rifle regt.

Walter H. Overton, captain in the 7th regt. infantry, to be major in the 3d rifle regt.

Joseph Selden, capt. in the 2d regt. light dragoons, to be major in the 3d rifle regt.

James Gibson, capt. in the regt. of light artillery, and col. by brevet, to be col. of the 4th rifle regt.

Col. Swift, of the U. S. engineers, is appointed a brigadier-general by brevet.

*From the National Intelligencer of the 4th inst.*

**ARMY AND MILITIA.** From the two letters from the department of war, yesterday laid before the house of representatives by the chairman of the committee of ways and means, it appears that the number of militia actually in service during the year 1813, is estimated to have averaged 30,000 men; and that the aggregate strength of the army (or regular

force) was on the 17th of January last, 38,822; an aggregate liable to daily decrease from the expiration of the term of enlistments, and to increase by recruits. It appears also that the aggregate military force of the United States was in 1813 as follows: In February, 18,945; in June, 27,609; in December, 34,325; and that the average number of volunteers in the service in 1813, was 6,000.

A medical board was convened in this city, by order of the secretary at war, on Saturday last, under the presidency of the inspector-general, col. Nicoll, and composed of the following members, viz. Dr. Tilton, physician and surgeon-general. Drs. Martin and Thomas, hospital surgeons, and Drs. Hays, Watkins, and Mercer, regimental surgeons. Dr. Watkins has been appointed to act as recorder to the board. We understand that the object of convening this board, is a complete organization of the medical staff of the army; that they will take into consideration all matters relating to that department, and devise such regulations as may tend to increase the respectability of the medical staff, and promote the good of the service.

#### MARINE MEMORANDA.

The sch. Superior, with cotton and rice, on her passage from Charleston to this port, was captured, Dec. 21, by the British frigate Loire, a midshipman and 5 men put on board, and ordered for Bermuda; 14 days after was dismasted in a gale, and drifted until Jan. 21, when she drove ashore on Nantucket. The midshipman and men were made prisoners, and conveyed to Boston.

The letter-of-marque schooner Meteor, of this port, on her passage from Nantz with a valuable cargo, was captured, Jan. 7, by the boats of the British frigate Endymion, after a short resistance, in which the chief mate, Mr. John Morris, of this city, was killed, and the cook wounded. She might have made a stout defence, having 30 men on board, and 3 guns, but the small arms were useless from rust!

The large and valuable British ship ———, laden with dry-goods, crates, &c. &c. prize to the privateer Chasseur, of Baltimore, has arrived at Wilmington, N. C.

The British brig ———, from Lisbon bound to London, with a cargo of oranges, has arrived at Fairhaven, prize to the Mars, capt. Ingersoll, of this port.

*An inhuman act.* The sloop Richard, capt. Lester, of New-London, bound home from Havana, was chased by the privateer Brilliant, of New-Providence, and the wind dying away, was pursued in the boats of the enemy. On their getting within gun-shot, the sloop hove to, and the privateersmen ceased firing, until within a few cables' length, when one of them fired a single musket, which killed captain Isaac Tracy, of New-London, on the spot. On boarding, they drove the crew below, excepting one who jumped overboard to save his life, and treated them with great brutality. The one who was overboard, (Wm. Hamilton) was picked up, but was assailed on coming on board by a mulatto, from whom he was rescued by the captain. The Brilliant's crew were almost wholly blacks, and their conduct such as might be expected from a gang of unprincipled banditti.

The British sch. Curlew, laden with fish, oil, lumber, &c. has arrived at Marblehead, prize to the privateer Alfred, of Salem.



